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Abstract 
The 2008 global crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis that follow it, originated, among 
other consequences, a general mistrust in financial institutions. This situation encourages the 
debate on the role of co-operative banks within a fairer society and their social responsibility as 
a key in the economic recovery, namely in the south European countries.   
The co-operative banking sector remains poorly understood and its specific governance 
challenges remain largely unexplored. The research included in this thesis aims to improve 
knowledge of the conduct and performance of the co-operative banks, and its findings should 
support the decision making process by members and management, mainly in terms of 
governance model. Thus, the main objective of this research is to analyse, both theoretically and 
empirically, the governance and financial robustness of co-operative banks, taking as a 
reference the Portuguese agricultural credit co-operatives (CCAM) and their integrated system 
(SICAM). Specifically, the thesis is structured in order to answer the following questions: (1) 
What are the economic bases of co-operative banks?; (2) How does a particular regulatory 
framework affect co-operative banking activity?; (3) What is the impact of the different 
governance mechanisms of co-operative banks on control management?; and (4) What are the 
explanatory factors of Portuguese co-operative bank failures? 
Besides the Introduction (Chapter 1) and the Conclusions (Chapter 6), the answer to these four 
questions is formulated in the chapters 2 to 5. Chapter 2 includes a survey of the economic 
nature of the co-operatives as a specific economic organisation, highlighting the strengths and 
the weaknesses of the governance model of co-operative banking.  Chapter 3 presents a 
literature review of the regulatory framework and some historic data on the Portuguese co-
operative credit system. Chapter 4 is concerned with the governance of co-operative banks, 
paying special attention to the control mechanisms operating within SICAM and assessing its 
effect on CCAM performance by two multinomial logit models. Chapter 5 is concerned with the 
survival of CCAM associated within SICAM, analysing the determinants of CCAM failures, by 
the estimation of a logistic regression analysis and a multiple discriminant analysis. In empirical 
terms, the period under analysis is mainly 1995–2009. 
As recognized in the literature on the topic, the co-operative governance model presents 
deficiencies in controlling agency conflicts, mainly resulting from its co-operative nature, which 
can jeopardize its survival. Operating in network, the CCAM are able to improve the 
effectiveness of CCAM governance mechanisms and, consequently, their performance. The 
results highlight the importance of the supervision role of Central CCAM in the performance of 
its associates. Moreover, the analysis of CCAM failure emphasizes the importance of  
diversifying CCAM income sources and of improving cost efficiency. This result  support 
CCAM lobbying for the removal of product restrictions, in order to achieve better conditions to 
compete with IOF banks, at a time when these banks are reorienting their activities towards 
traditional banking activity, i.e., domestic retail banking, the usual business core of CCAM. 
vii 
Resumo 
A crise global de 2008 e a crise europeia da dívida soberana que se lhe seguiu originaram, entre 
outras consequências, uma desconfiança generalizada nas instituições financeiras. Esta situação 
incita ao debate relativamente ao papel dos bancos cooperativos numa sociedade que se quer mais 
justa e a sua responsabilidade social, enquanto agentes chave para recuperação económica, 
especialmente, nos países do sul da Europa. 
O sector bancário cooperativo permanece pouco compreendido e os desafios que se colocam à sua 
governação permanecem largamente inexplorados. A pesquisa incluída nesta tese visa aprofundar os 
conhecimentos sobre a conduta e desempenho dos bancos cooperativos e as suas descobertas apoiar 
o processo de tomada de decisão de membros e gestores, principalmente, em termos de governação. 
Assim, o principal objectivo deste estudo é analisar, em termos teóricos e empíricos, a governação e 
robustez financeira dos bancos cooperativos, tendo como referência as Caixas de Crédito Agrícola 
Mútuo (CCAM) e o seu sistema integrado (SICAM). Especificamente, a tese está estruturada de 
modo a responder às seguintes questões: (1) Quais as bases económicas dos bancos cooperativos?; 
(2) De que forma o seu enquadramento legal afecta a actividade da banca cooperativa?; (3) Qual o 
impacto dos diferentes mecanismos de governação dos bancos cooperativos no controlo da gestão?; 
e, por fim, (4) Quais os factores explicativos da falência dos bancos cooperativos portugueses? 
Além da Introdução (Capítulo 1) e das Conclusões (Capitulo 6), a resposta a estas quatro questões é 
formulada nos capítulos 2 a 5. O Capitulo 2 inclui uma resenha sobre a natureza económica das 
cooperativas enquanto organização económica específica, salientando as forças e fraquezas do 
modelo de governação da banca cooperativa. O Capitulo 3 apresenta uma revisão da regulamentação 
e alguns dados históricos sobre o sector da banca cooperativa em Portugal. O Capitulo 4 debruça-se 
sobre a governação dos bancos cooperativos, tomando especial atenção aos mecanismos de controlo 
que operam dentro do SICAM e avaliando os seus efeitos sobre a performance das CCAM através de 
dois modelos multinominal logit. O Capitulo 5 examina a sobrevivência das CCAM associadas do 
SICAM, analisando os determinantes do desaparecimento das CCAM, através de um modelo de 
regressão logística e outro de análise discriminante múltipla. Em termos empíricos, o período sob 
análise é, predominantemente, 1995-2009. 
Como reconhecido na literatura sobre o tópico, o modelo de governação cooperativa apresenta 
deficiências no controlo dos conflitos de agência, particularmente devido à sua natureza cooperativa, 
podendo mesmo por em causa a sua sobrevivência. Funcionando em rede, as CCAM foram capazes 
de melhorar a eficácia dos seus mecanismos de governação e, consequentemente, a sua performance. 
Os resultados salientam a importância do papel de supervisão da Caixa Central na performance das 
suas associadas. A análise da falência das CCAM enfatiza a importância da diversificação das suas 
fontes de rendimento e da melhoria da eficiência custo, justificando assim o lobbying desenvolvido 
pelas CCAM no sentido da remoção das restrições à sua oferta de produtos, para melhor competir 
com os restantes bancos numa altura em que estes estão a reorientar as suas actividades para a banca 
tradicional, ou seja, para a banca a retalho doméstica, o negócio central das CCAM.  
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Chapter 1  – Introduction 
 
1.1 - Background and problem statement 
Co-operation, as an economic and business model, was born in England in response to 
the abuses of market power and asymmetric information generated by the Industrial 
Revolution, and subsequently spread to other countries. It is a social movement that 
enjoyed the attention of scholars such as Mill, Cairns, Pareto and Pigou (Hanich, 2005). 
About 150 years later, the economic analysis of co-operatives has vanished from most 
economic textbooks, enjoying relatively little publicity (Shawn, 2007; Cuevas and 
Fischer, 2009). As a governance model, the co-operative has also been neglected by 
policymakers in most European countries (Schoppe, 1996; Groeneveld and Sjauw-
Koen-Fa, 2009).  
However, in the financial sector of some European countries, surprisingly, they are 
among the largest and fastest growing groups. In countries like Germany, Finland or 
Netherlands co-operative banks1
Regarded by many people as an obsolete business model, the recent financial and 
ensuing economic crisis has proved that they are (still) a valid alternative way of doing 
business. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis the dominant banking 
model based on investor-owned firms (IOFs) is being questioned while other models, 
regarded in the past as a lower level, like co-operatives, have weathered the crisis better. 
Worldwide, co-operative banks remain financially sound, because their inherent 
characteristics allow them to persevere and, in some cases, to outperform their peers 
(Birchall and Ketilson, 2009; Ayadi et al., 2010; EACB, 2010). Kodres and Narain 
(2010: 14) highlight the merits of co-operative banks, claiming that “… these banks (co-
 hold more than 40% of individual deposits, in France 
almost 60%, and in the  European Union they have a market share of 20% for deposits, 
176 million clients, approximately 1/3 of Europe’s population and 50 million members 
(Oliver Wyman, 2008; EACB, 2010).  
                                                          
1 In this thesis term “co-operative bank” includes also saving and credit co-operatives and credit unions. 
2 
operative), less reliant on shareholders’ expectations, were generally able to avoid 
many of the mistakes made by larger private sector institutions. Though not always 
considered the most efficient, vibrant, or innovative institutions, in many countries they 
dependably and safely supply the small and medium-sized enterprises and many 
households with their credit needs”.   
The current economic crisis and the mistrust in financial institutions encourage the 
debate on the role of co-operative banks within a fairer society and their responsibility 
as key economic and social players in the challenges of economic development. Their 
historical background and important role in boosting local development give them a key 
role in economic recovery. Moreover, given the present lack of confidence in the 
shareholder model as an overriding paradigm, co-operation can be the foundation of a 
more sustainable, fair and transparent way of doing business.  
The co-operative banking sector remains poorly understood and its specific governance 
challenges remain largely unexplored (Shawn, 2007; Cuevas and Fischer, 2009; Ayadi 
et al., 2010). Also in Portugal, studies regarding governance and survival of non-profit 
institutions and of co-operative banks in particular are almost non-existent. 
The research included in this thesis aims to improve the knowledge of the conduct and 
performance of the co-operative banks, and its findings should support the decision 
making process by members and management, mainly in terms of governance model. 
Good governance is accepted as a vital tool to achieve sustainable growth of 
organisations. Effective governance mechanisms within a company could make 
bankruptcy less likely (Shawn, 2007; Schwizer and Stefanelli, 2009) and failure 
prediction models help to evaluate financial health and to detect financial distress before 
it is too late. 
The research attempts to answer the following questions:  
- What are the economic bases of co-operative banks? 
- How does a particular regulatory framework affect co-operative banking activity? 
- What is the impact of the different governance mechanisms of co-operative banks 
on control management? 
- What are the explanatory factors of Portuguese co-operative bank failures? 
3 
1.2 - Objectives and methodology 
The main objective of the research is to analyse, both theoretically and empirically, the 
governance and financial robustness of co-operative banks. The theoretical part focuses 
on the economic nature of co-operative banks, while the empirical part is concerned 
with the governance structure of co-operative banks, as well as with insolvency (or 
failure), taking as the object of study the Portuguese agricultural credit co-operatives 
(CCAM) and their integrated system (SICAM).  
The achievement of the main goal resolves itself into the following four specific 
objectives or tasks, each one presented in a separate chapter: 
- The survey of the literature (chapter 2) provides the theoretical bases of the 
economic nature of co-operative banks, their strengths and weaknesses, and recent 
trends in governance models. 
- Focusing on the Portuguese agricultural co-operative credit system, the regulatory 
framework is analysed in chapter 3. 
- Using the agency theory approach, the governance structure of the Portuguese 
agricultural credit cooperatives (CCAM) is analysed in chapter 4. 
- Focusing on CCAM, the issue of co-operative banks failure is analysed in chapter 5. 
Methodologically, the option was to present the four topics in separate chapters, while 
bearing in mind the strong connections between them. By this reason the structure of 
each chapter is similar to a scientific paper2
                                                          
2 The chapters were written in order to can be read independently, so some overlap of issues is present. 
, including, where applicable: introduction, 
literature review, empirical analysis, conclusions and references. In empirical terms, the 
period under analysis is mainly 1995–2009. The data are collected from different 
sources. The non-financial data are obtained from “Diário da República”, Ministry of 
Justice website, CCAM Annual Reports, CCAM by-laws and other SICAM official 
statements released during the study period. Additional information on CCAM 
governance is gathered by questionnaire to the CCAM managers. Annual accounting 
reports provide CCAM financial data. Finally, data for the banking system is collected 
from Bank of Portugal and Portuguese Banking Association annual reports and other 
publications.   
4 
1.3 - Outline of the thesis 
In addition to this Introduction (chapter 1), the thesis includes four essays on the 
governance and failure of co-operative banks (chapters 2 to 5) and conclusions (chapter 
6). 
Chapter 2 includes a survey of the economic nature of the co-operatives as a specific 
economic organisation, highlighting the strengths and the weaknesses of the co-
operative banking governance model. A co-operative bank is an organisation 
established to resolve the credit rationing problems emerging from market failures 
(namely, market power and asymmetric information). In this chapter the following 
topics are discussed: (a) the rationale behind co-operative banks, using concepts mainly 
provided by agency, transaction costs economics and property rights theories; (b) the 
particularities of co-operative banks derived from their co-operative nature; (c) the 
governance model of co-operative banks, paying special attention to the network issues. 
This chapter provides the theoretical support for the remaining chapters, namely, for 
chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 presents a literature review of the regulatory framework and some historic 
data on the Portuguese co-operative credit system. The chapter describes: (a) the 
establishment and evolution of the credit cooperative system in Portugal, emphasising 
its importance to the domestic retail banking system and development of rural regions; 
(b) the structure and organization of the system, in particular its legal framework and 
governance model.  
Chapter 4 is concerned with the governance of co-operative banks, paying special 
attention to the control mechanisms operating within SICAM and its effect on CCAM 
performance. The results of two multinomial logit models on the effect of different 
governance control mechanisms on the performance of CCAM show that internal 
control mechanisms are less efficient than external ones in disciplining management. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the survival of CCAM associated within SICAM, analysing 
the determinants of CCAM failures. The estimation of a logistic regression analysis 
(LRA) and a multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) allows the identification of 
“problematic” CCAM and the evaluation of their risk of insolvency as a function of 
5 
financial indicators. These results can be used by the stakeholders as a tool to predict 
bankruptcies with sufficient lead time in order to take appropriate actions.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis. 
Additionally, the author declares that Chapter 2 is solely her own work. Parts of Chapter 
3, 4 and 5 have been published as jointly authored articles with João Rebelo. Of the 
work presented here in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, at least eighty per cent of it is my own 
work. The article based on material presented in Chapter 3 has been presented in the 
2010 ICA European Research Conference at the University of Lyon, France, and is also 
part of a book about the Credit Co-operative System in the European Union countries, 
to be edited by Simeon Karafolas and with publication expected in 2012.The article 
based on material presented in Chapter 4 was first presented in 2005 ICA European 
Research Conference at the University of Cork, Ireland, and a more recent version to the 
2011 ICA Global Research Conference at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The 
article based on material presented in Chapter 5 has been presented in the 3rd 
International Research Conference on the Social Economy of CIRIEC at the University 
of Valladolid, Spain, and is also accepted for publication in the Agricultural Finance 
Review, with publication expected in 2012. 
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Chapter 2 - The Economic Nature of Co-operative Banks 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
The co-operative institutions have often dominated agriculture, housing finance, 
banking and life assurance markets.  It is evident that the interest of analysts, policy 
makers and researchers in the co-operative banking model has increased considerably 
over the last two years (EACB, 2010). The European Association of Co-operative 
Banks attributes this increased attention to the fact that co-operative banks escaped 
relatively unscathed from the 2008 financial and economic crisis thanks to their unique 
characteristics, not least in terms of their corporate governance. This is an encouraging 
development, given that the characteristics and achievements of co-operative banks 
have been largely neglected in studies, publications, the press and various reports. 
This chapter aims to contribute to a better understanding of the co-operative banking 
model, specially, its economic bases. With this goal in mind, this study assesses the 
strengths and weakness of the co-operative model, particularly, of co-operative banks. 
Thus, section 2 presents the definition and main characteristics of the co-operative 
model; section 3 discusses the rationale beyond co-operative banks, particularly, the 
arguments presented by agency, transaction costs economics and property rights 
theories; section 4 discusses the co-operative banks specificity regarding economic 
objective, membership, equity, decision making process, business model and 
operational dimension; and section 5 analyses co-operative banks governance model, its 
strengths and weakness, giving especial attention to the network issues. 
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2.2 - The cooperative model of enterprise 
The nature of a co-operative is often described by its internal statutes or by-laws. 
National laws on co-operatives also exist, providing the general principles of operation 
and the protection of members and third parties from the activities of these institutions 
(Ayadi et al., 2010). 
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) defines co-operative as “An autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and 
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled 
enterprise” (ICA, 2007). 
Traditionally, co-operatives are guided by seven principles: (a) voluntary and open 
membership; (b) democratic member control; (c) member economic participation; (d) 
autonomy and independence; (e) education, training and information; (f) co-operation 
among co-operatives; and (g) concern for community. The first four are core principles 
without which a co-operative would lose its identity; they guarantee the conditions 
under which members own, control and benefit (use) from the business. The education 
principle is a commitment to make membership effective and so is a precondition for 
democratic control, while co-operation among co-operatives is really a business strategy 
without which co-operatives remain economically vulnerable. The last principle, 
concern for community, recognises that, unlike investors, co-operative members tend 
also to be members of a particular community (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009). 
The traditional co-operative is an user-owned and user-controlled business that 
distributes benefits on the basis of use3
Membership is co-operatives’ distinctive attribute and the source of its general 
advantages. When the purposes of the business are aligned with those of members who 
are both investors and consumers of the cooperative, the results are loyalty, 
 (Barton, 1989). Its goal is to provide benefits to 
members, which has impact on business decisions. As a result, is an organization by and 
for the members’. Co-operative members take part in operations in three ways: (a) 
participation in ownership; (b) participation in control; and (c) participation in surpluses 
based on usage.  
                                                          
3 Fonteyne (2007) says that co-operatives incorporate their profits into their products.  
9 
commitment, shared knowledge, and member participation, underpinned by strong 
economic incentives. These are the kinds of values that any business organisation would 
want but that investor-owned business can only achieve by mimicking the idea of 
membership. The general disadvantages are the opposite of the advantages; when the 
purposes of the business are not aligned with those of the members, apathy or cynicism 
result, members lose interest and cease to participate. This leads to management 
pursuing their own interests, and to complacency and a reinforcement of oligarchic 
tendencies among the board (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009). 
The main features of co-operatives are: (a) free association (of qualifying persons) and 
withdrawal, resulting in a variable co-operative capital base; (b) the non-transferability 
of membership, implying the absence of a market for member shares; (c) a democratic 
structure usually giving each member one vote regardless of his investment; (d) profit 
distribution that is often restricted and is not necessarily proportional to members’ 
shareholdings; (e) ownership rights that are in effect limited to the nominal co-operative 
capital represented by member shares (and therefore do not extend to the reserves and 
the total economic value of the co-operative); and (f) the pursuit of specific member 
interests rather than profit maximization (Fonteyne, 2007). 
Several categories of co-operatives exist, depending on their purpose and the nature of 
their members (producer co-operatives, consumer co-operatives, worker co-operatives, 
and so on). Financial sector co-operatives are usually inserted in the category of 
consumer co-operatives (Fonteyne, 2007). 
 
2.3 - The rationale of co-operative banks 
Literature considers the co-operative banking model as particularly suited to the 
provision of financial services, partly due to co-operative banks ability to address more 
efficiently any inherent agency problems (Ayadi et al., 2010). Kay (1991) suggests that 
the special value of mutuality rests on its capacity to establish and sustain relationship 
contract structures. Thus, they have a comparative advantage in establishing trust (Kay, 
2006) which is particularly important in the presence of asymmetric information 
between the supplier of financial services and the customer, and consequently in longer-
term contracts. 
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Private banks (investor-owned firms (IOFs) and profit maximizing) are one of the most 
ancient forms of capitalistic organization, existing well before the Industrial Revolution, 
when other organizational forms, like co-operative banks, emerged mainly due to 
specific market failures (namely, market power and asymmetric information). Co-
operative banks appear as the “natural solution” to the problem of adverse selection 
(credit rationing) providing access to financial services for agents (as micro and small 
enterprises (SMEs), poor individuals, small farmers) otherwise rationed out by an IOF 
banking system (Cuevas and Fisher, 2006).  
Classical and neoclassical schools of thought explain the existence of co-operatives as 
the consequence of immature market developments or market developments in a non-
productive direction. Co-operatives are not described as a business enterprise per se, 
being the emergence of co-operatives understood in the context of social reform 
(Hanish, 2005).  
On the other hand, the New Institutional Economics currents argue that ownership 
structures and organizational forms are an endogenous result of rational choices made 
by agents facing market failures (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006). Thus, co-operative banks 
distinctive features justify their specific role. Cuevas and Fischer (2006) refer three 
different and complementary approaches, based on the theories of agency, transaction 
costs economics and property rights, in order to understand how institutional features 
may deal more effectively with market failures. A brief review of these theories can 
help to a better understanding of co-operative banks existence as economic 
organizations different of IOFs. 
 
2.3.1 - Agency theory 
Agency theory suggests that the firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts (loosely 
defined) between resource holders. This approach attempts to describe the relationship 
between the principal (who delegates work) and the agent (who performs that work) 
using a metaphor of a contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The authors argue that 
under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty, which characterize most 
business settings, two agency problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal cannot ascertain if the 
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agent accurately represents his ability to do the work for which he is being paid. Moral 
hazard is the condition under which the principal cannot be sure if the agent has put 
forth maximal effort.  Moreover, the problem of risk sharing is also present, when the 
principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk (Eisenhardt, 1989).  An 
overview of agency theory is given in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 - Agency theory overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization 
of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion  
Organizational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among stakeholders 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problem Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle blowing, 
vertical integration, transfer pricing)  
Source: Eisenhardt (1989) 
The agency theory approach assumes that the existence of asymmetric information 
between lenders and borrowers is a key issue for evaluating how agency problems may 
be tackled and sorted out by banking contracts (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009). The 
literature suggests that a co-operative bank experiments lower agency costs due to a 
peer-monitoring 4
                                                          
4 Specific monitoring or controlling activity performed by members-clients-employees on the possible opportunistic 
behaviour of other operators and customers. 
 mechanism, which reduces asymmetric information on the part of 
customer-members (Stiglitz, 1990). Boscia and Di Salvo (2009) refer that co-operative 
banks mutuality characteristic may lead to a greater loyalty of customers to “their bank” 
and it can result in lower agency and delegating costs between banks and their 
members. Members have more motivation to control and monitor the management of 
co-operative banks, by reducing the opportunistic behaviour of managers, and by 
acquiring more accessible information on their activity and by peer-monitoring 
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mechanisms. Moreover, the cost of screening and monitoring customer-members is 
lower in a co-operative bank, because information is more easily accessible, and soft 
information5
In the same way, co-operative banks mutuality characteristic can curb opportunistic 
behaviour by managers, since it is not their goal to maximize profits through the 
exploitation of information asymmetries (Kane and Hendershott, 1996; Fonteyne, 
2007).  
 about the borrower is normally coupled with hard information, enhancing 
the quality and scope of the data available. Peer-monitoring also acts as a form of 
contract enforcement, since the risk of social and moral sanctions within the co-
operative bank’s community can also be considered a strong incentive to reduce free-
riding or even fraudulent behaviors. Thus, co-operative banks may be endowed with 
greater social interaction and mutual trust between bank loan officers and its customers, 
which can be translated in lower monitoring costs for the bank and better credit terms 
for its customers. The proper knowledge of the customer’s economic and financial 
situation and of the quality of its investment projects usually implies the acquisition of 
soft information and the use of relationship-lending technology. Therefore, the bank’s 
loan officer assumes a key role as repository of the soft information collected by the 
bank about their customers and the local environment. Performing this task involves a 
trade-off between the loan officer autonomy regarding lending decisions and the 
minimization of agency costs. The few hierarchical levels and local nature of co-
operative banks can give them an advantage in managing this trade-off (Boscia and Di 
Salvo, 2009).  
Moreover, Bunger (2009) indicates that co-operative ownership structures resolve some 
of the principal-agent risk sharing problems that typically emerge in IOFs. Effectively, 
in IOF banks is usual that the principal (stockholders) searches for high short run 
investments based on high risk behaviour and on a diversified portfolio of financial 
assets, allowing them to play with the substitution effect between financial assets. For 
managers, bankruptcy has higher costs (e.g. losing job, income, reputation, and in some 
case, perks), so, they may have much lower risk appetites. This discrepancy between 
principal and agent, partially resolved by compensation packages, is not present in co-
                                                          
5 Private, unstructured information. 
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operatives, since the member-customers are the principal, they do not search to 
maximize the return of investments assuming therefore less risky behaviours.  
 
2.3.2 - Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
TCE studies how trading partners protect themselves from the hazards associated with 
exchange relationships. In a complex world, contracts are typically incomplete, thus 
parties who invest in relationship-specific assets expose themselves to potential 
opportunistic behaviour problems, i.e., a participant in a transaction can renege on the 
contract or can take advantage of the asymmetric dependency or asymmetric 
information and try to renegotiate and appropriate quasi-rents from its partner 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1995; Klein et al., 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990). The transaction costs are the costs incurred in doing an economic 
exchange, especially, the costs associated with designing, signing and enforcing 
contracts, and are broadly break down into motivation and coordination costs (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). Motivation costs are mainly caused by opportunism, and refer to 
the costs of motivating specialized agents to align their interests, such as: cost of 
cheating or opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975, 1985); agency cost among 
owners, managers, and debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Coordination costs 
are mainly caused by bounded rationality, and refer to the costs of coordinating the 
actions between specialized agents, such as: cost of obtaining information (Stigler, 
1961); cost of coordinating input in production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and 
measurement costs (Barzel, 1982). The basic assumption of TCE is that decision makers 
will choose whichever governance structure6
                                                          
6 Williamson (1996) defined a governance structure as an “institutional framework in which the integrity of a 
transaction or related set of transactions is decided” (Williamson, 1996:11). Governance thus consists of formal and 
informal structures and rules that enable carrying out economic transactions in an economic manner (Wieland, 2005). 
TCE maintains that hierarchies and markets are alternative governance structures to organizing economic activity 
(Arrow, 1974) and that firms need to align governance structure and transaction characteristics (Williamson 1985; 
Silverman et al., 1997). 
 minimizes the total cost associated with a 
transaction (Coase, 1937), as expressed in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 - Transaction cost economics model 
Transaction characteristics: 
- Asset specificity 
- Uncertainty 
- Frequency 
Transaction costs:  
- Motivation costs 
- Coordination costs 
Governance structure:  
- Market 
- Hierarchy 
- Hybrid  
 
By virtue of their local ethos and proximity to their member-customers, co-operative 
banks have traditionally engaged in relationship banking and hence facilitated access to 
finance to SMEs, craftsmen, farmers, etc., i.e. those who commonly have difficulties to 
access for loans of traditional banks (De Bruyn and Ferri, 2005). The proximity of the 
firm and the peculiar nature of the customer relationship give the co-operative bank 
some transaction-cost-specific advantages which may foster the placement of lending 
contracts at small enterprises (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009).  
Transaction costs advantage was especially important at the beginning of the activity of 
any financial institution, no co-operative banks exception. The supply of an efficient 
and sustainable financial service to rural populations implies the accomplishment of a 
range of conditions related with the customers, difficult to achieve for banks in the 
initial years. It was complex to set up healthy financial relationships, mainly because it 
was costly to gather “informational capital” about the clients. Co-operatives have two 
competitive advantages: their clients are their members, so the costs of gathering 
“informational capital” are lower and, furthermore, because all co-operative members’ 
solidarily respond to the co-operative losses, they actively monitor themselves. 
Moreover, the social and informal network of members or potential members is also 
relevant as a determining factor in decreasing transaction costs and in the process of 
establishing and running the activity of a co-operative (Guinnane, 2001; Cabo et al., 
2006). Fonteyne (2007) also emphasises the informational advantages of co-operatives, 
particularly evident in small credit unions, since the common bond of a credit union 
provides information about consumers, and a smaller breadth of socio-economic 
backgrounds to accommodate with products and rates. Plus, since owners are also 
customers, co-operatives can better identify their customers’ desires.  
However, the advantage of co-operative bank’s information supremacy has significantly 
decreased over recent decades. Credit rating services have evolved dramatically and 
now commercial banks and co-operatives hold similar insight into the credit-worthiness 
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of borrowers. To further mitigate this advantage, the distance between managers and 
members tends to increases over the life of the co-operative (Fonteyne, 2007), because 
as the bank growth and expands their activity (geographically and range of products 
offered) customers exert less control over managers, and managers know less about 
their customers.  
 
2.3.3 - Property rights theory 
Property rights are defined as a socially and legally enforced right to select uses of an 
economic good, giving the owners the right to claim the residual returns of the firm and 
participate in the decision making process. Legal constraints regarding the assets’ use or 
the assignment of rights to others through contracts prevent the owner from exercising 
all the rights associated with ownership of an asset.  
Property rights theory has common intellectual antecedents with TCE and agency 
theory.  Accordingly, Williamson’s (1985: 24) “cognitive map of contract” places each 
of these theories in the efficiency branch of organizational economics (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 - Cognitive map of contract 
 
Source: Williamson (1985) 
The starting point of the property rights theory is, like in TCE, the impossibility to write 
enforceable comprehensive contracts (Hart and Moore, 1999). Relationship-specific 
investments create the opportunity for hold up, that is, for ex-post appropriation of 
Monopoly 
Efficiency 
Incentives 
Transaction 
Costs 
Measurement 
Property Rights 
Agency 
Governance 
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revenues by the non-investing contract participant. The anticipation of possible hold-up 
may lead to under-investment in the economic relationship (Bijman, 2002). Grossman 
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) define a firm as a collection of 
non-human assets under common ownership, where ownership means holding residual 
rights of control, that is, the right to control the uses of assets under contingencies that 
are not specified in the contract. The allocation of residual rights of control affects the 
behaviour and resource allocation. For example, agents will be less inclined to invest in 
specific assets if they do not own these and relevant complementary assets. Owning an 
asset is important if one undertakes a non-contractible investment which is specific to 
the asset; if one does not own the asset, one is subject to the hold-up threat by the 
owner.  
The property rights theory argues that the authority to make such decisions ultimately 
rests with the owner(s) of the firm (Hart and Moore, 1990). Ownership of assets leads to 
efficient decisions, since the owner holds the residual control rights and receives the 
residual returns, and thus, he bears the full financial impact of his choices. 
The degree of separation between owners and managers, and the uniformity of interests 
and values among shareholders or members, are two components relevant for assessing 
the viability and efficiency of different property right models. 
Table 2.2 provides the general distinctions among the three theoretical perspectives of 
the firm: the agency theory, TCE and property rights theory taking into account the unit 
of analysis, focal dimension and cost concern, contractual focus, theoretical orientation, 
strategic intent, and sources of market frictions. 
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Table 2.2 - Comparison of organization economics theories 
 Agency theory TCE Property rights theory 
Unit of analysis 
Focal dimension 
 
Focal cost concern 
Principal–agent contract 
Incentives 
 
Residual loss 
Transaction 
Various types of asset 
specificity 
Unsuitability 
Holdup problems 
Institution 
Property rights 
 
Externalities 
Rent-seeking 
Contractual focus Ex ante incentive 
alignment. 
Monitoring mechanisms 
Choice of (ex post) 
governance mechanism 
Ex ante property rights 
allocation and ex post 
distributional conflicts 
Theoretical orientation Constrained optimization Comparative assessment Comparative assessment 
Strategic intent Shareholder perspective Shareholder perspective Stakeholder perspective 
Sources of market 
frictions 
Information asymmetry, 
unobservability, risk 
aversion (by agents) 
Bounded rationality,  
uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, opportunism, 
and asset specificity 
Externalities, unclearly 
defined and difficult to 
enforce property rights 
(Weak appropriability), 
vested interests 
Source: Kim and Mahoney (2005) 
The literature on property rights agrees on the hypothesis that the separation between 
owners and managers in a co-operative is rather severe, resulting of its wide and 
fragmented dispersed ownership, and the consequent difficulty of an efficient allocation 
of property rights. A high degree of separation between ownership and management 
may actually foster divergence of objectives among different stakeholders of a co-
operative firm, reducing its efficiency (Hart and Moore, 1998) and bring about expense-
preference behaviours by their managers. However, compared with private IOF banks, a 
co-operative bank may present lower agency costs consequence of its more efficient 
internal decision making process, as the chain of decisions is usually shorter, reducing 
the separation between ownership and management. This separation may also be 
reduced by appointing only members as managers and fostering members’ participation 
at the annual general assembly and other social events. Besides, the admission of new 
members is usually conditioned to the preservation of the common bonding, co-
operative principles and values (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009). 
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2.4 - Co-operative banks specificity  
In their long history dating back to the nineteenth century, co-operative banks have long 
been an integral, successful, and well-established part of the financial system in many 
countries. The essence of co-operative banking is quite simple: members, who include 
both savers and borrowers, use the co-operative to recycle money from those who have 
it to those who need it, without anybody outside taking a profit and with interest rates 
set so that the system works in everyone’s interest (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009). Co-
operative banks present several distinctive characteristics from IOFs, some deriving 
from their co-operative nature and others from their business approach, with reflex in 
the economic objective, membership, equity, decision making process, business model 
and operational dimension. 
 
2.4.1 - Economic objective 
Co-operative banks are non-profit institutions. Their main objective is to promote the 
well-being of their members – mutuality. In this perspective, Ayadi et al. (2010) defines 
co-operative banks as Stakeholder Value banks, given that maximizing profits and the 
rate of return on capital are not their dominant business objectives, contrary to the 
typical IOF bank, classified as Shareholder Value bank. However, if profit is not a goal 
in itself, as with all banks (irrespective of their capital structure), co-operative banks do 
need to earn a minimum rate of return on assets in order to safeguard their continuity, to 
finance growth and credit, and to provide a buffer for inclement times (Groeneveld and 
de Vries, 2009; Ayadi et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, co-operative banks’ purpose inhibits managers’ incentives to the 
exploitation of information asymmetries. This is particularly crucial in the 21st century, 
given the breadth and complexities of financial products; when all banks hold great 
advantages over their clients due to a greater understanding of products. This, together 
with “lock-in” from long-term contracts, is often exploited by IOF banks. The 
consumer-owned structure of co-operative banks does not encourage this behaviour and 
allows for greater client bank trust. Moreover, in their efforts to maximize consumer 
welfare, managers might provide financial products at below profit maximizing rates, 
19 
extend their services into rural areas that may be unprofitable, or donate money and 
efforts to their community (Fonteyne, 2007). 
Finally, being non-profit firms, co-operatives usually imposes limitations on the 
distribution of profits, transferring alternatively the net benefit to the equity and 
following a riskless strategy of capitalization (Cihak and Hesse, 2007; Boscia and Di 
Salvo, 2009). In this way, Oliver Wyman (2008) refers that co-operatives currently 
represent a relatively safe haven for investors, working to more risk-averse, longer time 
horizon investment objectives than shareholder driven institutions. The relevant 
property rights literature (see Fama and Jensen, 1983) also supports the idea that co-
operative banks are more likely to be characterised by relatively low risk business 
structures.  The main reason for co-operative banks to present less risky behaviour is 
related with the fact that: (a) they are not under maximise short run profits, being more 
inclined to adopt a longer-term horizon in their business decisions and lending policies 
(Oliver Wyman, 2008); (b) co-operative banks “shares” are not tradable, so the financial 
assets substitution effect problem does not arise and members present less risk 
behaviour (Drake and Llewellyn, 2001); (c) co-operative banks strong local presence 
and the proximity allows them to have a better understanding of the needs and the risk 
profiles of their customers and essentially to mitigate acute asymmetric information 
(Oliver Wyman, 2008); (d) the absence of traditional banks agency problems resulting 
from the potential conflict between the owners (equity shareholders) and 
depositors/customers7
 
, as owners and customers (and depositors) are largely one and the 
same (Ayadi et al., 2010).  
2.4.2 - Members 
Co-operative banks as a collective vertical integration structure are owned by the 
members who are also customers8
                                                          
7 For example, equity shareholders may prefer a higher risk profile for the institution than would depositors due to the 
former’s limited liability. This implies that shareholders can benefit from potentially significant “upside gains” while 
being exposed to only limited downside potential. In opposite, depositors do not share this upside potential and would 
implicitly be subject to greater risk given the limited scope of deposit insurance. 
 and, in most cases, ownership is at local or regional 
level. Oliver Wyman (2008) refers that the member ownership concept, central to the 
8 Although a co-operative bank may have customers who are not members, a key feature of co-operatives is that, in 
general, there is no formal separation of owner-customers and non-owner-customers. 
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co-operative model, is also an unique aspect that is hard to replicate outside co-
operative structures. Vital to the establishment of earlier co-operative banks, it remains 
today’s common defining feature and source of differentiation from IOF competitors.  
Collective ownership means that income rights and decision-rights are not assigned to 
any member individually, but are held by all members together. Both collective income 
rights and collective decision rights may lead to inefficiencies. For instance, collective 
ownership may be disadvantageous for the co-operative in attracting long term equity 
capital, for risky investments, such as in marketing and innovation (Bijman, 2002).  
Moreover, as ownership stakes (member’s capital “shares”) in co-operative banks are 
not tradable in an open market, it is virtually impossible for hostile bids for ownership 
to take place. Members cannot sell their ownership stakes in an open secondary market 
(although in some cases they can sell them back to the bank). Exit is however possible 
through the redeemability of members’ shares. In other cases, members may trade 
membership certificates in a closed market available only to members. Because of this 
and of the usual absence of a stock exchange listing, there is no market in corporate 
control since it is virtually impossible for hostile bids for ownership to take place: a co-
operative bank cannot be bought by new owners, which makes its ownership structure 
effectively impossible to be subject to a hostile take-over (Oliver Wyman, 2008). 
Cook (1995) refers that most co-operatives have no or limited options for trading 
property rights, originating that the property rights in co-operatives are ill defined and 
non-tradable, which may lead to inefficient decisions9
                                                          
9 Ownership of assets leads to efficient decisions about using these assets. However, if property rights are not well 
defined, not tradable or not well protected, inefficient choices may be made (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 294). “If no 
one clearly owns a valuable asset, then no one has an incentive to guard its value properly. If property rights are not 
tradable, then there is little hope that assets will end up with those people who can make the best use of them and 
therefore value them most. If property rights are not secure, then owners will not invest great amounts, in assets that 
they may lose with no compensation, or they may sink valuable resources into protecting their claims.”  Property 
rights that are ill defined, badly enforceable and non-tradable will lead to inefficient decisions, because decision 
maker no longer bears the full impact of his choices.  
 and resulting in five “vaguely 
defined property rights” problems: Free Rider Problem, Horizon Problem, Portfolio 
Problem, Control Problem, and Influence Costs Problem. The Free Rider Problem 
results when gains from cooperative action can be accessed by individuals that did not 
fully invest in developing the gains, whether those individuals are new(er) members or 
non-members. The Horizon Problem results from residual claims that do not extend as 
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far as the economic life of the underlying asset. Like the Horizon Problem, the Portfolio 
Problem stems from the tied nature of the equity in the cooperative; the organization’s 
investment portfolio may not reflect the interests or risk attitudes of any given 
investor/member, although members cannot withdraw and reallocate their investments. 
The Control Problem is similar in nature to the shareholder-manager problem in IOFs, 
but is compounded by the lack of external competitive market pressures (e.g., stock 
markets and the market for corporate control) that help discipline managers in IOFs. 
Influence Costs are incumbent to all organizations where decisions affect wealth 
distribution among members. These costs are greater if there is a wider variety of 
interests among group members and when the potential gains are greater. 
 
2.4.3 - Equity 
Co-operative banks have only limited access to external capital (equity) independent of 
their members, thus they have no (or very limited) externally-held risk capital. 
Therefore, co-operative banks usually retain profits to ensure the “organic growth” of 
their equity. Without accessing to publicly raised capital, co-operative banks may find 
supplying extraordinary demands for capital restricted or more costly than IOF banks. It 
is not so easy to increase rapidly the number of their members or raise members’ 
shareholdings, especially when they offer low returns on investments, resulting of the 
statutory limitations on profit distribution (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009). 
The net economic value co-operatives capital (i.e. total assets net of debts and the 
nominal value of members’ shares, which, in accounting terms, partially appears in the 
books as reserves), provides an intergenerational endowment without final owners 
(Fonteyne, 2007). Indeed, it is not owned by the current cohort of members, but rather 
by the co-operative itself. As underlined by Fonteyne (2007), the net economic value is 
essentially an owner-less intergenerational endowment, available for use by current 
members, under the implicit or explicit understanding that they will grow it further and 
pass it on to the next generation of members. Thus, the co-operative bank managers are 
custodians of an intergenerational transfer, which could create governance issues and 
the potential for opportunistic behaviour of managers. Nonetheless, the 
intergenerational endowment gives to the co-operatives a significant advantage over 
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IOF banks in the cost of capital, since co-operatives do not remunerate owners on 
earnings of the intergenerational endowment. 
Moreover, co-operatives tend to pay-out less on equity than IOF firms. Members 
usually purchase the minimum required shares acting as a membership fee, with many 
members not viewing the shares as a profitable investment, despite the low cost of 
capital can be transferred by managers to members in the form of lower lending rates 
and higher interest on deposits (Fonteyne, 2007).  
 
2.4.4 - Decision making process 
Regardless the level of participation on equity the cooperative bank members have an 
important role on the governance structure, although the precise arrangements vary 
considerably between them. Governance arrangements are based on the democratic 
principle “one member one vote”, with no possibility of unbundling voting and 
membership. 
Boscia and Di Salvo (2009) refer that co-operative members’ “sense of belonging” can 
result in lower agency and delegating costs between co-operatives and members, and is 
reinforced by the “one member one vote” rule.  However, this also can lead to possible 
agency problems between owners and management, mainly linked to free riding 
behaviours, with small share members having few incentives to control managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Sp∅gard, 1994; Nilsson, 2001; Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009).  
Otherwise, democratic governance may require longer decision-making processes, 
which can hamper the co-operative in its competition with an IOF, particularly if the 
heterogeneity among members implies more time and human resources in the decision 
making process (Bijman, 2002) and resulting in inflexibility, inertia, and reluctance to 
start new business activities (Reynolds, 1997; Hendrikse, 1998; van Bekkum, 2001; 
Borgen, 2004).  
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2.4.5 - Business model 
Co-operative banks’ business model is conditioned by the structure of property rights 
and governance, but also by their limited operational size and territorial area. 
Consequently, co-operative banks usually operate in retail banking and in a context of 
proximity with their membership base and local territory. Indeed, co-operative banks 
have a common vocation towards banking relationships with SMEs and households, 
which is fostered by close proximity with customers as a result of the co-operative 
ethos. This is the adequate environment for a strong and loyal customer base. Moreover, 
this relationship based conduct is supported by an extensive branch networking (in 
some cases even disproportionate to their size) which, along with their loyal customers, 
helps co-operatives retain deposits during a long time. Unlike IOF banks who often find 
it quite difficult to move, since they are unable to retain many customers, forcing them 
to essentially start from scratch (Fonteyne, 2007). 
According to Boscia and Di Salvo (2009), geographical proximity allows local co-
operative banks to have higher level (more and better quality) of information about the 
socio-economic characteristics of their actual and potential customers and target market. 
Thus, efficiently reducing and managing information asymmetries on customers’ risk 
profiles, and consequently helping “proximity” banks to screen (so avoiding adverse 
selection), to monitor (so avoiding moral hazard) and also to manage insolvency (so 
avoiding bankruptcy, since the bank is able to investigate the overall wealth and income 
capacity of the debtor). The proximity allows banks to serve specific segments of the 
market lending about which only meagre and low-quality information is usually 
available and is, consequently, not served by large banks, which are unable to capture 
that information. Since proximity banks know their customers well, they are able to 
finance them even when they are in financial troubles, thereby creating and developing 
a stronger, durable, and closer financial relationship with their clients. This advantage 
is, generally, enhanced by the continuity and the proximity of loyal staff, who enforces 
information efficiency and strengthens customer relationships. Co-operative bank 
employees often spend their entire careers in a small and well defined market, knowing 
their customers’ economic and financial characteristics, behaviour and personality 
(Borroni, 1996). Also, the employees tend to be from similar backgrounds as their 
customers, enhancing the relationship with the co-operative bank users (Becht et al., 
2003; Juvin, 2005). 
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Small dimension and proximity are important for local community, since social 
sanctions are applied when the opportunistic behaviour of a borrower compromises the 
wealth of local co-operative banks (Pagano and Panunzi, 1998). This is however a 
double-edged sword, since it can lead to a possibly abnormal involvement of banks in 
the socio-economic conditions of their local communities, leading co-operative banks to 
finance customers and projects without considering the minimum requirement for the 
profitability of each investment or be influenced by political considerations or 
prominent persons in the management of loan decisions (Piot, 1997).  
Fonteyne (2007) emphasizes that co-operative banks’ strictly defined target market 
(some credit unions are legally bound to their constituency) and their reliance on retail-
based income makes them unable to raise capital as quickly as commercial banks which 
have much more freedom in the pursuit of depositors. Co-operatives are unable to move 
to another region or other business activities when the respective branch or sector of 
activity is in crisis (Shawn, 2007). 
 
2.4.6 - Operational dimension 
Co-operative banks are of small and medium size, geographically limited to a restricted 
geographic area. The small (limited) size implies a simple and less bureaucratized 
hierarchic structure, characterized by flexibility in the decision making process and 
especially tailored to local customers and lower costs of internal delegation, when 
compared with classical commercial banks (Cerasi and Daltung, 1996). However, the 
flexibility and the low level of bureaucratization of bank decisions, which initially are 
competitive advantages, may become disadvantages when they allow loan decisions to 
become too “informal” and based on “personal” factors (Nakamua, 1994), i.e., irrational 
economic decisions.  
Co-operative bank limited size has also negative implications in terms of internal 
operational efficiency 10
                                                          
10 As part of a network with an integrated structure, small and medium co-operative banks can minor these limitations 
as we will see in section 2.5.2.  
, inhibiting the exploitation of scale and scope economies 
entailing a heavier operative-cost structure and limiting its ability to recruit highly 
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qualified management and train their staff, reducing its ability to react to trends in the 
financial markets (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009). 
Furthermore, small co-operative banks’ investment activity is concentrated in restrict 
local markets, being their loan portfolios less diversified and, consequently, they have 
higher risk concentration11
 
. Moreover, a small size potentially limits the effectiveness 
and the efficiency of investments which require a minimum portfolio size and may lead 
to a lower investment capacity in technology and in branch networks, which may also 
represent a market disadvantage, since small co-operative banks offering a low 
diversification range of products and services are less competitive than the larger banks 
able to offer a wider and more sophisticated array of products and services. 
 2.5 - Corporate Governance 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines 
corporate governance (CG) as “a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. CG also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good CG 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring” (OECD, 2004:11). But, CG goes beyond the simple valuing of the 
decision making process and how the strategic decisions are adopted and monitored, 
implying that the economic, financial and social role of the institutions also need be 
considered (Tormo and Vañó, 2008).   
The CG 12
                                                          
11  Co-operatives typically have a small and homogenous pool of depositors which leaves them vulnerable to 
volatilities in their specific market. Rather than having their risk hedged by a heterogeneous customer population, like 
larger commercial banks, co-operatives are subject to the full force of swings in their individual market. However, 
these volatilities can be limited by branch networking and financial markets through such derivative products as 
credit default swaps (Fonteyne, 2007). 
 has been focused on the separation between property and control of the 
company, namely in agency relationship problems resulting from the owners delegation 
12 For a survey on CG see Shleifer and Vishny (1997); La Porta et al. (1999); OECD (2003). 
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of the firm’s management in the directors. But the problem of governance is not limited 
to the scope of owners and managers. The organizations interact with a multiplicity of 
economic and social agents who depend on the success of the company (client-users, 
suppliers, public administrations, supervisors or community). From the stakeholders 
perspective CG refers to the mechanisms of participation and representation of the 
different agents, in order to reach a balance among them, avoiding conflict of interests, 
fomenting the transparency and facilitating joint control, thus giving trust and stability 
to the institution (Tormo and Vañó, 2008). 
 
2.5.1 - The corporate governance model of co-operative banks 
The governance model of co-operative banks can be approached at from both the 
theoretical and the regulatory sides13
Banks, as other complex organizations, systematically suffer from agency conflicts 
between owners and managers (e.g. managerial conservation and entrenchment). Since, 
the existence of banks depends on the asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers, causing also depositors/bank-owners agency conflict. The bank, as an 
organization or auctioneer that substitutes the direct change of money, is useful and 
welfare is enhanced if the costs of additional conflicts that it causes are lower than the 
costs of the original (lender-borrower) relationship.  
. When compared with that of IOF banks, the co-
operative model has a few distinct weak points, mainly correlated with the institutional 
asset (Schwizer and Stefanelli, 2009). 
The key feature of co-operative banks is that the distinction between lender and 
borrower is more blurred. The depositors/shareholders and members/borrowers often 
overlap, thus dampening some conflicts of interests (Coco and Ferri, 2010). Fischer and 
Mahfoudhi (2002) support this moral hazard argument, considering that under 
conditions of information asymmetry, debtholders and depositors (the principals), 
trusting their savings to an IOF bank, are subject to moral hazard exercised by 
shareholders (the agents) that manage those funds. This happens because the 
shareholders of banks will be encouraged to assume risk (in on- and off-balance sheet 
                                                          
13 In this thesis see chapter 3 and 4 for CCAM. 
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positions) that can result in a transfer of wealth from the debtors and depositors to them. 
The mutual characteristics of co-operative banks tend to prevent the conflict between 
shareholders and depositors.  
Moreover, in an agency-theoretic framework, managers are usually considered risk 
averse and encouraged to hold assets that will ensure the safety of the institution they 
manage. The severity of this effect is a function of the entrenchment of managers. In 
fact, managers are perceived as conservative decision makers that seek to preserve their 
employment through low risk investment decisions (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992) or by 
a choice of financing (Blazenko, 1987; Berger et al., 1997) that reduces the risk of 
equity, an incentive that stands in clear contradiction with IOF shareholders’ interests. 
This implies that when control (under management) and ownership (by shareholders) 
are separated, banks tend to be less risk assumers. In co-operative banks, once the 
member-customers (principal) do not wish to maximize profits, they show much lower 
risk appetites and share the risk aversion with managers (Staatz, 1987; Fischer and 
Mahfoudhi, 2002; Bunger, 2009; Coco and Ferri, 2010). 
Ayadi et al. (2010) summarize four issues favouring co-operative banks ability to deal 
with agency problems: (a) co-operative members’ claims in co-operative banks are, in 
principle, redeemable on demand, as stated by Fama and Jensen (1983:318) “the 
decision of the claim holder to withdraw resources is a form of partial take-over or 
liquidation which deprives management of control over assets. This control right can be 
exercised independently by each claim holder. It does not require a proxy fight, a tender 
offer, or any other concerted take-over bid. In contrast, customer decisions in open non-
financial corporations and the repricing of the corporation’s securities in the capital 
market provide signals about the performance of its decision agents. Without further 
action, however, either internal or from the market for take-overs, the judgment of 
customers and of the capital market leave the assets of the open non-financial 
corporation under the control of the managers”; (b) in co-operative banks, owners can 
exercise the easy and costless option of exit, which represents a powerful discipline 
mechanism and a direct threat to managers, since when a depositor withdraws funds, the 
capacity of the co-operative bank is immediately reduced, whereas the sale of an equity 
stake in an IOF bank does not remove assets from the control of the banks management 
neither immediately influence the capacity of the firm though the share price might fall; 
(c) the absence of capital market option functions as control mechanism, as co-
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operatives traditionally rely on retained profits for growth, business mistakes, exerting 
the effect of destroying equity, cannot be offset by external injections of capital and thus 
tends to make co-operative banks more risk-averse; and (d) the absence of 
shareholder/creditor conflicts, due to the nature of the debt contract14
Coco and Ferri (2010) consider that the perils for bank instability come mainly from 
bank owners’ perverse incentives and, therefore, from the agency problem between 
them and depositors, absent issues in co-operative banks given its owner-customer 
feature. Moreover, the opportunistic behaviour is less likely since co-operative bank 
members usually feature a network of linkages beyond the pure lending relationship, 
with positive effects. By this reason the stigma associated with a default is possibly 
larger and both screening and cross monitoring among members/borrowers is 
simplified. 
, shareholders have 
greater incentives to encourage the firm to take more risk than do debt holders.  
There is wide agreement that control by members in co-operatives is indeed weak, much 
more so than in corporations with diffused ownership (see Akella and Greenbaum, 
1988; Keating and Keating, 1992; Gorton and Schmid, 1999). Indeed, the absence of 
traditional control mechanisms such as the monitory shareholders who are not involved 
in the daily life of the co-operative bank, or by block shareholders, and absence of 
market stock can exacerbate the agency problems, creating “inertial management” 
situations which can, in the worst case, even compromise the financial survival of the 
co-operative (Staatz 1987; Gorton and Schmid, 1999; Becht et al., 2003; Cuevas and 
Fischer, 2006; Schwizer and Stefanelli, 2009). Therefore the setup of limits to the 
discretion of managers may be more useful in co-operative banks than in IOF banks 
(EACB, 2010). 
Ory and Lemzeri (2007) discussing “agency costs” in French co-operatives refer that 
principals have trouble in monitoring managers because they are subject to less 
disclosure regulation than joint-stock firms and do not face market discipline, a 
difficulty exacerbated by the dispersed ownership of co-operatives. Moreover, in joint-
                                                          
14 Specifically, the nature of the debt contract dictates that if a risky (ex ante) investment produces high (ex post) 
returns well above the face value of the debt, equity holders will capture the gains while debt holders receive only 
their fixed contractual payments. If, however, the investment fails, then, due to their limited liability, equity holders 
will face only limited downside risk while debt holders will face the same downside risk without any compensating 
upside potential. 
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stock firms, large shareholders have the financial tools to deal with shareholder 
meetings and enough power to exert pressure onto managers, thus benefiting the smaller 
shareholders who do not have the means to attend meetings or make informed decisions 
about the company. In co-operatives the democratic principle “one member, one vote” 
makes collective action more difficult than in IOFs (Gorton and Schmid, 1999; Ory and 
Lemzeri, 2007). 
Fonteyne (2007) mentions that co-operative members are rationally ignorant, since the 
“one member one vote” principle makes individual vote unlikely to have any influence. 
Thus, managers can allow inefficiencies to linger without principal action being taken 
against them. This lack of oversight makes co-operatives prone to managerial problems, 
as embezzlement or an empire-building, with managers being tempted by the large 
intergenerational endowment to engage in expansion strategies, self-interest and 
promotion in detriment of members’ well-being15
The lack of managerial vigilance can also be intensified by co-operative banks chronic 
low profitability which makes it difficult to pay competitive salaries when compared 
with IOF banks. Fonteyne (2007) notes that co-operative banks payroll is generally 
flatter than their competitors, making it difficult to acquire top talent. This is especially 
true for IOF bank managers, who command very large remuneration packages. Juvin 
(2005) suggests that talented managers can be encouraged to accept lower pay because 
of the social standing and elevated feeling of utility, that come with working at a co-
operative. 
. 
Schwizer and Stefanelli (2009) refer that for shareholder-management transactions, the 
highly fragmented nature of the co-operatives’ capital and the restrictions in the profits 
distribution could be a strong disincentive for members control management behaviour, 
leading to greater shareholder-management problems within the agency framework. 
That can lead to “captive” (attending mainly to the interests of a particular category of 
stakeholder) decisions, instead to global decisions that balance and harmonize the 
interests of the different stakeholders within the co-operative. The authors also notice 
that the presence of informal governance mechanisms, typical of the co-operative model 
(based on peer-monitoring among members and on extra-economic (social) sanctions 
                                                          
15 For empirical evidence of co-operative management pursuit of self-interest see, for example, Mester (1991); 
Hinson and Stewart (1999); Gorton and Schmid (1999); Leggett and Strand (1999). 
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imposed on debtors) leads, in the long term, to a gradual decline if it continues to 
increase the territorial area where the co-operative bank operates, intensifying the 
potential conflict within the co-operative.  
To sum up, in the theoretical debate on co-operative agency problems is often alleged 
greater scope for managers of co-operative banks to engage in rent-seeking or expense-
preference behaviour, since the owners have less influence on managers than 
shareholders in IOF banks. This is partly explained by the fact that the co-operative 
members are larger in number, have smaller ownership stakes, and are more dispersed. 
However, the empirical evidence does not support the proposition that co-operative 
banks systematically have higher costs (Ayadi et al., 2010). 
Comparisons are often made in the literature between the governance models of 
different types of firm ownership structures. A general perspective is that agency costs 
(associated with principal-agent issues) exist in all forms of firm structure and they are 
handled differently in different typology of firms. To this conclusion we must keep in 
mind that there are imperfections in all forms of governance arrangements, so it is 
invalid to compare the actual arrangements in one model with a perfect theoretical 
version of a different model (Ayadi et al., 2010). We will come back to the topic of co-
operatives governance in chapter 4 (and less in chapter 3) particularly in regards to 
governance control mechanisms operating within Portuguese Agricultural Credit Co-
operatives.  
 
2.5.2 - Networks 
Although co-operative banks operate in a specific market (most co-operative banks 
operate at a local level and in a given regional space), technological and regulatory 
threats are challenging co-operative banks, especially the more locally focused and 
those with limited size. This environment forces them to modify their strategies in order 
to achieve better efficiency and profitability. Consequently, co-operative banks feel the 
need of restructuring and redesigning their products and processes, as well as setting up 
new operational and organizational structures. Their overall strategies need to be 
oriented towards strengthening their relationships with their customers by enhancing 
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traditional lending activity, reconciling this with modern financial services (Boscia and 
Di Salvo, 2009). 
Like many other IOF banks, co-operative banks have witnessed consolidation strategies 
to increase their size, in order to achieve scale economies to obtain operational 
efficiencies and adequate returns on investments. Consolidation is a powerful strategy 
but, at the same time, especially for co-operative banks, it may be dangerous. Increasing 
size generally tends to weaken some of co-operative banks’ competitive advantages, 
namely information power. Weaker customer relationships, less localism, less 
information for managers and loan officers, less peer-monitoring, fewer social penalties, 
less social control from the local community on bank conduct; more agency problems; 
and more rigid organizational forms are troubles that the co-operative banks need to 
overcome (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009). 
Another strategy for co-operative banks to overcome the limitations and the restrictions 
of limited dimension and resources is the development of alliances and networks with 
other co-operative banks. In particular, a positive experience has flowed from their 
joining regional and national structures, federations, and other centralized organizations. 
In this way co-operative banks balance their strong local roots with an expansion and 
improvement in the supply of financial services (EACB, 2004).  
Worldwide, co-operative banks often evolve into pyramid-shaped national structures, 
with two or three levels of organizational decentralization (national, regional or local). 
These can be assimilated to “integrated” systems or simply to a “network”. A system 
with such a range allows lower levels wide margins of autonomy in managing customer 
relations and core-business activities and, at the same time, allocates policy direction 
and control to the higher level, which allows it to rationalize the use of resources and 
the growth of investments (Boscia and Di Salvo, 2009). 
There are several strategic and managerial advantages for co-operative bank networks. 
Besides limiting replicable costs, centralised institutions also arise out of a need to 
effectively reduce the “brand name externality problem” (Guinnane, 1997). Ayadi et al. 
(2010) summarizes: 
1. Networks allow small and medium co-operative banks to benefit from 
economies of scale (and scope), especially in back office and administration 
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functions. In this way, relatively small banks are able to secure collective 
economies of scale that each one is too small to generate internally. Thus, 
services as information and technology support, data processing, training, 
accounting, marketing, product development, and representation are left to 
network institutions that act as centralised service providers. 
2. Mutual support schemes provided by network allow the associated banks to 
assign a zero weight for intranetwork exposures and also serve to secure the 
certainty of repayment for creditors and depositors, thereby enhancing the 
banks’ funding opportunities. 
3. Depending on the level of network co-operation between local and central 
institutions, the network central institution may perform the task of a central 
bank, intermediating liquidity within the network, and management consultancy, 
disseminating best practice within the network.  
4. The network may also have subsidiaries providing services that benefit both 
member banks and their customers, which may not be feasible for individual 
member banks to provide themselves directly. 
5. Member banks may also gain through the reputation and profile of the central 
institution, including an increase in customer trust in banks which are known to 
be part of a credible network.  
On the other hand, the network may also represent a threat to member banks. For 
example, if the central institution pursues objectives that are at odds with the co-
operative principles and prioritisation of the members’ benefits or an excessive amount 
of centralisation worsens the co-operative banks’ ability to respond to the customer 
local needs. The net benefits will depend upon the nature of the network, the specific 
role of central institution and whether the local banks can continue fulfilling their 
functions as co-operative institutions (Ayadi et al., 2010).  
In highly integrated co-operative banks we can observe a “circular authority”, as in 
Figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3  - Circular authority in integrated co-operative banks 
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If in co-operative banks member-customers exercise their power by voting and claiming 
their rights to residual earnings, in integrated systems, the second-tier body is owned by 
primary-level organizations and its supervisory body is constituted by their 
representatives. It is a closed system where the primary level organizations have the 
customary ownership rights on secondary level organizations, but these have also some 
well-specified control rights towards the primary level organizations that, otherwise, are 
controlled by their member-customers (Ferri et al., 2010).  
The integrated structure helps controlling the principal-agency problem generated in the 
primary level due to the dispersed ownership structure (Desrochers and Fischer, 2005; 
Cuevas and Fischer, 2006). Moreover, the higher degree of integration reduces the 
variability of financial efficiency indicators of co-operative banks (Desrochers and 
Fischer, 2005). Beside possible associative integrations and working to protect the 
relation between single banks (and the relation among these and their stakeholders) the 
presence of a central organism, having the hierarchical control functions of local banks 
and the strategic and organizational support functions, can mitigate conflict between the 
Central Institution 
Local Bank Local Bank Local Bank 
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management and the ownership of the co-operative bank (Schwizer and Stefanelli, 
2009).  
Partly attesting to the growing importance of top-down authority in co-operative bank 
networks, national regulators have gradually delegated the supervision of local banks 
(all of which are separately licensed credit institutions) to the central institutions. In 
terms of supervision, this is equivalent to treating the entire network as a consolidated 
group (Ayadi et al., 2010). 
Network governance structures have their own governance issues, namely issues related 
with agency and coordination. The co-operatives have been introduced a variety of 
governance mechanisms to reinforce bottom-up ownership, including: a democratic 
voting structure, whereby members choose representatives of local institutions who then 
choose representatives in central organisations; distribution of benefits to members; 
election of directors of central institutions by local banks; and so forth. Highly 
integrated systems introduce an opposing problem, because central institutions have 
stronger incentives than local institutions to safeguard the mutual resources (i.e. the 
shared brand-name, pooled reserve fund, etc), the so called appropriability hazard (AH) 
problem, whereby counterparts may act opportunistically to obtain the rents provided by 
the alliance (Descrochers and Fischer, 2005).  
The AH arises in situations of inter-firm alliances that involve technology transfers and 
common production of goods and services in the presence of weak property rights 
(Hagedoorn, 1993; Oxley, 1997). AH can be traced to difficulties in adequately 
specifying payoff relevant activities under conditions of bounded rationality, monitoring 
the execution of prescribed activities, and/or enforcing contracts through the courts to 
control opportunism (Oxley, 1997).  For this author AH increases when: (a) the alliance 
involves product or process designs rather than when only production or marketing 
activities are undertaken; (b) the range of products increases; (c) a wider geographical 
area is covered by the alliance; (d) more firms are involved. All these factors play a role 
in networks of co-operative banks and, being engage in product design and production, 
they can cover an enormous range of products, huge geographical areas, often the entire 
country, and hundreds or thousands of institutions.  
One common response to reduce AH risk is to give the central institutions an 
appropriate level of authority and control (Ayadi et al., 2010), particularly, 
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standardising risk-management practices, imposing obligatory audits or giving central 
institutions the power to restructure the local banks’ debt, governance structure and 
pushing for a merger process. 
Moreover, in a co-operative banking network the single co-operative, which is already a 
first-level governance unit, becomes also a governance element at the system level. 
Thus, the network requires a complex balance to converge the “system” company 
objectives, considering that the central organisms lump together the various co-
operatives, with peculiarities and diversified (even territorial) needs.  
Likewise, increasing the size of the banking co-operative system credit, by the height of 
the hierarchical pyramid and further diversifying the profile of members, increases the 
costs of control or co-ordination (Williamson, 1967). This requires a governance model 
based on mechanisms that act on the entire network structure. Accordingly, the network 
can adopt other governance mechanisms (Di Salvo, 2003) ranging from exclusively 
associative types of company integration - as clubs for members or local committees - 
to varieties of greater integration of the working type - as the allocation of surveying 
and internal auditing to central bodies that carry out instrumental and auxiliary services 
for local banks. In most systems, these bodies also act as the institution’s mechanisms 
of cross-guarantee and penalization of each single case guarding the credit exposure of 
the entire system (cross-guarantee system or joint liability).  
 
2.5 - Final remarks 
This chapter sheds light on the economic nature of co-operative banks in general, 
emphasizing the rationale of co-operative banks on the basis of their specific features, 
and particularly their governance model. 
Co-operative banks differ from other financial institutions in several aspects, namely in: 
(a) the economic objective, which is not a profit maximizing but the fulfillment of 
members’ well-being; (b) democratic governance principle applying the “one member 
one vote” rule, with no possibility of unbundling voting and membership; (c) a business 
model centred on proximity to the local clients and relationship banking, allowing them 
to be competitive in their local markets, exploiting sound and low-cost local knowledge 
to identify customers’ needs, and to better monitor their risks; (d) equity growth 
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basically fulfilled through retaining annual earnings; and (e) the non-profit character 
frees them from the short-term pressure of the capital market which can induce banks to 
take excessive risks, undermining their stability and endangering their survival.  
The co-operative bank governance model allows banks to better reduce the information 
asymmetries on borrowers and thus overcome the market failure at the origin of their 
establishment. Moreover, the evidence shows that the governance model of the co-
operative banks is the basis of their lower profit volatility, allowing them to pursue 
longer-term objectives. 
As any other firm governance structure model, co-operatives model presents advantages 
and disadvantages. The typical co-operative governance model specificity is the 
presence of informal governance mechanisms, based on peer-monitoring among 
members and on extra-economic sanctions imposed on the debtors, which leads, in the 
long term, to a gradual decline, inflated by the increasing of the territorial area where 
the co-operative bank operates. Furthermore, technological and regulatory challenges 
are forcing co-operative banks, especially the more locally focused and with small size, 
to restructure and engage in integration strategies in order to achieve efficiency and 
profitability. Integrated networks support co-operative banks’ management, activities 
and organization, allows them to have more efficient back-offices and offer a wider 
array of products to serve customers but also present some specific agency and 
coordination problems that must be efficiently addressed in order to ensure the correct 
running of the integrated co-operative banking system. 
This chapter underlined the importance of an efficient CG model to align co-operative 
banks stakeholders interests (and efforts) for the survival of the organization. In this 
framework, in order to a better understanding how Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo 
can enhance economic and social performance, and ultimately, their chances to survive, 
to solve managers-owners agency problem, rooted in this theoretical chapter, the next 
chapters will be focused on the governance control and financial survival the Portuguese 
Co-operative Credit System. 
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3.1 - Introduction 
Nowadays, the financial system enterprises operate in an environment full of threats but 
also of opportunities. Indeed, as a consequence of corporate scandals and world 
financial crisis, along the last decade, the banking activity is constrained by ethical self-
restraining as well as innovative regulations enforced by domestic and international 
governance institutions. It is in this new environment that “over the past decade, dull 
but safe, cooperative banks have steadily increased their share of retail banking in 
Europe’s credit banking market…. A 2009 study by the Bundesbank, Germany’s central 
bank, into the connection between financial stability and bank ownership also found 
that co-operative banks were much less likely to fail than those owned by private 
shareholders….Part of the reason may lie on ownership and governance structures 
(The Economist, January 23d 2010: 66).  
The main aim of this chapter is to provide some insights about the Portuguese 
regulatory framework of co-operative banks, in order to understand how a particular 
regulatory framework affects co-operative banking activity. To achieve this goal, 
besides this introduction the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 describes the 
evolution of the agricultural credit cooperative system; section 3 illustrates the Credito 
Agricola positioning in Portuguese banking; section 4 includes a description of the 
Portuguese agricultural credit co-operatives regulatory framework and its governance 
model; finally, section 5 presents the conclusions.  
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3.2 - The genesis 
The Co-operative Credit System in Portugal comprises only agricultural credit co-
operatives. Its present corporate format was created in 1911, but the genesis of 
Portuguese agricultural credit co-operatives (Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mutuo – 
CCAM) goes back to the XVI century, to an institution called Common Barns, allowing 
farmers to keep stocks and seek financing. The early CCAM were very small units and 
membership consisted of small farmers with low incomes. The beginning of the system 
was an absolute failure: the capital provided by the state was insufficient to accomplish 
the objectives; and the co-operatives were used to pursue managers’ personal goals, and 
management errors and even fraud were commonly found during audit (Cabo, 2003). 
Despite these setbacks the number of CCAM grew significantly until the 1929 financial 
crisis (see Table 3.1 next page). Subsequently, CCAM were placed under the umbrella 
of the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, a public institution and, also the biggest Portuguese 
bank. During the dictatorial and fascist regime “Estado Novo” (1931-1974), the CCAM 
were used to restrict the expansion of communist ideology and for the political control 
of the rural population. It was a lifeless period for CCAM. Thus, until 1976 the CCAM 
played a minor role in the Portuguese banking system, with a share of less than 1% of 
total deposits and credit (Rebelo and Mendes, 1996).  
Following the 1974 political changes, all private financial institutions were nationalized, 
except for CCAM and foreign financial institutions. Moreover, CCAM started a lobby 
movement for autonomy, expanding implantation and broadening its activity, and in 
1978 the National Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Credit Institutions 
(FENACAM) was created to support and represent the interests of its members, both 
domestically and internationally.  
In 1982, the sixty-year old Agricultural Co-operative Credit law underwent profound 
alterations with the publication of a specific Legal Regime for Agricultural Co-
operative Credit (Regime Jurídico do Crédito Agrícola Mútuo - RJCAM). 
Subsequently, CCAM threw off the guardianship of the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, and 
in 1984, the Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mutuo (Central CCAM) was founded, 
with the purpose of regulating credit activity of its members.  
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In 1986 Portugal joined the European Union, and the following ten years were a period 
of profound changes in the Portuguese economy. The CCAM were considered an 
important player in the framework of a financing strategy for the development of the 
agricultural sector. Thus, during the 1980s CCAM activity experienced a spectacular 
growth, reflected in annual rates superior to 40% for deposits, and approximately 35% 
for loans and net assets, on average (Cabo, 2003). However, it was a decade of wild 
growth and mismanagement, with negative consequences for CCAM performance, 
jeopardising its survival. 
In 1991 the Integrated System of Agricultural Co-operative Credit (SICAM) was 
created by an association of the Central CCAM and the CCAM. The Central CCAM 
was empowered to supervise, intervene, guide and represent SICAM. SICAM 
established a regime of co-responsibility between the Central CCAM and its members, 
so solvency and liquidity supervision was accountable on a consolidated basis. A more 
demanding framework for the creation and functioning of the CCAM, along with the 
reinforcement of CCAM funds, ended the joint liability of CCAM members. The 
“agency agreement” allowed CCAM to broker operations forbidden in its normal scope 
of activity, by acting as an agent of the Central CCAM. 
Four years later, in 1995, the RJCAM was modified, widening the scope of CCAM 
operations to other activities connected with the rural world such as hunting, fishing, 
agro-tourism and handicrafts, and allowing CCAM to share with its members part of the 
net benefit (limited to 30% of net profits and in accord with legal and prudential equity 
requirements) and convert reserves into capital shares transferable to members. These 
modifications were crucial for boosting CCAM ability to attract new (and more heavily-
investing) members, improving CCAM capitalization. Additionally, the new diploma 
expanded the Central CCAM’s activities, converting it into a truly universal bank. 
In 2009 new changes were introduced in RJCAM, adopting a governance model closer 
to that adopted by investors’ own firms and extending CCAM activity and membership, 
widening the members’ scope as well as enabling the CCAM to extend credit operations 
to non-members or purposes not agriculturally related (although within specific limits). 
Additionally, once CCAM complied with the prudential requirements applied to banks, 
they were authorized to perform the majority of commercial activities carried out by 
other financial institutions. 
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Table 3.1 summarises the dynamic of creation and evolution of the CCAM during the 
last century.  
Table 3.1 - Creation and evolution of CCAM in the 20th century 
New CCAM Existing CCAM 
Before 1920 95  
[1920; 1930[ 67  
[1930; 1940[ 48  
[1940; 1950[ 18 In 1950  132 
[1950; 1960[ 17 In 1960  149 
[1960; 1970[ 4 In  1970  144 
[1970; 1980[ 21* In 1980 157 
[1980; 1990[ 57 In 1990 222 
[1990; 2000[ 6** In 2000 145 
Notes: *19: [1974; 1980]; ** resulting from the merging of existent CCAM. 
Source: Adapted from Cabo (2003) 
An analysis of Table 3.1 shows that, in the early days, the creation and demise of 
CCAM was accentuated. Until 1950, for each 5 CCAM created, 2 failed. During the 
Estado Novo the number of CCAM was relatively stable. After the April revolution, in 
1974, CCAM gained a new lease of life and proliferated, especially in the 1980s. In the 
last two decades no genuinely “new” CCAM were born, the only ones created resulting 
from a process of merger.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the age of existent CCAM in 1990. We can see that more than 40% 
of the existing CCAM were still juvenile, created in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Figure 3.1 - Year of creation of CCAM 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on information available on Bank of Portugal website 
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50 
With the exception of the island of Madeira, all the continental (mainland) territory was 
now already covered by CCAM, which, allied with regional restrictions on CCAM 
activity, made it economically and legally impossible to establish new CCAM. 
With the formation of SICAM, in 1991, CCAM entered into an era of consolidation, 
and the creation of new CCAM was a rare event. Thus, during the last two decades 
(Table 3.2), along with the organic growth of the CCAM, a regional merger process 
occurred, and consequently, the number of CCAM fell from the earlier 220 in the 1990s 
to 90 (85 integrated in SICAM, 5 independents) in 2010. Mergers between local CCAM 
have considerably increased their size both in terms of assets and number of branches 
per CCAM. Profitability16 has also improved. Indeed, at the time SICAM was created, 
the CCAM presented overall negative net results 17
Table 3.2 - Evolution of SICAM 1995-2010 
, but the ongoing restructuring 
process allowed CCAM to improve their performance and experience profitability 
levels close to or even higher than those of the Portuguese banking system in general. 
 Number of 
CCAM 
Average Assets 
per CCAM 
(million €) 
Average Branches 
per CCAM (#) 
 
ROA* 
1995 186 22,28 2,5 -0.3% 
2000 140 47,56 _ 0.7% 
2001 132 54,88 4,3 1.0% 
2002 121 61,50 4,6 0.5% 
2003 120 67,00 5,0 1.0% 
2004 118 71,80 5,2 1.0% 
2005 111 82,00 5,7 0.9% 
2006 105 91,60 6,0 1.0% 
2007 100 102,50 6,4 1.1% 
2008 92 116,90 7,2 1.1% 
2009 88 137,50 7,8 0.3% 
2010 85 155,44 8,2 0.3% 
Note: * Ratios for 1995 to 2006 calculated in accordance with Portuguese rules (PCSB), transitional rules in 2007 (NCA) and 
IAS for 2008 to 2010. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CCAM annual reports 
                                                          
16 Return on assets – ROA 
17 The 1992-1993 Portuguese agricultural crisis together with CCAM difficulty in attract new members ended in the 
continuous degradation of CCAM results, which became negative from 1992-1995 (Cabo, 2003).  
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Simultaneously, in the 1990s the Crédito Agrícola Group was founded. Nowadays, the 
Credito Agrícola group is one of the leading financial groups in Portugal, composed of a 
large number of small- to medium-sized co-operative banks (CCAM) and some 
specialized companies - like the shared services centre CA Serviços - under the 
supervision of the Central CCAM resulting in the Group represented in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 - Crédito Agrícola group structure 
 
Source: Crédito Agrícola (2011a) 
 
3.3 - Credito Agrícola in Portuguese banking 
Today, the Crédito Agrícola (or SICAM) is a financial Group that spans the country, 
with around 400 thousand members in 2010; 1.1 million customers, mainly small- and 
medium-scale savers, farmers, SMEs and traders; 85 local banks – the CCAM – with a 
network of 700 branches, scattered across the mainland and in the autonomous region of 
the Azores; a balance sheet of 14 thousand million euro; equity  totalling 1,100 million 
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euro; a solvency ratio – core tier 1 – of 12.3%; and a transformation ratio of close on 
90% (Crédito Agrícola, 2011b).   
These figures rank Crédito Agricola as the 5th Portuguese financial group: 7th in terms of 
Net Assets; 6th in Deposits and 3rd regarding the dimension of the Retail Franchise. 
Table 3.3 presents the market share of the four biggest Portuguese banks and Crédito 
Agrícola (CA) in the Portuguese banking system. It shows that CA has an important 
position in the Portuguese banking system, in regard to employment, network of 
branches and customer deposits. 
Table 3.3 - The biggest Portuguese retail banks, by December 2010 
(Values in euro million and for domestic activity only) 
  CGD Millennium 
BCP 
BES Banco BPI CA 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Employment (#) 9,672 17.01% 9,899 17.41% 6,142 10,81% 7,032 12.37% 3,876 6.82% 
Branches (#) 869 13.93% 881 14.12% 700 11,22% 750 12.02% 691 11.07% 
Net Assets 112,903 22.30% 102,144 20.18% 75,964 15,01% 42,417 8.38% 13,213 2.61% 
Equity 6,202 21.84% 6,609 23.28% 6,258 22,04% 1,055 3.72% 1,026 3.61% 
Net Profit 47 4.18% 301 26.59% 256 22,64% 89 7.88% 36 3.21% 
Net Loans  69,715 24.15% 52,999 18.36% 41,096 14,24% 28,381 9.83% 8,069 2.80% 
Total Deposits 54,788 28.11% 31,367 16.09% 26,591 13,64% 16,656 8.54% 9,989 5.12% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on company annual reports; Bank of Portugal and Portuguese 
Banking Association websites. 
A structural analysis (Table 3.4) shows the robustness of Crédito Agrícola. The value of 
deposits continues to be way above loans, leaving SICAM with a strong liquidity 
position on its balance sheet, and the highest solvency ratio (Tier 1) of all the 
Portuguese banks. This gives Crédito Agrícola a solid security buffer crucial in the 
current economic and financial crisis context.  
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Table 3.4 - Crédito Agrícola ranking, by December 2010 
Performance Indicators Values Ranking 
Transformation Ratio* 86.2% 1st 
Efficiency Ratio** 67.1%  
Return on Assets (ROA)*** 0.3%  
Return on Equity (ROE)**** 3.5%  
Solvency Tier 1 Ratio****** 12.6% 1st 
Customer claims:   
Deposits: claims per 1000 accounts 0.07 1st 
Mortgage credit: claims per 1000 contracts 0.42 1st 
  Checks: claims per 10,000 checks processed 0.05 1st 
Notes: * Net Loans / Deposits; ** Structural Costs / Net Worth [Structural costs include amortisation + general administrative 
expenses + staff costs; Net Worth include financial margin + net commissions + other income (including results from 
financial operations)]; *** Net Profit/ Average Net Assets; ****Net Profit / Equity; ***** Basic Own Funds / Weighted Risks 
(assets + off-balance-sheet items) 
Source: Crédito Agrícola (2011b); Banco de Portugal (2011) 
Crédito Agrícola presents the lowest transformation ratio: 86.2%, remaining this 
indicator at a clearly conservative level. Historically, it has never presented a value 
higher than 90%, a percentage much inferior to the generality of other financial 
institutions, which exceed 100%. This fact has a positive influence in terms of CCAM 
liquidity. 
Efficiency ratio reflects CCAM efficiency-cost efforts and its ability to explore scale 
and scope economies. SICAM efforts to control the increase of structural costs below 
net worth were crushed by the harsher operating conditions and especially by the 
deterioration in the financial margin resulting from the policy adopted by the monetary 
authorities in response to the liquidity problem (consequence of the 2008 financial and 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis) affecting other financial institutions. Therefore, the 
overall performance of Crédito Agrícola has changed for the worse and results have 
continued to be badly hit, as they were in 2009, by extraneous factors connected to 
monetary policy rather than the crisis itself (Crédito Agrícola, 2010a). Thus, return on 
operations overall was poor, with ROA at 0.3%, and ROE at 3.5%, well below the 
figures of 1.1% and 13.08%, respectively, for 2008. 
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But the co-operative business model upon which Crédito Agrícola is founded has also 
proved to be resilient 18
Finally, the Crédito Agrícola business model approach reflects on the quality of the 
services provided, as the excellent scoring on the customer claims indicator shows. The 
“recipe” lies in its better understanding of proximity as a factor in banking, backed by 
an extensive network of branches and points of contact with its members and customers. 
A model regarded by many, before the present financial crisis, as “obsolete”… 
 during hard times, with its robust capitalisation and ample 
liquidity. Low but steady results allow Crédito Agrícola to bolster its financial situation, 
which is today very robust. Given the co-operative nature of Crédito Agrícola, profits 
are mostly directed to the reinforcement of equity. This continuous reinforcement is 
reflected in the solvency ratio of 12.6%, the highest in the Portuguese banking sector 
and much higher than the 8% imposed by the Bank of Portugal.  
 
3.3.1 - Regional development 
The real importance of Crédito Agrícola in the Portuguese banking industry is 
entrenched in its business approach. Notable for their unique form of proximity to their 
communities, the CCAM are a powerhouse for local and regional development, 
fulfilling the Crédito Agrícola corporate mission “… contributing to the development of 
Local Communities” (Crédito Agrícola, 2009). The CCAM fulfil their mission, being 
spread across the entire domestic territory, with the exception of the island of Madeira.  
Apart from the two metropolitan areas, the Crédito Agrícola has a solid presence, as 
shown in Figure 3.3, with a market share which, in some regions – the North, Centre 
and South of the country – is more than 15%. In some parts, the figure rises to over 
30%. But there is another, more important point: in hundreds of places across the 
countryside, the only link into the financial system available for the local economy is 
the Crédito Agrícola network or its facilities – the ATMs, the automatic banking 
counters or the POSs – installed by the local CCAM (Crédito Agrícola, 2011b).  
                                                          
18 The interim 2011 financial  results show a substantial improvement with the Crédito Agrícola presenting 53.3 
million euro of net profits, 46.8% above the ones of 2010 (Crédito Agrícola, 2012).  This growth is particularly 
significant when the profits of the Portuguese IOF banks continue to decrease and in some of them even became 
negative. 
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Figure 3.3 - Crédito Agrícola local market share 
 
Source: Crédito Agrícola (2011b) 
In terms of geographic distribution (Figure 3. 4) CCAM are very different from the 
other banks, given that over half of its customers (53.3%) live in the country’s inland 
regions. The Crédito Agrícola has a special responsibility in these circumstances. Its 
distribution across regions means it is present in many places where economic strength 
has been sapped. Thus, a very high proportion of the customers (more than 90%) have 
low or moderate incomes (Crédito Agricola, 2009).  
Figure 3.4 - Customer profile of the biggest Portuguese banks 
 
               Source: Adapted from Crédito Agrícola (2009) 
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3.3.2 - Internationalization 
Although 1992 marks the beginning of international business activity, it is still a new 
area for Crédito Agrícola. In 2010, Crédito Agrícola involvement in international 
business operations reached 1,670.5 million Euro.  Market share stands at 1.8% (Crédito 
Agrícola, 2011a). In particular, emigration is a specific segment with a role in the Group 
which has been growing consistently over recent years, thanks to the excellent 
geographical distribution of Crédito Agrícola throughout the country and the dynamic 
approach of the Group’s branches abroad. The sustained increase in emigrant 
remittances is symptomatic of this area of Group operations, as can be seen from the 
Group market share: 15.5% in emigrant remittances and 3.4% in emigrant deposits, in 
2010. The foreign branches of the Crédito Agrícola (International Financial Institution 
in Praia, Republic of Cape Verde and 2 Representative Offices, in Paris and 
Luxembourg) showed results of around 243 thousand euro, with assets under 
management standing at 70 million euro. 
 
3.4 - Structure and governance 
Essentially, the agricultural co-operative credit system in Portugal is made up of an 
integrated system (SICAM) of two types of co-operatives: the central and the individual 
(single, associated or member), i.e., SICAM = Central CCAM + Associated CCAM, 
including 85 CCAM. Together they own several specialised companies forming the 
Crédito Agrícola Group. The central structures of the group are the Caixa Central de 
Crédito Agrícola Mútuo and FENACAM. The former is a co-operative banking 
institution empowered to supervise, orientate and monitor operations in the associated 
local banks. The latter is a co-operative institution which provides specialised services 
for the Group. 
Membership of the Central CCAM is not mandatory for CCAM. There are CCAM in 
Portugal which are not members of the Central CCAM or which have withdrawn from 
membership of the Central CCAM, although the rules for this are more stringent, and 
approximate more to those that prevail in private credit institutions19
                                                          
19 Portuguese banking activity is regulated by the General Regime of Credit and Financial Institutions (RG), approved 
by Decree of Law nº 298/92, and with the following alterations. 
. Currently, only 
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five CCAM remain outside SICAM. Services are not offered by the Central CCAM to 
these CCAM.  
Except for banking operations, the CCAM follow traditional co-operative principles, 
namely, open membership, democratic control and restricted residual claims. The dual 
nature of credit co-operatives is reflected in their formal and institutional solutions.  
According to the RJCAM20
RJCAM specifies that CCAM are created in a co-operative form, with limited liability, 
and should seek, without the aim of profit, the satisfaction of their members’ economic, 
social and cultural needs and aspirations. The CCAM present in this way structural and 
intrinsic differences to banks, since according to the law, banks must be in the form of 
public limited companies (corporations) and, therefore, aim for profit. 
, the CCAM are credit institutions of a co-operative nature, 
whose goal is to perform agricultural credit operations in favour of their members, as 
well as the other banking functions inherent to banking activity. Thus, CCAM are under 
a special regime, essentially because of their co-operative form and their priority goal of 
performing agricultural credit operations in favour of their members. 
The RJCAM impose several limitations resulting from its social objectives, territorial 
area and members’ attributes. In addition it is difficult for CCAM to increase their 
issued share capital since they cannot publicly do so. These limitations have their 
counterpart in minor issued share capital, organizational structure, technical and human 
resources available, solvency, control and accountability requirements (on an individual 
but not a consolidated basis). 
The 2009 RJCAM alterations basically aimed to adjust the CCAM governance model to 
those established for corporations in the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code21
Table 3.5, next page, summarizes the main features of co-operative credit, according to 
Portuguese legislation.  
, 
and, simultaneously, to widen the CCAM membership base, bringing it more in line 
with other financial institutions, and boosting issued share capital increase, in view of 
the recession felt in the agricultural sector. 
                                                          
20 Approved by Decree of Law nº 24/91, with the following alterations, and republished in apex of the Decree of Law  
n.º 142/2009. 
21Approved by Decree of Law nº 262/86, and with the following alterations. 
Table 3.5 - Portuguese credit co-operatives portrayal 
Creation Bank of Portugal approval, following the agreement of Central CCAM and 
FENACAM. 
Legal form and 
nature 
Credit Institution, Co-operative form. 
RJCAM (and subsidiary: RG for the banking activity, and Co-operative Code22 
and other co-operative legislation) applies. 
Operations Granting credit primarily to their members and for financing of primary sector 
activities. CCAM complying, on individual basis, with prudential rules settled 
in the RG, can perform operations with non-members or financing activities 
outside primary sector up to 35% of net assets. Exceptionally, that limit can be 
raised to 50% by the Bank of Portugal for SICAM associates, at the suggestion 
of the Central CCAM. 
Additionally, CCAM that have adequate structural conditions and sufficient 
funds could be authorized by the Bank of Portugal to perform most of the other 
activities allowed to banks, with few exceptions. 
Membership Singular or collective persons, who carry out any activity linked to the primary 
sector (production, transformation or services) in the CCAM territory (or 
adjacent). Membership outside primary sector activities is permitted but limited 
to 35% of the CCAM members. Exceptionally, that limit can be raised to 50% 
by the Bank of Portugal. 
Minimum shareholding: € 500; Minimum of 50 members. 
Territorial 
activity 
CCAM activity is restricted to their headquarters municipality. CCAM can 
expand to an adjacent region if there is no other CCAM operating there, or as a 
result of a CCAM merger. 
Opening of 
branches 
Branch opening is subject the authorization of the Central CCAM for 
associated CCAM and of the Bank of Portugal, for independent CCAM. 
Shareholders 
capital 
Capital is variable; it can be increased by the admission of new members or 
higher shareholdings or by the incorporation of reserves; or it can be reduced 
by exit of members or lower shareholdings or by covering losses. 
Capital reduction is restrained by prudential rules. The maximum 
reimbursement value is defined by the accounting value net of compulsory 
reserves. 
Capital minimum fixed by the Ministry of Finance: 7.5 million euro;  SICAM 
associates: 1.496 million euro (5 million euro until 30th June of 201523). 
Resources Deposits and other reimbursed funds from their members and/or customers. 
Access to other financing resources, namely interbank market, requires Bank of 
Portugal (and Central CCAM for associated CCAM) approval. 
General financing means stipulated in Co-operative Code, namely, issuing of 
investment securities or debt. 
(Continues next page)  
                                                          
22 Approved by the Law nº 51/96, with the following alterations. 
23 By 30th June 2015, CCAM capital should reach at least € 5 million; beginning with € 2.5 million by 30th June 
2011 followed by an annual increase of € 0.5 million. 
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Table 3.5 - Portuguese Credit co-operatives portrayal 
(Conclusion) 
Financial 
applications 
Besides deposits, CCAM can make applications in public debt under conditions 
established by the Bank of Portugal. 
CCAM can only hold participations: (a) in regional unions, Central CCAM and 
FENACAM; (b) in enterprises whose object is of regional interest (up to 20% 
of equity); (c) to assure the reimbursement of credits; (d) when especially 
authorized by Bank of Portugal24. 
Governance 
bodies 
The management and supervision bodies (composition and competences) 
stipulated for corporations apply, preserving the importance and competences 
of the General Assembly, characteristic of the co-operative model. 
Shares No tradability of shares. 
Voting rules Principle of democracy, voting right independent of shareholding position: one 
member, one vote. 
Reserves CCAM must allocate up to 50% of the net profits to the reserves: (a) at least 
20% to the legal reserve until it reaches the value of issued share capital; (b) at 
least 20% to the special reserve for reinforcement of equity in the case of 
CCAM under financial restructuration process, until it reaches the value of the 
amount of the benefits obtained with the process; (c) between  1% - 5% to the 
members’ education; and (d) a max of 5% to the mutual reserve.  
CCAM statutes can design other reserves. 
Profit 
allocation 
After covering eventual losses of previous exercises, profits not allocated to the 
reserves can be distributed among members. The remuneration of capital shares 
is limited to 30% of the results25
Profits cannot be distributed if the CCAM do not comply with prudential rules, 
or if the member shareholding is inferior to the minimum required, in which 
case his portion of the profit will revert to them. 
.  
Supervision Bank of Portugal. Central CCAM for SICAM members. 
Tax Policy Profits are subjected to a rate (IRC) of 20%; excepting the results of no 
members operations or activities outside co-operative purposes and the taxation 
on consolidated basis, in which the IRC general rules apply26. 
Deposits 
insurance 
Insurance Fund of Agricultural Co-operative Credit. This fund as well as 
securing CCAM customer deposits, performs an active role in the SICAM 
economic and financial restructuring process, as part of its task to promote 
SICAM solvency and liquidity. 
 
                                                          
24 CCAM hold direct participations in the Crédito Agrícola specialized companies under this special authorization. 
25 CCAM do no usually give out profit to members. Members’ remuneration usually takes the form of capital shares 
allocation resulting from the incorporation of reserves. 
26 According to the Co-operative Tax Statute, Law nº 85/98.  Although, according to FENACAM (2009) co-operative 
credit system is, inside of the Portuguese Financial System, in percentile terms, the greater contributor. In many cases 
co-operative credit system taxation is triple of the other banking companies.   
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As mentioned, Crédito Agrícola Group takes a specialized approach to financial 
services. However, most of the people who use the services of the local CCAM are non-
members. Any person may open an account, make deposits, obtain loans, and use the 
services of the CCAM, complying with the limits imposed by RJCAM (Table 3.5). Of 
the approximately 1.1 million customers of the Crédito Agrícola Group, only about 
400,000 are members.  
With certain incentives to membership having been removed in recent tax reforms, the 
Crédito Agrícola Group is attempting to encourage membership in order to enhance the 
grass roots of the movement by offering special conditions attaching to financial 
products and services, such as the “Clube A” card for members. This is a hard task in a 
country struggling with the declining of rural regions and agro-business industry.  
Entering the new millennium, the number of Crédito Agrícola has stagnated, with new 
entrances scarce and diluted by the exit of members. Simultaneously the number of 
CCAM customers has declined by almost ¼ in one decade. Crédito Agrícola is 
attempting to diversify its customer’s portfolio, targeting a new type of customer, not 
linked to the primary sector activities, promoting Crédito Agrícola as a good and 
friendly brand.  
Within general prudential guidelines provided by Central CCAM, the local CCAM have 
control over their pricing and personal services. In general, CCAM sell products and 
services developed by the Crédito Agrícola Group and pursuant to formal policies and 
procedures issued by Central CCAM, to which the local CCAM must adhere. The 
CCAM operate from a common technology platform. 
The operations of the CCAM are restricted, and limited to their headquarters region. 
Whenever competitive friction between local CCAM arises, their dispute is arbitrated 
by Central CCAM. The local CCAM consistently honour the principle of non-
competition. Any new branch of a CCAM must be approved by the Central CCAM. 
The role of the Central CCAM has no parallel in other financial institutions. Central 
CCAM is a financial institution in co-operative form, offering a full banking service and 
competing on equal terms with the largest banks operating in Portugal. The Central 
CCAM aims at the concession of credit and other practices inherent to banking activity, 
on the same terms as commercial banks. However, it should not compete with its own 
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members. For example, Central CCAM is authorized to open branches on the same 
terms as banks, but must previously consult the local CCAM member.  
Central CCAM acts as central bank for the group, creating and developing a joint 
banking strategy. For instance, individual excess of liquidity is transferred to Central 
CCAM, which can lend to non-primary economic sectors or carry out transactions in the 
money, foreign exchange or capital markets. It pays the market rate on liquidity deposits 
and, following the principle of “user payer”, charges fees to the CCAM for consultative 
and advisory services. Central CCAM does not attempt to generate a profit from its 
transactions with its member CCAM. It sets prices to recover costs.  
The CCAM are its only members and have capitalized it through share investments. As 
in the case of local CCAM, Central CCAM capital is variable and can be increased by 
the admission of new members or higher shareholdings, or by the incorporation of 
reserves, and shareholding reimbursement is restrained by prudential rules and requires 
General Assembly approval. The minimum capital of Central CCAM, as fixed by the 
Ministry of Finance, is 17.5 million euro; with minimum shareholding of 5,000 euro 
and maximum of 10% of capital, except in the case of extraordinary supplies. 
Although the Bank of Portugal is responsible for banking sector supervision (i.e., the 
financial regulator), with regard to SICAM associates the law delegates a great part of 
these functions to the Central CCAM which, in turn, is under Bank of Portugal 
supervision. The Bank of Portugal defines the relations and prudential limits applicable 
to SICAM, and supervises the system accounts on a consolidated basis. Central CCAM 
assures the fulfilment of SICAM and associated CCAM solvency and liquidity rules and 
controls and guides them. The accounts consolidation of associated CCAM is a Central 
CCAM responsibility, in compliance with the terms defined by the Bank of Portugal. 
Specifically, Central CCAM orientation powers include the definition of general rules: 
(a) necessary to assure the fulfilment of the solvency and liquidity rules of SICAM and 
associated CCAM; (b) of commercial and credit granting policies including the setting 
up of guarantees; (c) regarding admission, remuneration, training and staff 
qualifications; (d) regarding the creation of new branches; (e) to define general rules of 
office operation and security. 
Furthermore, without prejudicing Bank of Portugal authority, Central CCAM is 
empowered to control administrative, technical and financing aspects of associated 
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CCAM, and their organization 27
Finally, Central CCAM guarantees its associates without limitations and is also 
guaranteed by them. In fact, Central CCAM guarantees the obligations assumed by the 
associated CCAM, even if they are prior to the association, in the same way as a bailer 
guarantees the obligations of the warrantee, without enjoying the right of exclusion. 
SICAM is, in this way, subordinated to a double guardianship; in fact Central CCAM is 
directly responsible not only for the organization, but also for the economic and 
financial management of its associates.  
 and management. Moreover, Central CCAM can 
intervene by the assigning a representative to monitor CCAM management or the 
nomination of provisional directors when it encounters an unbalanced situation which 
could jeopardize the daily functioning of the CCAM, its solvency is at risk, or serious 
irregularities occur. In addition, when the member is in (or at risk of) financial 
unbalance and not following Central CCAM guidelines, Central CCAM can dismiss all 
or part of the associated management and supervision boards, and assign interim 
directors to them. 
The autonomy of the local CCAM, combined with the assistance the local CCAM 
receive from Central CCAM, creates a decentralized, but strongly orchestrated, bottom-
to-top decision making process.  
Figure 3.5, next page, includes a summary of the skeleton of the SICAM structure  of 
governance, i.e. the different governance bodies and linkages between them. 
Similarly to most of Portuguese IOFs, local CCAM have adopted the so called, 
“Reinforced” Latin Model, as stipulated in corporations’ law but maintaining the 
General Assembly (GA) competences deriving from the Co-operative Code. In the 
“Reinforced” Latin Model the management and supervising responsibilities are divided 
among the Board of Directors (BoD), the Audit Board and a Statutory Auditor (ROC - 
Revisor Oficial de Contas) independent of the Audit Board. It is this last element that 
provides the characteristic of “reinforced” model, since the Audit Board has the 
function of effective monitoring and auditing CCAM operations and the ROC the power 
of analysis and certification of CCAM accounts. 
                                                          
27 Exemplifying, if the Central CCAM has an unfavourable appreciation regarding the registration of a member 
governance bodies, Bank of Portugal rejects its registration. 
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Figure 3.5 - Governance structure of SICAM 
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In most CCAM, the BoD delegates management powers in an Executive Committee or 
into two or more Chief-Executive Officers. The two biggest CCAM have adopted an 
advisory board to support the Board of Directors, being all the directors also executive 
directors. 
Co-operatives supreme governance body is the GA and, according to the Co-operative 
Code, GA is composed by all the co-operative members.  GA makes decisions 
regarding election and remuneration of the members of the management and 
supervision governing bodies, as well as on major issues like closure of the co-
operative, merging and changing the bylaws. The GA also has the right to approve (or 
refuse) the annual financial report. Decision making process is democratic (one member 
one vote) and its decisions are mandatory for the other social bodies and to all co-
operative members.  GA meets at least twice a year, to appreciate the annual report, 
including the balance sheet and income statements, and for approval of next year plan of 
activities and budget.  
The BoD is the main decision-making body of the CCAM. The BoD, as the fiduciary 
agent of the members, has the formal authority and legal duty to act in the members’ 
best interests. The members of the BoD are elected by and accountable to the GA. 
Decisions of the BoD are taken collectively, the responsibilities and liabilities are also 
collective and solidary. The CCAM bylaws may stipulate authorisation for the BoD to 
delegate into Executive Directors, or professional managers28
The Audit Board is responsible for: (a) over-watching the management of the company; 
ensuring that the law is upheld and the bylaws are observed; (b) verifying the regularity 
of the books, accounting records and supporting documents and the accuracy of the 
financial statements; and (c) furnishing statements of opinion on the management report 
and accounts for the financial year. Moreover, is competence of the Audit Board to 
suggest the name of the Statutory Auditor to be nominated (elected) by the GA.  
 the CCAM operational 
management.  
Central CCAM adopted a different governance model. The BoD is also the Executive 
Board of Directors. According the bylaws, there are matters or category of acts that 
                                                          
28 The professional managers are appointed by the BoD. The delegation of powers to professional managers is limited 
to a restricted range of acts. The BoD remain with the inherent legal responsibilities and duties.  
65 
require previous approval of the General and Supervisory Board. The auditing activities 
are carried out by the General and Supervisory Board and Statutory Auditor.  
 
3.5 - Conclusions 
The Portuguese co-operative credit system is a typical example of how the public policy 
can influence the development of the co-operative banks. Until the 1990s CCAMs had 
no control over their own life. Having been developed in a top-down process, the 
CCAM depended on public funds to carry out their mission and were often used to 
accomplish political goals. Indeed, CCAM were used to provide a public benefit to the 
rural economy and rural population. 
Like co-operatives in other sectors, the CCAM increasingly face survival challenges, 
partly as a consequence of their co-operative nature. Worldwide co-operatives have 
adopted varied strategies to combat difficulties inherent to the co-operative definition 
and use of property rights. Most of the solutions presented are based on some degree of 
deviation from traditional co-operative principles. CCAM implemented a very different 
strategy. They opted to focus their efforts on co-operative activity and performance, 
rather than on the co-operative rules themselves. Still, in the face of an increasingly 
competitive banking industry, the 2009 RJCAM changes improved CCAM activity, 
easing product and territory restrictions and approximating their governance model to 
that of corporations. It was a change which distanced RJCAM from the Co-operative 
Code. Nevertheless, it is in the Co-operative Code that CCAM can find the solutions to 
some of their governance problems, without losing their co-operative identity. 
The signs of the times are complex and blurred by uncertainties. The world economy is 
experiencing a crisis never before seen. In Europe, the euro zone countries, above all the 
most vulnerable, have been caught up in shockwaves that revealed structural 
weaknesses, and triggered a sovereign debt crisis. With financial resources scarce, the 
effects caused economic activity to falter, and unemployment to rise significantly. The 
result has been a plummeting standard of living in many thousands of households, 
namely in Portugal. 
But “what doesn’t kill us make us stronger”. This is perhaps the biggest lesson of the 
last decade crisis in Europe. Regarding the co-operative banks, its governance model, 
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considered in a recent past as obsolete, is proving its strengths to overcome quickly the 
troubles linked with the crisis. The Crédito Agrícola 2011 annual report show that 
CCAM are recovering from the crisis faster than other national banks, presenting 
returns similar to the ones of 2008, before the crisis burst out. 
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Chapter 4 - The Governance Control 
Mechanisms of CCAM  
Chapter 4  - The Governance Control Mechanisms of CCAM 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
In recent years the importance of corporate governance (CG) has rising new attention, 
as the 2008 financial crisis illustrates. Co-operatives, like investor-owned firms (IOFs), 
are subject to pressure for greater efficiency and change in CG, being important for co-
operatives to consider CG within the framework of their origins and building up an 
effective system of internal control (Pellervo, 2000).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the dominant economic view in economic analysis is that CG 
deals with the relation between owners and managers, following the agency theory.  
Using this approach the question to solve is how to make a manager enough committed 
to the creation of long-term shareholder value as if it was his own money (Tirole, 2006). 
Even though the question of controlling managers is basically the same in both co-
operatives and IOFs, the co-operative has many special features that make governance 
different and challenging, particularly, their ownership character, goal setting, methods 
of financing and profit distribution and decision making process. These differences bind 
not only members more effectively to the activities and running of the co-operative, but 
also blur the ownership role and bring the owners many other interests in addition to the 
success of the firm (Pellervo, 2000). 
The CG mechanisms available for co-operatives to discipline management differ from 
those of IOFs (Staatz, 1987; Trechter et al., 1997). Co-operatives do not have the stock 
market mechanism for assessing their performance (and its management), unlike stock-
listed  companies  they are not  scrutinized  by the  financial media.  Indeed  the particular 
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features of the capital shares of co-operatives29
The absence of these control mechanisms implies that for disciplining the management 
co-operatives rely on active and continuous monitoring by the board of directors (BoD). 
It can be a problematic function, since the BoD of co-operatives are less likely than the 
boards of IOFs to monitor or replace management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rasmusen, 
1988) and its delegated power can be damaged by the usually low level of member 
participation in the co-operative life, including the exercise of voting in general 
assembly (Spear, 2004).  
  inhibit it to be used as channel of 
information and control as in the listed companies. Also hostile takeovers or threat of 
hostile takeover that can lead to the change in management is not available in co-
operatives and the application of the democratic principle “one member one vote” 
prevents the accumulation of votes into blocks and consequently the monitoring by 
blocks of shareholders. Finally, the alignment of managerial and members interests 
through executive compensation contracts is complicated, since  co-operatives could not 
use the market share value as a performance indicator or use share options as part of the 
remuneration package. 
Being the critical link between members and managers, BoD key functions include 
over-watching co-operative operations and hire/dismiss management. Particular issues 
for co-operative boards derive from their elected status which provides no certainty that 
directors will hold the right skills mix and knowledge to effectively scrutinise 
management decisions. Frequently, directors do not work full-time or they lack the 
relevant education to exercise their functions, potentially leading managers to exploit 
these weaknesses for their own benefit.  
Indeed, the co-operative systems of governance contribute to the development of 
powerful 30
                                                          
29 Co-operatives share capital: (a) varies in size (as function of the entry/exit of co-operative members); (b) is 
accumulated either in proportion to member purchases or investments of the same sum (members do not invest 
according on the basis of risk as in IOFs); (c) investment in share capital is not freely transferable (sellable) to 
another person as is a normal shareholding; (d) the value of an investment in co-operative share capital is not 
determined by the market (repayment of shares is at par value). 
 and entrenched managers who have more control than in similar IOFs. 
Furthermore, in the context of co-operative governance structures and especially elected 
30  The development of managerial dominance within co-operatives is linked with the declining of the role of 
membership in governance (members’ apathy), the expansion of the co-operative and a growing domination of 
commercial values fostered by a professional management distanced from co-operative values (Meister, 1984; 
Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Cornforth, 2004; Malo and Vezina, 2004; Spear, 2004).  
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boards, beyond the member-manager conflict, there is also the member-board conflict to 
consider.  Co-operative boards can pursue their own interests at the expense of members 
as well as be inclined to interfere with the operational responsibilities of managers. 
Examples of governance problems include directors becoming rent-seekers, taking steps 
to make sure that members cannot participate, becoming self-perpetuating groups, 
holding meetings without telling members and giving themselves inappropriate loans 
(Shaw, 2007; Cuevas and Fischer, 2009). To overcome these weaknesses and develop 
the co-operative model is essential an effective CG, particularly one that become larger 
and adopt multi-tier (e.g., management and supervisory) board structures (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2001).  
As described in Chapter 3, the Portuguese Agricultural Credit Co-operatives (Caixas de 
Crédito Agrícola Mútuo - CCAM) are regulated by the legislation specific to co-
operatives and partly covered by company law, and in their banking activity they are 
subject to similar regulations as those applied to the banking system as a whole. But 
CCAM differ from banks in two important aspects: they are non-profit firms (therefore 
return of profits is restricted); and they do not have access to publicly raised capital. The 
CCAM capital base growth is supported by their retained net benefit. Thus 
understanding how CCAM governance can work on correcting bad economic 
performance is a matter of crucial importance to overcome this constraint and ensure the 
economic and financial survival of CCAM. 
The goal of this chapter is to determine the impact of the different governance 
mechanisms of co-operative banks on control management, by analysing CCAM 
governance and assess its efficiency in disciplining management. Hence, using data 
from 1995-2009 period, and multinomial logit models, the relation between CCAM 
performance and several control mechanisms operating within the Integrated System of 
Portuguese Agricultural Co-operative Credit (SICAM) is analysed.  
To achieve this purpose, the remainder of the chapter consists of three sections. Section 
2 provides a summary of the governance mechanisms operating in the CCAM 
associated from SICAM. Section 3 describes the model, sample and results. Section 4 
offers some concluding remarks. 
The CCAM information included in the next sections was collected from CCAM 
Annual Reports, legislation, CCAM by-laws and other official documents, 
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complemented by a questionnaire to CCAM managers regarding CCAM governance, 
including membership and governance and management bodies functioning. 
 
4.2 - The CCAM governance mechanisms 
As described in Chapter 3, the Crédito Agrícola Group has a three-fold structure: local 
member banks (CCAM), Central CCAM (the network’s central bank) and the 
subsidiary firms. In its essence, SICAM is an integrated system of separate CCAM and 
the Central CCAM, a network cooperative bank model with a powerful central bank 
serving the member banks in a wide scope of products and services.  
In terms of CG mechanisms, the CCAM associated to SICAM present a two-tier 
system: the individual and the system mechanisms. The analysis of the RJCAM, CCAM 
Annual Reports, by-laws and other official documents and the responses of a 
questionnaire filled by CCAM managers31
Figure 4.1 - CCAM governance mechanisms 
, result in the identification of the governance 
mechanisms working in SICAM as illustrated in Figure 4.1 and briefly described in the 
following subsections.   
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31  A questionnaire was sent to CCAM management intending to collect data in order to characterize CCAM 
membership and governance. The goal was to identify the different typologies of CCAM governance and construct an 
econometric model to relate it with CCAM performance in order to identify the most efficient one. Despite Central 
CCAM collaboration in the administration of the questionnaire (the questionnaire was send directly by Central 
CCAM to its associates) the rate of response was slightly bellow of 30%, thus, ruining its econometric use. 
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4.2.1 - Regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework, including legislation and bylaws, contains the general rules 
governing the firm (what governance bodies it should have and how their members are 
elected, what to disclose concerning the company’s operations, etc.) and plays a central 
role in the control of the company (Pellervo, 2000). Similar to most Western European 
countries, Portuguese co-operatives are regulated by legislation specific to co-
operatives, the Co-operative Code, complemented by each sector’s particular 
regulations, the RJCAM for CCAM, and partly covered by company law. The Co-
operative Code and the General Regime of Credit and Financial Institution are the 
subsidiary law. CCAM by-laws comply with them.  
 
4.2.2 - Ownership structure 
Except for banking operations, the CCAM are ruled following the traditional co-
operative structure with open membership, democratic control and restricted residual 
claims. Consequently, the CCAM members do not see the CCAM capital as a financial 
investment and the ownership structure is highly dispersed. Figure 4.2, next page, 
includes a description of the consequences/effects of the “co-operative nature” on the 
ownership structure of CCAM. 
As a consequence of the CCAM dispersed ownership, they lack the control over 
management exercised by large (share) owners or block shareholders. Furthermore, by 
distributing equally the control rights over the CCAM members, power is transferred to 
the management. The equity ownership structure is exogenous and cannot be adjusted to 
eliminate managerial inefficiency (Gorton and Schmid, 1999).  
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Figure 4.2 - Co-operative doctrine and ownership structure of CCAM 
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No market for CCAM shares 
⇓ 
CCAM capital shares is not seem as a financial product for investors
 
Accumulation of asset value is not reflected in the value of shares  
CCAM shares are normally refundable at par value 
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Elderly, low income and educational level, farmers and agro-businessmen 
[CCAM shares not transferable to members’ heirs] 
⇓ 
Inactive and mostly uninterested members 
Low and short-term investments in CCAM capital 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
C
on
tr
ol
 
Members’ power independent of his/her shareholding investment 
⇓ 
Ownership does not bring commensurate voting power 
Dissuasive influence in attracting further capital 
Notes: * Since 2009 the CCAM complying, in individual basis, with prudential rules settled in the RG, can perform operations with 
no members until 35% of the net assets. Exceptionally, that limit can be raised to 50% by the Bank of Portugal for SICAM 
associates, by Central CCAM suggestion; ** The Portuguese law requires the net benefits to be transferred into reserves and limits 
the remuneration of capital shares to 30% of the results.  
4.2.3 - Internal monitoring 
Internal monitoring includes monitoring by the BoD and internal control and audit and 
aims to achieve reasonable assurance of the CCAM running accordingly to members’ 
purpose, laws and regulations. 
As described in Chapter 3, CCAM typical governance structure preserves the co-
operative nature of CCAM through the composition and competences of the General 
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Assembly (GA), although it strengthens the CCAM management and supervising 
bodies’ competences. It is a governance structure that reflects the respect for co-
operative principles and the need to maintain a high level of monitoring and 
coordination, designed to promote management transparency and members’ 
participation, and to ensure the effective operations of the organization. Figure 4.3 
summarizes CCAM internal governance control. 
Figure 4.3 - CCAM internal governance control 
         General Assembly 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                   
                                
                                                                    
                Executive Management 
 
The GA is the supreme governing body of cooperatives, reflecting its democratic 
character and the guardian role of the CCAM co-operative identity. Members exercise 
control over CCAM activities participating and voting in GA meetings. This control is 
mainly done ex-post and can be damaged by members’ low level of participation and 
the predominance of members-employees in the GA meetings. 
The Audit Board and Statutory Auditor duo is the pillar of the CCAM internal control 
systems as it monitors, on a regular basis, its performance and activities, in accordance 
with the law, GA and Central CCAM deliberations, CCAM conduct code and Bank of 
Portugal regulations. The Audit Board supervision (or control) function is performed 
Audit Board 
and 
Statutory Auditor 
Board of 
Directors 
Monitoring 
Periodic updates and consultation 
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ex-ante. Historically, Audit Board role was neglected as its members often lack the 
skills and will to perform their role.  The adoption of the corporations’ law empowered 
the monitoring function of the Audit Board, since one of the audit board members must 
have the skills required for the task (at least one of the members must hold an 
undergraduate degree suitable for the exercise of his/her functions and be 
knowledgeable in auditing and accountancy) and the Statutory Auditor is a qualified 
and certified auditor (ROC- Revisor Oficial de Contas). 
The Portuguese Co-operative Code does not establish a separation between BoD and 
Management, being the CCAM direct administration made by its own members, elected 
by the GA. In this circumstances, the supervising function stays on the non-executive 
directors’ role [who should participate in strategic decisions and have the “challenger” 
function (CMVM, 2006)] and on the Audit Board and Statutory Auditor.  
The discussion on BoD efficiency highlights issues related with its size (by law an odd 
number), composition, meetings frequency, term of office and body working rules. In 
general, the BoD is composed by three members. However, CCAM BoD post-merger 
(or incorporation) can have five or seven members, in order to include utmost of the 
BoD members of the former CCAM. Since 2009, with the adoption of the corporations 
rules, that practice was almost discarded (extra BoD members are now part of the 
Advisory Board or non-existent).  
Traditionally, the CCAM directors are members of the co-operative, but it is allowed, 
under CCAM bylaws, for non-members to be elected directors if the members lack the 
necessary banking expertises to perform their duties. Still, in a considerable number of 
CCAM, BoD members are former CCAM employees with management and banking 
skills and a deep knowledge of the co-operative operations, thus, having the right profile 
to appraise BoD operations and decisions. On the other hand, a great number of CCAM 
still depend on part-time directors to carry on their day-to-day activities, with the 
inherent negative impact of it on CCAM performance. 
In CCAM there is no limit to the number of mandates and most of CCAM directors are 
in office for decades, until death surrenders them! 
Concerning working rules, often, the BoD president (chairman) has a qualitative vote 
and is the one who has the functions of CEO in the Portuguese co-operatives, including 
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personal liability. Clearly when the CEO is also the BoD president, as happens in many 
CCAM, that person occupies a very powerful position 32
The double role of CEO and BoD chairman of most of the CCAM presidents puts them 
in a position to choose how closely the (non-executive) Board is kept informed of the 
state of the business. By rule, CCAM management reports to the boards on a monthly 
basis, BoDs meet on a weekly basis
. The flow of information 
between board and management is crucial to an efficient boarding working, in this way 
CMVM (2007:31) recommends that “When Directors that carry out executive duties 
are requested by other Board Members to supply information, the former shall do so in 
a timely manner and the information supplied shall adequately suffice the request 
made… The Chair of the Executive Committee shall send the convening notices and 
minutes of the meetings to the Chair of the Board of Directors and, when applicable, to 
the Chair of the Supervisory Board and the Audit Committee…” 
33
 
 and the Audit Board on a quarterly basis. In these 
circumstances, BoD is dominated by executive directors, whom often have access to 
better information than non-executive directors. Audit Board can consider this reporting 
practice adequate to its needs. 
4.2.4 - External monitoring 
Since co-operatives do not have access to publicly raised capital, in order to increase 
their capital base, they can normally only ask their members to increase their capital 
input, or increase the number of members. Furthermore, in addition to equity and 
retained net benefit, co-operatives can finance their operations by borrowing. The 
importance of debt financing, as a management control mechanism, has been 
emphasised as the burden of debt ties managers’ hands and forces them to work 
efficiently in order to maintain the debt in regular intervals (Pellervo, 2000). In this 
                                                          
32 This circumstance where a chief executive has the dual role of being the (supervised) chief executive and the 
(supervising) chairman of the board is hardly conducive to being critical. [A board of directors should be able to 
dismiss, when necessary, the chief executive – how can this succeed if he is also the president of the board? (Pellervo, 
2000)]. The most prevalent argument against this CEO duality arises from agency theory which concludes that an 
independent board structure improves the board’s control over the management. On the other hand, stewardship 
theory supports CEO duality. It argues that the separation of the Chairman and CEO roles may be the cause of 
conflict situations (Kan and Omari, 2009).  
33 On average, CCAM BoD meets 80 times per year, between, 52 weekly ordinary meetings, 12 monthly coordination 
meetings, 4 quarterly general meetings, 4 quarterly of auditing report meetings, 1 annual assessment meeting and 7 
extraordinary meetings (the Audit Board meets 5 times and the GA meets 2 times year) 
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way, Jensen (1986) argues that increases in firm leverage helps reducing the 
inefficiencies resulting from the separation of ownership and control.  
In the CCAM case, the Insurance Fund of Agricultural Co-operative Credit (FGCAM) 
is an important creditor of financial distressed CCAM and it actively controls their 
performance. Besides securing the CCAM customer deposits, FGCAM supports 
SICAM solvency and liquidity. FGCAM subordinated loans are conditioned to an 
economic and financial restructuring process, monitored closely by FGCAM, which can 
interfere in the CCAM management. 
Central, multi-tier structures play a special role in the supervision of co-operatives. A 
central co-operative is often given the power to monitor and even directly intervene in 
the affairs of the co-operative members (Pellervo, 2000). Within SICAM, management 
controls are often exercised by Central CCAM which has the function of supervising the 
members and consequently is usually the first to find out managerial failures.  
Although Bank of Portugal is responsible for the banking sector supervision, regarding 
SICAM associates the law delegates great part of these functions in the Central CCAM 
which, in turn, is under Bank of Portugal supervision. Hence, without damaging Bank 
of Portugal competences, Central CCAM is empowered to control their associated 
CCAM administrative, technical and financing aspects and their organization and 
management. In cases of gross mismanagement Central CCAM can intervene in the 
associates, by the assignment of a representative to track CCAM management or the 
nomination of interim directors. Moreover, when the associated is in (risk of) financial 
imbalance and un-follow Central CCAM guidelines, Central CCAM can assign interim 
directors to them and even dismiss total or partly of the members management and 
supervision boards.  This control function of the Central CCAM is mainly done ex-ante. 
During the 1995-2010 periods Central CCAM intervened in 62 CCAM, in 11 of them 
the BoD was suspended and in 4 of them both the BoD and the Audit Board were 
suspended. Interventions have up to one year of lifetime, after which it can be renewed. 
In two of the biggest CCAM, it was settled a Management Board formed by Central 
CCAM workers (under the assistance agreements) and the intervention continues for 
more than a decade. 
 
77 
4.2.5 - “Market” for corporate control  
The traditional co-operatives are not under the effect of takeover corporate control 
mechanisms. Since they do not have publicly quoted shares, they cannot be taken over 
by acquiring a majority shareholding on the stock market and then replacing the 
management. However, regarding CCAM, merger activity is a very important corporate 
control mechanism. Long term inefficiencies are usually solved through forced 
incorporations into (or mergers with) a more efficient CCAM. CCAM mergers act as an 
external control mechanism because, although mergers are friendly (they must be 
approved by the GA), the influence of Central CCAM is considerable, as the trigger and 
even the one that chooses the merger partners (Cabo, 2003). 
Historically, CCAM mergers activity was part of an entrepreneurial restructuring 
strategy in order to solve CCAM inefficiency. Indeed, a 1992 SICAM study (see Cabo, 
2003) refers that, to generate consistent returns, a typical CCAM must have a volume of 
deposits up to 70 million euro, a value not achieved by 96.6% of the CCAM at that 
time. Under Central CCAM lead, inefficient CCAM were incorporated or merged with 
more efficient CCAM, often after a Central CCAM intervention or lobbying action, and 
as a result, since the creation of SICAM the number of CCAM decreased to 2/5 of them. 
Nowadays, the restrictions to internal growth imposed by the CCAM territorial feature34
 
 
make smaller CCAM potential targets for bigger CCAM directors eager to continue 
their CCAM expansion plans. Hence, smaller CCAM directors are pressured to present 
high results in order to avoid incorporation. 
4.2.6 - Executive compensation 
Management (and staff) remuneration schemes have become an important instrument of 
corporate governance. This is not just a desire to motivate managers to work harder or 
guarantee them a competitive salary (thereby obtaining the best people), but a way of 
getting them to work in the interests of the owners. Owners and managers should have 
                                                          
34  CCAM activity is restricted to their headquarter municipality. CCAM can expand to an adjacent region if there is 
no other CCAM operating there, or when that results from CCAM merger.  
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parallel objectives and these should be reflected in the governance and remuneration 
mechanisms (Pellervo, 2000). 
Following CMVM (2007) recommendations, the remuneration of the members of the 
CCAM supervising bodies consists exclusively of a fixed amount, in order to secure its 
objectivity and fairness. Regarding the management, CMVM (2007) recommends that 
the remuneration of the members of the BoD shall be aligned with the interests of the 
shareholders. Thus the remuneration of Directors carrying out executive duties shall be 
based on performance. However, the majority of CCAM does not do so and Directors 
remunerations are fixed. The specific nature of CCAM determines the inexistence of 
any type of attribution of shares or stock options for the BoD. The exceptions set a mix 
of fixed plus variable remuneration, usually a percentage of CCAM profits to distribute 
among their executive Directors limited to a given amount. One of the CCAM, for 
example, applies “a variable remuneration equivalent to 2.5% of the positive net profits, 
with an annual overall limit of 50,000€”, to give out to three executive directors.  
The fixed remuneration usually consists of a voucher of around 250€ per each meeting 
attended. Some CCAM differentiate between BoD and other boards meetings, 
remunerating the first ones with higher amounts. Others stipulate an upper limit to the 
number of meetings remunerated per month, independently of the actual number of 
meetings realized. 
Besides the remunerations referred, CCAM directors can obtain other compensations by 
participating in the governance bodies of other Crédito Agrícola Group companies. 
When CCAM BoD members are (former) CCAM employees, they maintain the salary 
and other benefits as long as they are in the Office, although the law stipulates that the 
contractual labour relationship is suspended. 
Contractual remuneration chart schemes aside, a look into CCAM annual proposals for 
profits allocation indicates that CCAM reward BoD and staff in accordance with the 
profits. This practice can be assumed as covered variable remuneration, intending to 
boost up BoD and staff performance. 
Considering that CCAM face survival challenges related to financial issues linked with 
equity capital deficiencies and that its capital base growth is supported by retained 
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profits, understanding how CCAM governance can be used to correct low economic 
performance is of crucial importance.  
 
4.3 - Model, data and results   
Assuming that legislation and ownership structure affect equally all the CCAM and that 
Central CCAM intervention, merger activity or BoD and executive compensation have 
different impact on individual CCAM, this section is dedicated to assess the efficiency 
of the different control mechanisms available to discipline CCAM management, i.e., to 
test if there is any relation between CCAM performance and those mechanisms.  The 
focus is on the mechanisms that reflect direct monitoring inside SICAM; 35
 
 the 
supervision function exercised by Central CCAM; the members control in GA, reflected 
in BoD turnover and peers’ control by CCAM merger/incorporation activity.  
4.3.1 - Model 
To analyse the determinant factors of CCAM governance control mechanisms the 
multinomial logit model is used, in line of others studies on banking (Prowse, 1997; 
Barro and Barro, 1990; Blackwell et al., 1994; Anderson and Campbell, 2000; Crespi et 
al., 2004).  
The multinomial logit is used, reflecting the values of the dependent variable, seven 
different situations (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6) 36
                                                          
35 Executive compensation and debt-holder FGCAM monitoring mechanisms were not considered. The first because 
data was only available to the 2010 year, and the second because, FGCAM debt-holder monitoring function was not, 
a priori, “present” to all CCAM.  
, as shown in Table 4.1. The value of each 
event in the t period will be determined according to the behaviour of the CCAM in the 
t+1 period. Multiple equations are estimated jointly in order to make efficient use of the 
available information (Greene, 2000), and the coefficients for each possible outcome are 
to be interpreted with respect to a reference group. In our case, the reference group 
represents the CCAM that did not experience any governance intervention in any 
particular year (value 0 of the dependent variable). 
36 The values assigned to every governance intervention only reflect different categories, and the ordinal value has no 
further meaning. 
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Table 4.1 - Values assumed by the dependent variable in the MNL models 
Model Dependent variable 
Model 1- Aggregated Model 0 – No intervention 
1 – BoD turnover 
2 – Central CCAM intervention and merger/incorporation 
Model 2 – Extended Model 0 – No intervention 
1 – BoD partial turnover 
2 – Chairman turnover 
3 – BoD total turnover 
4 – Central CCAM intervention by nomination of an Agent 
5 – Central CCAM intervention by nomination of interim 
Directors 
6 – Merger/incorporation 
 
In the case of the merger operation it can adopt the form of a merger or incorporation. In 
the last one, only the CCAM merger target (incorporated) was considered in the 
analysis. 
Central CCAM intervention can take the form of the nomination of an agent, usually to 
decide on and manage credit risks, or taking a safeguard, strong and deeper decision, by 
the nomination of interim directors and eventual replacement of the full body. 
BoD turnover can assume the form of a partial turnover or a total board turnover. The 
first alternative is the most usual in our sample, since there are only 27 cases of total 
board turnover. Furthermore, only the cases for which there is evidence that the board 
and chairman changes are not due to retirement or death are considered. Moreover, 
given that mergers are often followed by changes in the BoD, for those CCAM that 
continue, changes in their management are not considered.  
Concerning internal control, the role of co-operative member and their responsibility for 
the success of the enterprise is in actual fact greater than in publicly quoted companies 
as the market continuously monitors the company and distributes information via the 
media (Pellervo, 2000). It is expected that CCAM performance and management 
turnover should be negatively related.  
However, several factors, as the increasing complexity of banking activity and the 
decline in member participation in GA affect the efficiency of internal control 
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governance mechanisms. Thus, is expected that CCAM external corporate governance 
mechanisms to be more efficient than the internal ones. 
Based on the values assumed by the dependent variable two different models (Table 
4.1) are estimated to analyse the efficiency of the different control mechanisms. Model 
1 is similar to an “internal versus external” governance control mechanisms model and 
Model 2 considerers the different mechanisms individually. 
When different mechanisms are simultaneously present we consider the one that takes 
deeper effects. Exemplifying, to the model 2, in a decreasing way, from the whole data 
sample, the CCAM-year observations for which a merger has occurred are first 
identified and a value of 6 is assigned to these observations. The checking process 
continues assigning the value correspondent to the observed situation (2nd column of 
Table 4.1). 
As explanatory variables (Table 4.2) are used some CCAM performance measures that 
are independent of the business strategy implemented. Thus, indicators related to 
business strategy as the transformation ratio were left out.  
Credit overdue is an indicator of the CCAM credit risk management and is expected to 
have a positive influence on CCAM governance intervention probability. Customer 
resources growth ratio is a measure of CCAM competitive strength and market share 
and should present a negative influence.  Expenses ratio, Staff and Structural Costs 
ratios are measures of the CCAM cost efficiency, and should positively influence the 
probability of a CCAM governance intervention. Finally, Indebtedness measures 
CCAM level of capitalization and ROCS37
  
 the return on the members’ investment in 
CCAM equity. Indebtedness should exercise a positive influence over the probability of 
CCAM governance intervention, and ROCS a negative one.  
                                                          
37 CCAM goal is not maximizing profit but, as mentioned earlier, the key-issue for CCAM is the lack of equity. 
Therefore, as the growth in equity is fuelled completely by net benefits retained, Return on Equity (ROE) is the 
correct variable to express the “profitability”. The option for Shareholders Capital instead of Equity is justified by the 
existence of CCAM with lower equity resulting from previous years accumulated losses that can jeopardise the study 
results. 
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Table 4.2 - Explanatory variables and expected coefficients signals 
Group 1 – Operational Efficiency and Growth  Expected signal 
Credit Gross
OverdueCredit   OverdueCredit =
 
1
1- tin time  DepositsCustomer 
 tin time  DeposistsCustomer  Growth    ResourcesCustomer  −=  
+ 
_ 
Group 2 – Cost Efficiency  
Margin Financial
*Expenses Staff   and  tiveAdministra  Costs Structural =  
Margin Financial
Expenses Benefits andSalary   Costs Staff =  
Revenue  Total
Expenses  Total  ratio  Expenses =
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Group 3 – Capitalization and Profitability  
Assets Total
Debt Total  ssIndebtedne =  
Capital rsShareholde
ProfitNet  ROSC =  
+ 
_ 
Note: * Costs of general services incurred in controlling and directing an organization, such as accounting, energy 
and water supply, advertising, office resources expenses, etc. 
Two control variables are used: the size of the CCAM expressed by the Total Assets at 
the end of the year and a temporal trend (Year). The total asset is often correlated with 
other unobserved variables such as asset diversification and managerial skills (Crespi et 
al., 2004). The trend tries to catch control shocks, like technological changes, common 
to all CCAM in a given year.  
Hence, the multinomial logit estimated is: 
∑
=
+
== j
k
kxi
jxi
1
i
exp1
expj)prob(y
β
β
                           (4.1) 
where: Y - dependent variable, assuming the value of j = 0, 1, 2 for model 1, and j = 0, 
1, 2, …, 6 for model 2; X - column vector of p+1 dimension, where p is the number of 
independent variables; and β - unknown parametric vector to be estimated. 
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4.3.2 - Data 
The analysis addresses the 1995-2009 period. Data refers to the end of the year and are 
all expressed in 1995 prices.  The financial data was obtained from CCAM annual 
accounting reports. Non-financial data (CCAM mergers and incorporations, board or 
chairman change and Central CCAM interventions) was obtained from the “Diário da 
República38
At the end of this process we had a pool of 1,806 observations from 15 years of 
unbalanced allocation: a) 1352 observations corresponding to CCAM not experiencing 
any governance intervention; b) 101 corresponding to CCAM with BoD partial 
turnover; c) 66 chairman turnover; d) 18 corresponding to BoD total turnover; e) 62 
CCAM with Central CCAM intervention by an agent; f) 104 CCAM Central CCAM 
intervention by the nomination of interim directors; and g) 99 CCAM participating in a 
merger/incorporation. Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 4.3, 
with the data grouped according to the governance mechanisms.  
”, Ministry of Justice website, CCAM Annual Reports and other SICAM 
official statements released during the study period. We excluded from the data sample 
25 CCAM from 1998, because of data missing from their annual financial reports, plus 
21 observations corresponding to different CCAM-years, as we were not able to obtain 
their BoD configuration. 
  
                                                          
38  Official Portuguese legislative journal. 
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Table 4.3 - Group summary statistics 
Variables Max Mean Median Min Std. Dev. 
N
o 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
Total Assets* 352.466,002 44.877,260 32.404,210 726,085 44.659,690 
Customers’ resources growth 3,6115 0,1017 0,0855 -0,4048 0,1286 
Credit Overdue 0,7043 0,0820 0,0629 0,0000 0,0686 
Staff Costs 3,0879 0,3420 0,3302 -2,7670 0,2021 
Structural Costs 1,8038 0,2318 0,2295 -1,5653 0,1234 
Expenses Ratio 2,4544 0,8599 0,8566 0,3739 0,1348 
ROSC 5,4384 0,2261 0,1735 -11,8300 0,5958 
Indebtedness 4,3984 0,9230 0,9087 0,2025 0,1819 
B
oD
 P
ar
tia
l T
ur
no
ve
r 
Total Assets* 239.772,378 49.381,660 32.723,530 839,919 49.921,510 
Customers’ resources growth 0,4720 0,1334 0,1055 0,0090 0,0963 
Credit Overdue 0,3495 0,0861 0,0713 0,0024 0,0647 
Staff Costs 0,6952 0,3366 0,3237 0,1625 0,0890 
Structural Costs 0,5119 0,2317 0,2235 0,0824 0,0758 
Expenses Ratio 1,3484 0,8550 0,8663 0,4216 0,1076 
ROSC 7,7375 0,3966 0,2334 -0,9495 0,9180 
Indebtedness 1,0689 0,9123 0,9211 0,4801 0,0717 
C
ha
irm
an
 T
ur
no
ve
r 
Total Assets* 223.352,011 37.985,120 27.298,970 753,808 38.438,230 
Customers’ resources growth 0,3108 0,0822 0,0772 -0,1757 0,0824 
Credit Overdue 0,3282 0,0853 0,0761 0,0069 0,0625 
Staff Costs 0,7616 0,3575 0,3415 0,1749 0,1039 
Structural Costs 0,4717 0,2434 0,2405 0,0616 0,0775 
Expenses Ratio 1,2753 0,8778 0,8647 0,6483 0,0999 
ROSC 1,3429 0,2529 0,1751 -0,8632 0,3359 
Indebtedness 1,1676 0,9130 0,9191 0,6931 0,0634 
B
oD
 T
ot
al
 T
ur
no
ve
r 
Total Assets* 117.756,340 31.475,490 21.456,010 3.275,865 27.662,950 
Customers’ resources growth 0,1976 0,0891 0,0880 -0,0330 0,0824 
Credit Overdue 0,5806 0,1233 0,0838 0,0208 0,1489 
Staff Costs 0,6473 0,3205 0,3703 -0,6186 0,2659 
Structural Costs 0,5438 0,2057 0,2190 -0,2841 0,15961 
Expenses Ratio 1,4206 0,9343 0,8937 0,6828 0,1767 
ROSC 0,6248 -0,1006 0,1117 -3,4418 0,9385 
Indebtedness 4,1053 1,0859 0,8969 0,8006 0,7566 
C
en
tra
l C
C
A
M
 A
ge
nt
 
Total Assets* 75.394,431 27.025,530 25.619,350 3.053,662 17.879,980 
Customers’ resources growth 0,8374 0,0683 0,0597 -0,1206 0,1250 
Credit Overdue 0,5790 0,1839 0,1659 0,0040 0,1086 
Staff Costs 1,1478 0,4099 0,3873 -0,2427 0,2131 
Structural Costs 0,7712 0,3018 0,3010 -0,1219 0,1236 
Expenses Ratio 4,1421 1,15786 0,9887 0,4327 0,5347 
ROSC 0,9433 -0,6344 -0,0520 -7,0617 1,5299 
Indebtedness 4,3030 1,0473 0,9767 0,8180 0,4311 
Notes: * Thousands  euro; Std. Dev. : Standard Deviation                   (Continues next page)  
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Table 4.3 – Group summary statistics 
                                                                                                                                                                                              (Conclusion) 
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Total Assets* 111.289,268 19.165,410 12.559,780 1.218,769 19.292,83 
Customers’ resources growth 0,4453 0,0596 0,0682 -0,7874 0,1307 
Credit Overdue 0,7254 0,2021 0,1732 0,0119 0,1538 
Staff Costs 13,4681 0,6692 0,4020 -1,3229 1,5750 
Structural Costs 8,0206 0,4390 0,2893 -0,6081 0,9209 
Expenses Ratio 4,5101 1,1759 0,9768 0,6239 0,6098 
ROSC 5,3851 -0,6103 0,0544 -12,2339 2,7510 
Indebtedness 2,1132 1,0701 0,9867 0,7570 0,2462 
Notes:* Thousands euro; Std. Dev. : Standard Deviation   
4.3.3 - Results 
To determine which of the 7 performance indicators represent the probability of a 
governance intervention, a stepwise procedure combining forward and backward 
elimination is applied. The model starts as a baseline model without any variable on it. 
Then the 7 indicators are considered one at each time and added to the model if 
succeeding in the selection criterion based on a p-value of 5%. When a new variable is 
added to the model, the variables previously included are evaluated for exclusion, at 
10% significance level. The ones that fail are excluded. When no more variables can be 
added or removed, the algorithm stops.   
The application of this approach, using Likelihood ratio statistics, excludes the control 
variable Total Assets and the Indebtedness indicator from Model 1, and ROCS indicator 
from both models. 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the MNL models estimation. For each event, the 
coefficients measure the impact of each variable on the probability of each event with 
respect to the baseline case (no governance interventions in the following year), being to 
be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio. 
  
Variables Max Mean Median Min Std. Dev. 
In
te
rim
 D
ire
ct
or
s 
Total Assets* 312.620,604 70.037,540 33.199,860 5.137,3510 81.927,560 
Customers’ resources growth 0,2686 0,0345 0,0364 -0,1802 0,0710 
Credit Overdue 0,6683 0,1879 0,1331 0,0147 0,1457 
Staff Costs 5,4095 0,2665 0,3878 -22,3365 2,3512 
Structural Costs 3,5156 0,2673 0,2836 -6,7920 0,8114 
Expenses Ratio 3,1628 1,0212 0,8965 0,2688 0,4486 
ROSC 9,3133 -0,2105 0,1321 -13,2999 2,6080 
Indebtedness 4,9566 1,1710 1,0255 0,8166 0,6130 
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Table 4.4 - MNL model results 
Mechanisms    
 
Performance 
Indicators 
Model 1 Model 2 
Internal External Internal External 
Board of 
Directors 
Turnover 
Central 
CCAM 
intervention 
& Merger or 
incorporation 
Board of Directors Turnover Central CCAM 
intervention 
Merger or 
incorporation 
Partial Chairman Total Agent Interim 
Directors 
Constant -2,027* 
(0,499) 
-5,108* 
(0,439) 
-1,005 
(1,140) 
-1,091 
(1,391) 
-5,823* 
(1,243) 
-6,374 
(0,718) 
-7,132* 
(0,668) 
-5,769* 
(0,672) 
Customers’ 
resources growth 
0,067 
(0,658) 
-5,451* 
(1,074) 
0,819 
(0,507) 
-4,901* 
(1,747) 
-2,961 
(2,805) 
-4,530*** 
(1,641) 
-8,161* 
(1,498) 
-4,747* 
(1,420) 
Credit overdue -0,388 
(1,315) 
9,167* 
(1,031) 
-0,294 
(1,848) 
-2,016 
(2,274) 
3,084 
(3,238) 
7,647* 
(1,574) 
10,101* 
(1,426) 
8,169* 
(1,358) 
Structural costs 1,692 
(1,096) 
4,913* 
(0,910) 
2,804*** 
(1,623) 
3,471*** 
(1,864) 
0,150 
(3,103) 
4,914* 
(1,142) 
4,849* 
(1,018) 
5,972* 
(1,035) 
Staff costs -0,600 
(0,433) 
-1,515* 
(0,360) 
-1,083 
(0,738) 
-1,030 
(1,018) 
0,286 
(1,628) 
-1,453* 
(0,489) 
-1,407* 
(0,412) 
-1,754* 
(0,453) 
Expenses ratio 0,450 
(0,560) 
2,052* 
(0,428) 
0,172 
(0,835) 
0,980 
(0,945) 
0,842 
(1,249) 
2,051* 
(0,517) 
1,227** 
(0,524) 
2,074* 
(0,485) 
Indebtedness __ __ -1,709 
(1,170) 
-1,872 
(1,460) 
0,997*** 
(0,601) 
0,445 
(0,534) 
1,208* 
(0,407) 
0,337 
(0,504) 
Total assets __ __ 0,000* 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
0,000** 
(0,000) 
0,000* 
(0,000) 
0,000* 
(0,000) 
Year -0,080* 
(0,025) 
0,027 
(0,024) 
-0,124* 
(0,036) 
-0,137* 
(0,045) 
-0,013 
(0,082) 
0,036 
(0,044) 
0,032 
(0,036) 
0,092** 
(0,039) 
Chi-squared  
(degrees of freedom) 
395,272 
(12) 
552,843 
(48) 
Significance level 0,000 0,000 
Notes: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis 
  2. *, **, ***: Significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The results of Model 1 show that the performance variables are not statistically 
significant for the group of internal governance mechanisms, i.e., they do not exercise 
any influence over the probability of BoD turnover. Thus, these governance 
mechanisms are not linked to the CCAM performance, confirming the weakness of 
CCAM internal control mechanisms. On the other side, most of the performance 
indicators (expect ROSC and Indebtedness) are statistically significant for the group of 
external governance mechanisms, i.e., they proved to have influence on the probability 
of a Central CCAM intervention and of a merger or incorporation. This outcome 
demonstrates that external governance mechanisms present greater efficiency in 
disciplining CCAM management than internal control mechanism. 
87 
Overall the signals presented by the variables coefficients correspond to the expected, 
except for the Staff Costs variable which surprisingly present a negative signal meaning 
that it negatively influences the probability of an external governance mechanism act. 
The smaller a value for Staff Costs the greater is the probability of a Central CCAM 
intervention and of a merger or incorporation, which can be understood in the context of 
an option for the qualification/training of the human resources and maybe as 
consequence of members-employees dominance of GA meetings. 
The results achieved can be compared with those of other researchers. Blackwell et al. 
(1994) find a negative relation between accounting profitability and management 
turnover in the subsidiaries of Texas’ multibank holdings. Prowse (1997) found some 
substitution between regulation and other governance mechanisms in banks. Gorton and 
Schmid (1999) argue that only mergers and proxy contests are feasible for co-operative 
banks as control changes. Anderson and Campbell (2000) explain the lack of a 
relationship between executive change and the performance of Japanese banks as 
evidence of the banking sector’s inefficiencies. Crespi et al. (2004), for the Spanish 
banks, only observe a negative association between governance activity and economic 
performance in saving banks that merge, evidence of their weak internal governance 
mechanism.  
The Model 2 allows us to check for the influence of each mechanism individually. 
Regarding the probability of a BoD turnover, the Structural Costs has statistically 
positive influence over the probabilities of a partial turnover and chairman turnover. 
This last one is also (statistically) negatively influenced by Customers’ Resources 
Growth indicator. Total turnover is only negatively influenced by Indebtedness. 
Looking at these results we first note the real and perceived importance of Indebtedness 
indicator for CCAM survival, and of the BoD chairman role in detriment of other 
directors’ role.  
The probability of a Central CCAM intervention by the nomination of an agent or 
interim directors and the probability of a merger or incorporation are (statistically) 
negatively influenced by Customers’ Resources Growth and Staff Costs indicators and 
positively influenced by Credit Overdue, Structural Costs and Expenses Ratio 
indicators. Moreover, the probability of a Central CCAM intervention by the 
nomination of interim directors is also negatively influenced by Indebtedness. The 
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results highlight the importance of the Central CCAM supervision task in monitoring 
their associates, and of the merging activity on SICAM overall performance. More 
specifically:  
- Customers’ Resources Growth is a measure of the CCAM competitive strength and 
in a certain way of the members’ commitment.  “Voting with their feet” is not usual 
(or easy) for CCAM members as it is for IOFs shareholders. The closing of the 
CCAM membership status is a delayed, often financially harmful operation that 
needs BoD previous approval. “Voting with their deposits” is the CCAM version of 
it! It is the first sign of the members’ disapproval of CCAM management. On the 
other hand, giving the saver profile of CCAM, Customers’ Resources Growth is also 
a measure of their market share and competitive strength. This is illustrated by the 
statistically significance and negative sign associated to the variable coefficient. 
- The positive, statistically significant, sign of the Credit Overdue coefficient is at 
harmony with the importance of the management of credit risks for banks and 
particularly for CCAM, given that its net worth is highly dependent from financial 
margin results. CCAM double specialization (in customer served and products 
offered) reinforces this situation and strengthens the importance of an efficient (and 
prudential) risk management lending policy. 
- Regarding operational costs, the negative, statistically significant, sign of the Staff 
Costs coefficient is somewhat surprising. Small CCAM have limited ability to 
recruit highly qualified management and to train their staff (Cabo, 2003) and usually 
the need of investment in qualified labour is the justification for CCAM mergers and 
incorporations. Labour market rigidity, CCAM policy of “no firings” (Cabo, 2003) 
and SICAM bet in the qualification/training of human resources can enlighten this 
outcome. Indeed, looking into SICAM social reports we observe positive values for 
job creation, with CCAM presenting, in the last decade, an annual average increase 
of 2%. Moreover, Crédito Agrícola puts money on internal and external training 
programmes for CCAM employees, providing internally more than 100,000 annual 
teaching hours, for 8,000 trainees, adding up to 5,000 hours of external training. 
This bet in the qualification is reflected in the system of promotions, being most of it 
based on merit. On the other hand, most of the CCAM employees are also members 
of it. Ordinary members invest modestly and (consequently) had moderate interest 
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in the development of CCAM. Members-employees have a big stake on CCAM 
(their job for start), thus, they are deeply involved in CCAM life, actively 
participating in the GA, and influencing CCAM strategies and policies.   
- Structural Costs and Expenses ratio present, as expected, a positive, statistically 
significant, sign, thus, proving to affect the probability of an external governance 
intervention. This is  coherent to the fact that the small size of the CCAM limits the 
rationalization of administrative costs (Cabo, 2003) and, according to Cabo and 
Rebelo (2005), cuts-off in administrative costs is a determining factor leading to 
merger operations. Banking is a highly demanding activity, where cost efficiency is 
crucial for success. Literature suggests that banking industry competition is mostly 
based in cost efficiency neglecting revenue efficiency. Moreover, CCAM low 
income customers prevent CCAM from pursuing a revenue efficiency strategy, 
attaining high profit margins by applying superior prices in their operations. This 
strengthens the need for cost efficiency, justifying their positive influence over 
CCAM probability of governance intervention. 
- Indebtedness negative, statically significant, sign for BoD total turnover and Central 
CCAM intervention by the nomination of interim directors’ mechanisms illustrates 
the importance of strong capitalization for CCAM success. The importance of 
banking system capitalization was evident in the 2008 crisis and recently in the 
European sovereign debt crisis. CCAM co-operative nature makes it arduous for 
them to boost equity. Considering that capitalization upgrading is expected to occur 
due to the increase of equity via better net benefits, profitability improvements are 
decisive. Thus, BoD turnover or the nominations of interim directors are entirely 
justifiable when a CCAM suffers capitalization problems. Furthermore, considering 
the solidarity mechanism acting in the SICAM is understandable this Central 
CCAM concern with the individual CCAM indebtedness.  
 
4.4 - Conclusions 
Legislation, ownership structure (control and residual claims), “market” for corporate 
control, board of directors, debt-holders and central organizations and executive 
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compensation, were identified as the major CCAM governance mechanisms operating 
in the CCAM associated from SICAM.  
The results of the MNL models to assess the efficiency of different control mechanisms 
in discipline CCAM management show that overall internal governance mechanisms 
(BoD turnover) are not related to the CCAM performance, which indicates potential 
weakness of the CCAM internal control mechanisms. On the other hand, external 
governance mechanisms are related to CCAM operational and cost efficiency 
indicators, demonstrating the importance of these mechanisms in disciplining CCAM 
management. Moreover, the results highlight the value of the supervision task of 
Central CCAM in the performance of the associates.  
Comparing the CCAM experiencing governance intervention with those that did not 
witness it, the main conclusions are: (1) Merged CCAM and those target of a Central 
CCAM intervention present weaker operational efficiency, either in credit management, 
with higher bad loans, or in customer resources management, with minor deposits 
growth. Moreover they experience cost efficiency deficiency, particularly, they hold 
heavy structural costs. Unexpectedly, the costs with human resources are smaller for 
these CCAM. (2) The choice among a Central intervention by the nomination of an 
agent or interim directors is mainly due to the performance of indebtedness indicator. A 
bad score in this indicator motivates a deeper interference from the central organisation, 
even with potential replacement of CCAM governing bodies, attesting for the crucial 
role of indebtedness for CCAM survival. (3) Both CCAM with BoD partial turnover 
and chairman turnover hold heavier structural costs and CCAM with chairman turnover 
present minor customer resources growth. (4) Indebtedness is the only trigger for total 
BoD turnover.  
These remarks confirm the decision-related incentive problems of co-operatives, which 
create a potentially weak internal system of corporate governance (Crespi et al., 2004; 
Gorton and Schmid; 1999; Prowse, 1997). The robustness of the results will be 
improved if the effects of CCAM management and governing bodies’ remuneration and 
of debt-holder FGCAM monitoring in CCAM performance were analysed, which is a 
topic for further research. 
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Chapter 5 - The Determinants of CCAM Failure  
 
5.1 - Introduction  
The 2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign crisis that follow it left no doubt 
that if big banks get into troubles taxpayers end up bailing out them, showing that banks 
which are global and private in life are national and public in death. This is one reason 
because the robustness of the European banking system is a current concern and a 
policy priority to national authorities.  
The recent financial crisis and subsequent economic recession highlight both the 
strengths and weaknesses of co-operative banks (The Economist, January, 23th 2010: 
66). In the Portuguese case, there is no doubt that the improvement of co-operative 
banking performance is a strategic and operational necessity to ensure the economic and 
financial survival of Agricultural Credit Co-operatives (CCAM - Caixas de Crédito 
Agrícola Mútuo). The co-operative nature and unique business approach makes the 
CCAM a powerful force for Portuguese economic recovery, working as a stabilizing 
factor in the banking industry and a booster of local development, particularly in 
regions which economy is supported by agriculture. Indeed, CCAM have tried to 
encourage modernisation in the agricultural sector, through training and measures to 
combat depopulation, along with financial options that make it possible to develop new 
techniques and technologies, new forms of organisation and the potential for start-ups, 
for instance in bio-fuel or in agro-industry (Crédito Agrícola, 2011).  
Although Crédito Agrícola performance, as a group, compares favourably with that 
investor owned banks, individual CCAM occasionally do enter in distress, as illustrated 
by past events. The increasingly large size of the CCAM raises concerns regarding the 
resolution of potential distress situations, given some of the rules governing co-
operatives. 
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In the past, resolution of CCAM drawbacks typically involved merger or incorporation 
of the weak CCAM by the stronger CCAM (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005). However, this 
strategy is more difficult to apply to a large systemic CCAM and CCAM regional 
orientation can be a constraint to find an adequate merger partner, without losing the 
individual territorial identity. 
As a system, in the process of strategic planning, more specifically, in the phase of 
diagnosis and subsequent adoption of plausible prescriptions by the main stakeholders 
[members, customers, staff and others partners working for the Group, local 
communities, suppliers and the State (as a fiscal and regulatory body)], it is important to 
know something about the survival of the units that integrate the system. In other words, 
it is relevant to estimate the probability that a CCAM with a given set of characteristics 
will survive longer than some specified length of time into the future, and identify the 
characteristics that most contributed to the CCAM insolvency. The achievement of this 
objective requires the use of some sort of statistical model to translate CCAM 
characteristics into estimates of risk.  
The issue of insolvency and causes of its possible occurrence has been studied by 
several authors, in order to anticipate the restructuring processes and to reduce  the 
probability of bankruptcy. The first study on insolvency prediction was published in 
1932 (Patrick, 1932 apud Kanitz, 1978). However, the topic only flourished in the 
1970s with the use of statistical and econometric approaches. In the last four decades 
several studies have addressed this matter, especially regarding bank failure, but co-
operative banks39
This chapter main purpose is to determine the explanatory factors of Portuguese co-
operative bank failures, by identifying “problematic” CCAM and evaluating their risk 
of insolvency as a function of financial indicators, providing regulators and other 
stakeholders with a set of tools that would be predictive of future insolvency and 
perhaps bankruptcy.  
 have been neglected (Wilcox, 2010). 
To accomplish this purpose, the study analyzes CCAM failures in the period between 
1995 and 2009, using a logistic regression analysis (LRA) and a multiple discriminant 
                                                          
39 In this thesis, the term “co-operative bank” includes also saving and credit co-operatives and credit unions. 
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analysis (MDA) for assessing the potential failure of CCAM as a function of 
financial/economical indicators.  
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 frameworks the role of 
the agricultural credit co-operatives in agricultural development. Section 3 discusses the 
corporate failure (insolvency) event and offers a brief literature review on failure 
prediction models and the empirical findings on the failure of financial institutions. 
Section 4 explains the sample-selection method and describes the data. Section 5 
discusses the variables of the model, sample and data used to analyse CCAM failures. 
Section 6 reports the empirical results and, finally, section 7 presents the conclusions. 
 
5.2 - Agriculture, co-operatives and agricultural credit in Portugal 
The agricultural sector is situated within the framework of the rural economy and the 
financial markets. Agricultural credit can play a critical role in agricultural 
development, especially if it is part of a set of tools to promote this development. The 
provision of this input is important because credit or loan able funding (capital) is 
viewed as more than just another resource such as labour, land, equipment and raw 
materials. It determines access to all of the resources on which farmers depend 
(Shephard, 1979).  
The farm family is typically located in an environment characterized by a number of 
market failures. A frequent market failure is limited access to credit, a consequence of 
imperfect and costly information problems found in the financial markets. Such 
problems are known to be particularly important in agriculture (Stiglitz, 1993). Banks 
perceive agricultural credit as risky, and seek to channel credit to less risky sectors. This 
behaviour may be due to rational and efficient responses by the lenders to information 
and contractual problems inherent in agricultural credit markets. As a result of the 
informational imperfections between the lenders and the borrowers, rationing of credit 
demand becomes necessary for financial institutions (Stiglitz, 1994).  
Credit rationing can be a problem for small farmers and, consequently, a serious 
constraint to economic growth and social development of poor regions where the 
agriculture is the main activity. When credit is rationed, some borrowers cannot obtain 
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the amount of credit they desire at the prevailing interest rate, nor can they secure more 
credit by offering to pay a higher interest rate. In such circumstances, liquidity can 
become a binding constraint on farmers’ operations. 
In addition, the literature highlights the potential ability of co-operative banks to 
facilitate financial development in a rural area. In a competitive market, joint-stock 
banks may have an extremely small incentive to develop a physical or institutional 
infrastructure that facilitates the smooth operation of financial intermediation in a rural 
area (e.g., a branch network), because of the public good nature of information about the 
quality of potential customers (Hellmann et al., 1997, 2000). That is, if the bank invests, 
but the quality of the local market is poor, it loses its investment. Even if the quality is 
high, competitive entry reduces its profit immediately. In contrast, co-operative banks, 
whose main economic objective is not profit maximization, but the provision of credit 
services to their members, develop such infrastructures for local financial development 
at the expense of their own profitability. Moreover, it should also be emphasised that in 
several countries, including Portugal, the area of operation for co-operative banks is 
geographically restricted directly/indirectly by the government. In these cases, co-
operative banks have no other choice but to take advantage of their own geographically 
restricted area of operation. For these reasons, it may seem plausible that co-operative 
banks have potential advantages over their private owned counterparts in promoting 
local economic growth, by delivering more sophisticated financial services in rural 
areas. In fact, the literature provides strong evidence that local financial development 
could promote local economic growth (Guiso et al., 2004). 
In Portugal, the use of credit dates back a long time, but its wider use developed notably 
only in the last century. Portugal was a pioneer in the foundation of agricultural credit 
by creating, in the 16th century, charitable banks and community barns. However, it 
was only in the beginning of the 20th century that agricultural credit was established in 
Portugal on an institutional basis. Until the 1980’s agricultural credit was used without 
any link to other tools which lead to specific goals, because of the lack of consistent 
policies of agricultural development in Portugal.  
The Portuguese agricultural landscape has undergone enormous changes in recent 
decades following a process of structural adjustment, after the entry into the European 
Union in 1986. However, Portuguese agriculture is still dominated by small family 
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farms with high labour intensity and small margins; 80 percent of the amount of work 
done in the sector continues to depend on family labour (INE, 2010). Data from the 
Agricultural Census of 2009 (INE, 2010) show that the area occupied by agricultural 
production in Portugal was about 50 percent of the land area of the country - 4.6 million 
hectares, distributed over 304,000 farms (about 25 percent less than in the previous 
agricultural census, in 1999). Based only on two previous factors, it is concluded that 
the average size of farms increased by 2.5 hectare to 11.9 hectare, which ensures 
economies of scale and makes production more competitive.  Still, three quarters of 
Portuguese farms have an average size below five hectares and only 6 percent of 
farmers get their income solely from agriculture and 64 percent are reported to receive 
retirement and other pensions (INE, 2010).  
Access to agricultural credit has particular relevance in the context of agricultural and 
rural development, especially, given the country’s heavy dependence on imported food 
products and the present Portuguese sovereign debt crisis. Historically, governments 
have attempted to overcome agricultural credit constraint problems by subsidizing 
credit, setting up credit guarantee fund schemes and specialized agricultural credit 
institutions – the CCAM - and stimulating institutional innovations in the financial 
system (Santos, 1989). 
Cooperation as a principle of economic and agricultural development has long been 
popular in Portugal. Since the inception of agricultural credit co-operatives in 1911, 
government support has allowed them to play a key role in agricultural development 
programmes. Public entities saw the co-operative as a means of reducing the influence 
of usurious village moneylenders, while increasing savings and providing easier credit 
terms to small farmers (Mansinho, 1989). Agricultural credit co-operatives were 
originally envisaged as a mechanism for pooling the resources of small producers and 
providing them with access to different financial services. Democratic in substance, the 
movement was also an effective instrument of progress in deprived regions, increasing 
productivity, providing food security and generating employment opportunities in rural 
areas, thus ensuring social and economic development. 
Today, the Crédito Agrícola Group (CA) is a co-operative financial group specialised in 
agriculture lending and other complementary services, such as insurance, targeting rural 
and low-income customers, strongly integrated in local communities and playing a 
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crucial role in the struggle to overcome regional and sector discrimination40 in bank 
lending supporting and fuelling local development. CA is an “unique institution” since 
it has been the mainstay of regional development and has contributed, over the years, to 
the prevention of the desertification of the countryside”41
Recent research questions many of the agricultural credit advantages (Gomes, 2009). 
The conception of credit as a factor of production instead of the product of financial 
intermediation ignores an essential property of the financial instrument (is fungible) 
which allows the separation of the intention of the loan from its effective use. Efficient 
intermediation reorients evaluation first to the behaviour of savers and investors and last 
to the performance of the organizations. Nowadays, the subsidized/cheap agricultural 
credit policy is under question because it favours the farmers who demand bigger loans 
and has a high default rates (because of adverse selection and moral hazard behaviours) 
which also debilitates the financial institutions, seriously limiting the contribution of 
financial markets to agricultural development. Market liberalization and financial 
politics directed to flexible, more realistic, nominal interest rates seem to be irreversible 
trends. In this context, the existence of financial institutions, soundly based on their 
origins, and cultivating “proximity”, appears to be a “pro” for the agricultural 
development process. Here credit co-operatives have a key role to play. 
.  
 
5.3 - The corporate failure event: modelling and prediction 
The prediction of corporate failure is important for the firm stakeholders (shareholders, 
creditors, staff, managers, regulators, public entities and local community). However a 
failure of a firm is something that is not easily predicted, though a company does not 
                                                          
40 Banks have the important function to collect resources (savings) and later canalize it, through the credit granted, to 
the different areas of economic activity, regions, companies and individuals, supporting ones (the ones that have 
access to this credit) and strangling others (the ones that do not obtain credit), and, in such way, conditioning the 
economic growth and development. Portuguese banking lending practice favours seaboard urban regions and 
construction, real estate and mortgage credit sectors in detriment of other productive sectors as agriculture and 
hinterland regions. Indeed, according to Portuguese Central Bank (Banco de Portugal, 2012), in December of 2010, 
the credit granted to agriculture represented only 2,036 million Euros (less than 1% of total credit); and credit 
distribution across regions show that less than 10% of the loans go to the hinterland regions; thus aggravating sector 
and regional inequities. This policy is not followed by CCAM. Indeed, 2010 CA credit portfolio broken down by 
regions shows that more than 30% of the credit granted goes to hinterland districts and, in terms of distribution per 
sector, agriculture stake for 11% of it (Crédito Agrícola, 2011). 
41 Dr. João Costa Pinto during the commemorations of 30º anniversary of FENACAM, 28 of November of 2008. 
100 
collapse before the onset of some economic and financial indicative signs. Economic 
and financial ratios could be used as a means to the early detection of insolvency.  
Different economic and financial indicators have been used to analyse the insolvency of 
firms, though there is no consensus between authors regarding the definition of 
insolvency and even the appropriate prediction insolvency models. Altman (1968) 
considers that failure occurs when the shareholders receive profitability lower than 
alternatives supplied by the market under similar conditions. For Emery and Finnerty 
(1997), failure occurs when a firm is not able to pay its debts. Matias and Siqueira 
(1996) classified a bank as insolvent (failed or bankrupted) if it was under intervention 
or in liquidation by the supervising entity. Similarly, Janot (2001) considers that a firm 
becomes insolvent when it presents negative equity or if it is impossible to continue 
operating without incurring losses that would result in negative equity. This author also 
defines it as insolvent when an institution is placed under evidence by the supervising 
authorities. He concludes that the identification of a financial institution as a likely 
candidate for failure by bank regulatory agencies is a signal of insolvency. 
The main reason to knowing the sources of corporate failure is to prevent it (Argenti, 
1976). However, it is hard to discover the causes except via its symptoms. Thus, the 
study of corporate failure, addressing its causes, is essentially based on the analysis of 
visible and detectable symptoms.  
The failure process results from the mix of several external and internal factors. Some 
of these causes are mismanagement, deficiency in the accounting systems, inability to 
adapt to a changing environment, engaging in over-risky projects, exaggerated leverage, 
and risk inherent to the firm’s activity sector, among many others. Macroeconomic 
conditions also influence a firm’s health (Richardson et al., 1998). Table 5.1 
summarizes the main causes of corporate failure. With regard to symptoms, Argenti 
(1976) points out the deterioration experienced in the financial ratios as the most 
significant sign of corporate failure.  
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Table 5.1 - Causes of corporate failure 
External causes   
 - From the market - Huge competition;  
- Strong fall in demand. 
 - From the political, economic 
and social environment 
- Regressive phase of the economic cycle; 
- Crisis (Oil Crisis, Gulf War, Iraq War, local 
conflicts, etc.); 
- Government economic policies; 
- Radical and significant social changes. 
Internal causes 
 
 - Administrative inefficiency; 
- Wrong or inadequate strategies; 
-  Inefficient productive system; 
-  Non-profitable investments; 
- Extreme indebtedness, especially in times of 
high interest rates; 
- End of product life-cycle; 
- Failure of other group companies; 
- Unresolved internal problems; 
- Huge delays. 
Special causes  - New companies experience a high “mortality” 
rate in the first years of activity. 
Source: Adapted from Gabás (1980) 
Relatively to the banking industry, the literature emphasises the influence of 
macroeconomic variables, frauds, management imprudence and consecutive losses 
(Fully-Bressan, 2002). Gimenes (1998) highlights external causes, such as a strong fall 
in demand, economic recession, governmental policies and radical and significant social 
changes, and internal causes, like management inefficacy, inadequate business strategy, 
inefficient productive system and huge indebtedness. 
The use of failure prediction models started at the ends of the 1960s and continues to 
nowadays. To study this issue, four different kinds of model have been used: a) 
statistical models (univariate analysis, multiple discriminate analyses and logit 
regression analyses), b) gambler’s ruin-mathematical/statistical models, c) survival 
models (as the Cox proportional hazards model), and d) artificial neural network 
models.  
Univariate analysis assumes that a single variable can be used for predictive purposes 
(Cook and Nelson, 1998). The univariate model, as proposed by Beaver (1966), 
achieved a moderate level of predictive accuracy (Sheppard, 1994). Univariate analysis 
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identifies factors related to financial distress, but does not provide a measure of the 
relevant risk (Stickney, 1996).  
Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) attempts to overcome the potentially conflicting 
indications that may result from using single variables (Cook and Nelson, 1998). The 
best-known and most-widely used MDA method is that proposed by Altman (1968). 
Despite the positive results of his study, Altman’s model has a key weakness: it assumes 
variables in the sample data as normally distributed. If one variable is not normally 
distributed, the method employed may result in a biased selection of a set of predictors 
(Sheppard, 1994).  
The Zavgren (1980) model corrected this problem. Her model is considered more 
robust, due to its use of logit analysis (Lo, 1986). Furthermore, the logit regression 
analysis (LRA) provides the probability (in percentage terms) of bankruptcy. In 
addition, the probability calculated might be considered a measure of the effectiveness 
of management (i.e. effective management will not lead a company to the verge of 
bankruptcy). During the 1980s and 1990s, LRA was predominantly used at the expense 
of MDA (Stickney, 1996). 
The Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) has also been used to predict failure 
events [as in Rocha (1999), Janot (2001), Martins (2003) and Braga et al. (2006)]. The 
Cox model presents three main advantages over other risk modelling techniques, such 
as discriminant analysis and Logit/Probit model: it can be used to generate the probable 
time to failure; it does not require to set assumptions about the data’s distributional 
properties, and results from the Cox model are considerably more significant than the 
ones from alternative models (Whalen, 1991). When compared with logit in their ability 
to predict the insolvency, hazards models proved to be superior (Lee and Urrutia 1996; 
Janot, 2001). 
More recently, alternative models, as the Gambler’s Ruin models, have been used to 
predict financial distress.  Wilcox (1971 and 1976), Santomero (1977), Vinso (1979) 
and others have adapted a gambler’s ruin approach to bankruptcy prediction.  
Further, Neural Networks impose less restrictive data requirements than other methods 
(the requirement for linearity, for example) and are especially useful in recognising and 
learning complex data relationships. Empirical research has found that the approaches 
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perform similarly and the robustness of the results is higher if different methods are 
used (Altman et al., 1994). 
To sum up, until the early 1980s, MDA was the primary multivariate methodological 
approach to ratio-based modelling of corporate failure. However, as new statistical tools 
became available, researchers started testing them with the objective of deriving models 
that performed as well as MDA, but which relied on fewer assumptions. Regardless of 
the method chosen to compute the results, the majority of them compare with MDA. 
Hossari’s (2007) review of corporate failure studies indicates that when MDA is not the 
main methodology used, it is assumed as a benchmark, highlighting its relevance in 
empirical applications. 
In line with other studies, this work uses LRA and MDA42
 
 for assessing potential failure 
of CCAM as a function of financial/economical indicators.  
5.3.1 - Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) 
MDA is a statistical technique used to identify the variables which better differentiate 
(or discriminate) between two or more groups of individuals, structurally, different and 
mutually exclusive, and employs them to create a score (or discriminant function) that 
parsimoniously represents the differences between groups  (Maroco, 2003). It can be 
used to make predictions in situations where the dependent variable is qualitative 
(bankrupt or non-bankrupt). In the first step explicit group classifications are 
established. Next, data are collected, taking into account the internal characteristics of 
the groups. Then, is derived a linear combination of these characteristics (financial 
ratios) which “best” discriminates between the groups (Altman, 1968).  
If a CCAM has characteristics (financial ratios) which can be quantified for all of the 
CCAM in the analysis, the MDA determines a set of discriminant coefficients. When 
these coefficients are applied to the actual CCAM ratios, a basis for classification into 
one of the mutually exclusive groupings exists. The MDA technique has the advantage 
                                                          
42 Despite the general advantages of Cox model the characteristics of the data available proved it was difficult to 
apply it to predict CCAM failure in similar conditions to LRA and MDA, as the Cox model requires the construction 
of a specific data base different from the one used in LRA and MDA models (the Cox model uses only data to a 
specific year in the estimation while the LRA and MDA models use data from a range of years) and consequently the 
results would not be comparable. Cabo and Rebelo (2010b) apply this approach to analyze the CCAM survival.  
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of considering an entire profile of characteristics common to the relevant firms, as well 
as the interaction of these properties (Altman, 1968). 
The MDA discriminant function:  
kk XXXZ βββ +++= ...2211  
transform individual variable values to a single discriminant score or Z value which is 
then used to classify the object, where X1, ,..., Xk  are independent variables and β1, β2, 
…,  βk the  discriminant coefficients.  
The MDA computes the discriminant coefficients, βj, while the independent variables Xj 
are the actual values, where j =1, 2, …, k. 
Altman (1968) indicates that a potentially high degree of correlation or collinearity 
between some ratios, while requiring a careful selection of the predictive variables 
(ratios), has the advantage of generating a model with a relatively small number of 
selected measurements with the potential to convey a great deal of information. The 
main advantage of MDA is its potential to analyse the entire variable profile of the 
object simultaneously, rather than sequentially examining its individual characteristics. 
Thus, ratios presenting significant differences between groups, but not of a magnitude 
to facilitate the development of an accurate prediction model, are excluded. 
 
5.3.2 - Logistic Regression Analysis (LRA) 
The Logit model is a model of qualitative response. It analyzes the relationship between 
dependent (or response) variables and independent (or explanatory) variables. The 
dependent variable is always categorical, while the independent variables can be 
numerical or categorical. These models are applicable to a more extensive set of 
research situations than MDA (Judge et al., 1985).  
While MDA requires the assumption of multivariate normality of the independent 
variables and equal variance-covariance matrices in the two groups to obtain an 
excellent forecast rule the LRA requires fewer assumptions and, even when the 
assumptions required by MDA are satisfied, LRA still presents good results (Norusis, 
1993). To Lo (1986), MDA and the LRA are equivalent when dealing with models to 
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predict failure. While, for Laffarga et al. (1987) cited by Fully-Bressan (2002) accuracy 
in predicting a firm’s bankruptcy is higher for the LRA model. 
MDA specifies a joint distribution of the dependent variable (Yi) and the independent 
variables (Xi), not only the conditional distribution of Yi given Xi. In models of 
qualitative response, the determination of Xi (in our case characteristics of the CCAM) 
clearly precedes Yi (insolvency). Thus, it is important to specify Pr(Yi =1|X) while the 
specification of the distribution of X can be ignored. On the contrary, in the MDA, Yi 
precedes the determination of X. 
In brief, MDA is a mere technique of classification, while LRA analyses the causal 
relation (Janot, 2001). LRA is used for prediction of the probability of occurrence of an 
event by making use of several predictor (independent) variables. In our case, the 
predictor variables are financial ratios and the aim is to estimate the probability of a 
given CCAM being insolvent. 
The logit model assumes the logistic function functional form: 
βxi−+
==
exp1
11)prob(yi  
where: Y = binary variable (assumes the value of 0 or 1); X = column vector of p+1 
dimension, where p is the number of independent variables; β = unknown parametric 
vector that we intend to estimate. 
The estimated probability always lies between 0 and 1, independently of the value of 
Xiβ. Essentially, the estimation of the Logit model intends to produce a set of 
probabilities. The CCAM which declared insolvency have a higher ex-ante probability 
of insolvency compared with the others. A “good adjustment” is a set of coefficients 
closest to this objective. Logit regression allows testing the significance of individual 
estimated coefficients, which is not the case with MDA. Additionally, LRA is more 
flexible and has a higher statistical power (Lo, 1986).   
Table 5. 2 summarizes the key characteristics and assumptions of LRA and MDA 
methods.  
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Table 5.2 - LRA and MDA key characteristics and assumptions 
Method 
Assumes normality and 
equal group covariances 
matrices 
Functional form Assumes 
homokedasticity 
Distribution of 
itu  
LRA No Non linear Yes Logistic 
MDA Yes Non linear No Non applicable 
Source: Adapted from Lennox (1999) 
5.3.3 - Earlier studies of co-operative and non co-operative bank failures 
Failures of co-operative and non co-operative (commercial) banks have not been studied 
to an equal extent in recent decades. Commercial bank failures were the first to be 
studied using statistically sophisticated methods, and they continue to attract the most 
scholarly interest. Co-operative bank failures have been studied only sporadically, and 
these studies have rarely used statistically sophisticated methods (Wilcox, 2010).  
The earlier studies focused on small samples of banks over short time spans, but other 
studies investigated failures over long time spans (Martin, 1977; Harrison and Ragas, 
1995; Fuller and Kohers, 1994; Jordan and Rosengren, 2002; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006).  
A number of studies document the large differences in failures and insurance losses of 
commercial banks and variations in the coefficients and statistical significance of 
explanatory variables over time and under different macroeconomic, regulatory, or 
industrial conditions (Hanc, 1998; Kaufman; 2004).  
Different studies (Fuller and Kohers; 1994; Harrison and Ragas, 1995; Helwege, 1996; 
King et al., 2006) compare the estimates of models predicting failures across different 
time periods and find that the variables likely to be significant in explaining failure have 
been roughly similar but that the values of the coefficients (and thus their economic 
significance) vary with time. King et al. (2006), comparing the characteristics of failing 
and surviving commercial banks in 1984–1994 and 1995–2003, report that, during their 
earlier period of study, failing commercial banks are larger than average, held more 
commercial real estate, and did not experience climbing cash levels before failure. 
During the later period, each of these warning signs was reversed, or was no longer 
predictive. Oshinsky and Olin (2006) also find changes in the patterns of bank problems 
and failures. They report that in the early 1990s, most banks classified as troubled 
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remained troubled 6 to 24 months later, but in late 1990s most banks classified as 
“troubled” recovered within 6 to 24 months. 
On the other hand, some research examines the “too big to fail” hypothesis, showing 
that the characteristics and mechanics of failure are different for banks with different 
sizes. Kaufman (2004) contrasts failures, losses, and loss-to-asset ratios in commercial 
banks with different asset sizes. King et al. (2006) find that, on average, failing banks 
were larger than surviving ones in 1984–1994 but smaller in 1995–2003. However, the 
small number of large bank failures has limited the ability to study them separately from 
failures among smaller banks. Demigurc-Kunt (1989) and Kolari et al. (2001) are 
among the few studies to model the characteristics of failing commercial banks 
segregated by assets. Even in these studies, the paucity of data forces the time covered 
to be short (e.g., 1989–1992 in Kolari et al. (2001)), limiting their predictive capacity. 
Many studies of failures (e.g., Glennon and Golan 2003) have included as explanatory 
variables different measures of state macroeconomic performance, with mixed results. 
Nuxoll (2003) reports that models that include macroeconomic variables do not perform 
significantly better than models that do not include them. Jordan and Rosengren (2002) 
find that macroeconomic forecasts provide little additional information on bank- 
specific financial data to predict failures during prosperous times, but that such forecasts 
are relevant during troubled periods. Similarly, DeYoung (1999) finds that banks are 
more prone to failure during recession and are very unlikely to fail during expansion 
times.  
The failures of co-operative banks have been described in several studies but without 
using statistically sophisticated methods (Gordon et al., 1987; Gordon, 1991; Shafroth, 
1997). These studies identify a number of variables likely to play a role in credit union 
failures and losses, some of them akin to those found in studies of commercial bank and 
thrift failures, namely riskier assets (real estate loans and member business loans) and 
high non-interest expenses. The authors suggest some additional risk factors of credit 
unions that are distinctive and particularly to the smallest credit unions: small size, 
youth, sponsor failures, poor record keeping, weak lending and collection practices, and 
refinancing delinquent loans. 
If compared with commercial banks, the use of statistical methods to study co-operative 
bank failures is scarce. Exceptions are Kharadia and Collins (1981) that use ordinary 
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least squares (OLS) to model failures of federal credit unions in 1960–1971 and Kane 
and Hendershott (1996) using logit to predict failures of federally insured credit unions 
in 1987–1990. More recently, Maggiolini and Mistrulli’s (2005) survival analysis 
studies the features of the new Co-operative Credit Banks (CCBs) established in Italy 
during the 1990s. The authors found that duration is positively related to the market 
share of large banks and is higher when there are no incumbent CCBs in the same 
market and the survival probability is directly related to the local level of gross 
domestic product (GDP). Fiordelisi and Mare (2011), using a discrete time survival 
model, show that efficiency has a positive and statistically significant link with the 
probability of survival of co-operative banks. Studies conducted by Fully-Bressan 
(2002), Fully-Bressan et al. (2004), Braga et al. (2006) and Carvalho et al. (2009) 
focused on Brazilian credit co-operatives. The first two studies employed a logit and 
Cox proportional hazard model. Their results suggest that the relevant indicators for 
insolvency prediction are capitalization, volunteer covering and fund-raising growth, 
and, for relative risk analysis, liquidity, short run disposable resources and labour cost. 
Braga et al. (2006), using a Cox proportional hazard model, indicate that the relevant 
indicators for insolvency prediction are, in descending order of predictive ability, 
general liquidity, salary and benefit expenses, and loan/equity ratio. Finally, Carvalho et 
al. (2009), using both logit and Cox proportional hazard models, conclude that credit 
co-operative mortality depends on their size and operational efficiency. 
Some studies investigate the failure of co-operative and non co-operative financial 
institutions. Schaeck and Wolfe (2005), drawing on an original dataset of distressed co-
operative and savings banks, develop early warning indicators for banking difficulties, 
using a parametric approach. These authors’ findings indicate that banks in West 
Germany are less risky than credit institutions in the Neue Länder and co-operatives are 
more prone to experience financial difficulties than savings banks. Wilcox (2005) 
compares the evolution of failures and insurance losses in credit unions and commercial 
banks and the characteristics of failing and surviving credit unions for banks with 
different sizes and for different sub periods. This author reports that, between credit 
unions, smaller asset size, lower capital, higher loan- to-asset ratios, higher non-interest 
expenses, and more delinquent loans were associated with lower failure rates. Beck et 
al. (2009) assess the stability of German banks using three different measures of bank 
stability,  the z-score, a standard measure of distance from insolvency, non-performing 
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loans, and distress probabilities derived from hazard models, finding consistent 
evidence that investor owned banks are less stable than government-owned savings 
banks and co-operative banks. Furthermore, co-operative banks are farther away from 
insolvency than government-owned savings banks, but are more likely to become 
distressed than savings banks. The authors also find evidence for the too-big-to-fail 
phenomenon, as larger privately-owned banks hold less risk-weighted capital than their 
smaller peers, thus moving closer to insolvency, but face lower distress probability. Co-
operative or savings banks, on the other hand, are more stable if larger. 
Wilcox (2010) presents the first large-scale, long-term (1981–2005) econometric 
analysis (logit and OLS) of individual commercial bank and credit union failures. The 
author concludes that the behaviours and operating procedures that foretell credit union 
failures differ from those that foretell bank failures. He found that the variables 
traditionally used to analyze private bank failures (i.e. smaller asset size, higher ratios of 
net loans, commercial and industrial  loans, provisions for loan losses, delinquent loans, 
non-interest expenses, higher state unemployment rates, lower ratios of capital and 
ROA)  are useful in analysing credit union failures.  However, most individual variables 
have coefficients that are statistically different for samples of credit unions and 
commercial banks. The value and significance of coefficients could vary with typology 
of bank, asset size ranges and time periods. More unsecured loans were associated with 
increased failures among small credit unions but not among other banks. Failures of 
medium-sized credit unions were not associated with several variables that affected 
other banks, such as residential mortgages, non-interest expenses, and the state 
unemployment rate. Furthermore, the author found that past failure rates and the 
percentage of banks at a high risk for future failure are generally lower for larger banks, 
for credit unions, and in later periods. Usually, credit unions have lower failure rates 
than commercial banks of the same size, but, in recent years, small credit unions have 
had higher failure rates than small banks. 
5.4 - Data and sample  
5.4.1 - The CCAM failure event 
The agricultural co-operative credit system in Portugal is made up of an integrated 
system (SICAM) of two types of co-operatives: the central and the individual 
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(associated) in a regime of co-responsibility. SICAM = Central CCAM + Associated 
CCAM (85 local CCAM).  
Nowadays, celebrating their hundredth anniversary, Portuguese credit co-operatives had 
a tough birth and a difficult childhood: mismanagement, lack of funds and political 
control and interference resulted in a fairly inactive life until the eighties of last century. 
Following the 1974 political changes and the entry of Portugal into the European Union 
in 1986, CCAM experienced a spectacular growth in their activity, as they were 
considered an important factor in the framework of a financing strategy for the 
development of the agricultural sector. But this was a period of euphoric growth and 
disorganization.  
During the 1990s the financial imbalance, that touch most of the 211 CCAM, began to 
be resolved via a merging process driven by SICAM.  The root of this strategy is a 
report prepared by SICAM, based on 1992 data, which concludes that to generate 
consistent net benefits a typical CCAM must have deposits up to 70 million euro, a 
value not achieved by 96.6% of CCAM (Cabo, 2003). Despite these initial 
circumstances, only few CCAM went bankrupt and nowadays SICAM has a significant 
position in the Portuguese banking system, especially, regarding employment, branches 
network and total deposits, being one of the most robust entities operating within it, 
with an excellent position with regard to efficiency, solvency, liquidity, and customer 
claims (Cabo and Rebelo, 2010a). These results derive above all from two main factors: 
the intense restructuring process carried out within SICAM and SICAM governance 
structure and control mechanisms. 
The restrictions on internal growth imposed by the local nature of CCAM43
                                                          
43 The CCAM’ activity is restricted to the county (“concelho”) where it is located, i.e., the CCAM are regional 
organizations and their product markets are limited. 
 and the lack 
of funding and time, led SICAM decision makers to engage in an intense process of 
merging and restructuring operations, financially supported by the Insurance Fund of 
Agricultural Co-operative Credit (FGCAM). This process was so intense that, in ten 
years, CCAM’s average assets increased more than fourfold and in 2010 the number of 
CCAM was reduced to 85. Although this process continues [until it reached the ideal 
number of 70 CCAM (Portal da Serra: 21st November 2006)] “the merger process is 
now fundamentally geared to buttressing operating structures in the Caixas concerned 
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and not to solving financial imbalances” (Credito Agricola, 2010: 7). This strategy not 
only “saved” distressed CCAM from bankruptcy but also provided CCAM with the 
operational conditions necessary to compete efficiently with other credit institutions in a 
changing and challenging banking system.  
SICAM establishes a regime of co-responsibility between Central CCAM and its 
members. Central CCAM guarantees its associates without limitations and is also 
guaranteed by them. SICAM is, in this way, subordinated to a double guardianship. 
Furthermore, when a CCAM gets into financial distress, the Central CCAM has an 
incentive to protect this CCAM from default because it is important to maintain the high 
reputation of the whole CCAM system and the confidence of its different stakeholders 
(members, depositors, borrowers, Bank of Portugal).  
Within SICAM management control is often exercised by Central CCAM whose role is 
to orientate and supervise, and, consequently is the first to detect managerial failures. In 
cases of gross mismanagement or fraud, CCAM governing bodies can be formally 
dismissed by Central CCAM, under its supervision and intervention powers. Indeed, 
Central CCAM is empowered to intervene in the associates, by the assignment of a 
representative to monitor CCAM management or by the nomination of interim directors 
whenever it verifies an imbalance situation which, because of its extension or 
continuity, can jeopardize the daily running of the CCAM, its solvency is at risk or 
serious irregularities occur. Moreover, when the associate is in serious financial 
imbalance, or at risk of being so, and not following Central CCAM guidelines, Central 
CCAM can dismiss all or part of the associated management and supervision boards and 
assign interim directors to them. Long-term inefficiencies are often resolved through 
“forced”44
                                                          
44 Although mergers are friendly (they must be approved by the general meeting) the influence of Central CCAM is 
considerable, being this top institution the trigger and even the one that choose the merger partners (Cabo and 
Rebelo, 2005). 
 merger with another (more efficient) CCAM. Additionally, the FGCAM, as 
was as the assuring of CCAM customers’ deposit, promotes SICAM solvency and 
liquidity and, therefore, performs an active role in the economic and financial 
restructuring process of SICAM, offering financial support in the form of subordinated 
loans. Rescuing operations by FGCAM are conditional on an economic and financial 
restructuring process which often includes the merging with (or incorporation into) 
more efficient CCAM.  
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5.4.2 - Sample 
The period under study is 1995-2009 and includes the CCAM associates of SICAM, a 
pooled of 1,827 observations. The financial data are collected from annual accounting 
reports and the non-financial data (CCAM mergers and incorporations, Central CCAM 
interventions, and others) from “Diário da República45
The profound SICAM restructuring process reduced the number of CCAM from 190, in 
1995, to just 85, in 2009, only 40% of which were initially considered solvent. The 
1,827 observations of the sample are divided in two groups: group1 has 1,315 
observations and is made up of solvent CCAM, i.e. those that did not become insolvent 
during the study period; group2, with 512 observations, are CCAM that become 
insolvent in the study period. Table 5.3 next page provides summary statistics.  
”, Ministry of Justice website, 
CCAM annual Reports and other SICAM official statements released during the study 
period. 
Most studies of bankruptcy use matching samples composed of pairs of bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt firms. This procedure clearly introduces much sample-selection bias 
(Zavgren, 1980; Lo, 1986) and, therefore, was not followed in this study. The choice of 
a fifteen-year period is not the best procedure, since average ratios shift over time. 
Ideally we would prefer to examine a list of ratios in time1 in order to make predictions 
about other CCAM in the following period, time2. Unfortunately it was not possible to 
do so because of data limitations. However, the number of insolvencies was more-or-
less evenly distributed over the fifteen-year period, thus minimizing its effects on 
estimations.   
                                                          
45 It is the Portuguese government official journal. 
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Table 5.3 - Summary group statistics 
 Max Median Mean Min Std. Dev. 
G
R
O
U
P 
1 
– 
SO
LV
EN
T 
C
C
A
M
 
                              
Credit Growth 3.1420 0.1003 0.1220 -0.2591 0.1558 
Customers Resources Growth 3.6115 0.0855 0.1040 -0.4048 0.1319 
Transformation Ratio 1.2989 0.6433 0.6388 0.1491 0.1535 
Credit Overdue  0.3785 0.0592 0.0727 0.0000 0.0551 
Intermediation Function Ratio 924.8692 2.9055 4.9202 -42.5351 27.5488 
Labour Costs 1.0649 0.3242 0.3318 0.0663 0.1012 
Structural Costs 1.9817 0.6082 0.6181 0.1881 0.1627 
Expenses Ratio 1.7812 0.8432 0.7937 0.0000 0.2144 
Liquidity 4.1073 0.3936 0.4686 0.0319 0.4246 
Cash Flow 0.2338 0.0192 0.0232 -0.0046 0.0200 
Indebtedness 0.9992 0.9012 0.8876 0.0565 0.0761 
Debt to Equity ratio 1,306.8825 9.1192 12.9563 0.0599 40.5262 
ROA 0.2095 0.0121 0.0149 -0.1526 0.0171 
ROSC 7.7375 0.1721 0.2600 -1.0915 0.4136 
Financial Margin 0.3224 0.0368 0.0444 0.0011 0.0361 
Total Assets* 352,466.001 31,205.577 44,072.790 726.085 44,008.339 
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Credit Growth 1.5464 0.0656 0.0786 -0.7422 0.1631 
Customers Resources Growth 0.8374 0.0685 0.0748 -0.7874 0.0996 
Transformation Ratio 1.0810 0.6254 0.6205 0.1226 0.1564 
Credit Overdue  0.7254 0.1329 0.1674 0.0024 0.1274 
Intermediation Function Ratio 419.1061 2.4129 7.2080 -63.2969 35.3760 
Labour Costs 13.4681 0.3862 0.4270 -22.3365 1.3072 
Structural Costs 23.6262 0.7420 0.8070 -33.5953 2.0992 
Expenses Ratio 4.5101 0.9120 0.9514 0.0000 0.4784 
Liquidity 5.0659 0.3978 0.5941 0.0360 0.6665 
Cash Flow 0.8619 0.0156 0.0084 -1.0558 0.0826 
Indebtedness 4.9566 0.9868 1.1140 0.4801 0.4977 
Debt to Equity ratio 19,147.8248 5.7891 45.6337 -314.8737 848.6963 
ROA 0.8234 0.0070 -0.0079 -0.7060 0.0853 
ROSC 9.3133 0.1443 -0.1928 -13.2999 1.9825 
Financial Margin 0.5402 0.0344 0.0443 -0.3944 0.0581 
Total Assets* 312,620.604 24,728.779 40,326.560 848.417 51,791.814 
Notes: *In thousands of Euros, 1995 prices; Std. Dev. : Standard Deviation   
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5.5 - Model and variables 
5.5.1 - Model 
A general model of CCAM insolvency is estimated following the failure model: 
ititiit uXFail +=
'* β       
where  
otherwise         0
0    if   1 *
=
≥=
it
itit
Fail
FailFail
 
The dependent variable, Failit, takes a value of 1 if the insolvency requirement is met. 
Otherwise, Failit takes a value of 0. The Xit variables used to predict bankruptcy are 
financial and operating ratios.  
In the iterative way of the modelling process, a core group of predictors was developed 
to which additional predictors were added individually. The core set of variables 
expands as additional factors yield a coefficient with the expected sign, statistic 
significant and improved classification accuracy. This approach concentrates on the 
explanatory power of variables. The selection of the final set of financial and operating 
ratios was based on their conformity to a priori sign expectations, the statistical 
significance of the parameters estimated and on model classification results.   
Methodologically we followed a two-step procedure. In the first step, the 1995-2010 
data were used to categorize CCAM by status: solvent and insolvent CCAM. CCAM 
were placed in the insolvent group when they were positive for one of tests for 
insolvency.  In contrast, a CCAM was categorized as solvent otherwise. Then financial 
ratios were created with the earlier data from 199446
 
-2009. These ratios were used in the 
second step to predict insolvency among CCAM. 
5.5.2 - Variables 
It is not usual to see a CCAM bankruptcy. Over the period of our analysis (1995-2009), 
only 5 CCAM went bankrupt and their assets went transferred to other CCAM. But the 
                                                          
46 Data from 1994 were also collected to allow measurement of growth rates from 1994 to 1995. 
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consulting of the sample financial data for the year 1995 shows that almost 30% of the 
CCAM present negative equity and, additionally, 20% more are severely financially 
distressed and restructuring at FGCAM request. Thus, half of the CCAM, although still 
operating, are insolvent and, without SICAM support, this would certainly be their end. 
Indeed, only one of the 5 bankrupt CCAM belongs to the above-mentioned insolvent 
group.  
Because of this small number of CCAM which went bankrupt as defined, it was 
necessary to refine the definition of “insolvent” to better illustrate the CCAM case. 
Thus, following Cabo and Rebelo (2010b), it was adopted a multidimensional 
interpretation of insolvency in which a CCAM is categorized as insolvent when it meets 
at least one of the following criteria in a given year: (a) presents negative equity; (b) is 
subjected to a Central CCAM intervention or FGCAM47
Using the four insolvency definitions, more CCAM are labelled as insolvent than would 
be the case with a single screen. That is, it is more likely that a solvent CCAM is 
labelled as insolvent; though, as a consequence, more insolvent CCAM may be 
correctly described. This outcome is preferred when the cost of misidentifying a non-
insolvent CCAM as insolvent is lower than the alternative misclassification. Insolvent 
CCAM in period t were defined as those that comply with at least one of the screening 
criteria in t+1 period. In contrast, non-insolvent CCAM does not comply with any of the 
four screen metrics for t+1 period. 
 restructuring operation; (c) is 
incorporated into (or merged with) another CCAM; (d) is bankrupt for any reason.  
As explanatory variables a set of financial ratios is used, created from the balance sheet 
data of the 1994-2009’ period. The choice of variables was based on author previous 
studies of CCAM and from a review of the literature on insolvency. The financial ratios 
represent measures of profitability, financial leverage, liquidity, operating efficiency 
and growth, all of which are factors frequently included in models predicting either 
financial distress or bankruptcy.  
Table 5.4 shows the financial ratios which were tested as independent variables for 
modelling purposes. (The summary statistical measures of these variables were included 
in Table 5.3). 
                                                          
47  A CCAM is considered potentially insolvent if benefits of FGCAM subordinated loans greater than 50% of equity.  
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Table 5.4 - Variable definitions and transformations 
Group 1 – Operational Efficiency and Growth  Group 3 – Leverage and Liquidity  
ProfitNet 
Margin Financial   ratioFunction tion  Intermedia
*
=  
DepositsCostumer 
Loans Total  ratiotion Transforma =  
Credit Gross
OverdueCredit   OverdueCredit =  
1
1- tin timeCredit  Gross
 tin timeCredit  Gross Growth Credit −=  
1
1- tin time  DepositsCustomer 
 tin time  DeposistsCustomer  Growth  ResourcesCustomer −=  
sLiabilitie Total
intitutioncredit  other   & Banks Centralin Cash  Net  Liquidity =
 
Assets Total
ProvisionsNet on AmortisatiProfit Net   FlowCash ++=  
Assets Total
Debt Total  ssIndebtedne =  
Equity
sLiabilitie Total  ratioEquity    Debt  to =  
Group 2 – Cost Efficiency Group 4 – Return ratios 
Revenue  Total
Expenses  Total  ratio  Expenses =  
Margin Financial
ExpensesBenefit    andSalary   Costs  Labours =  
Margin Financial
Expenses tiveAdministra  Costs Structural
**
=  
Assets Total
ProfitNet  ROA =  
Capital rsShareholde
ProfitNet  ROSC  *** =  
Assets Total
Margin Financial Margin  Financial =  
 
Notes: * Net Interest and other similar income; **Costs of general services incurred in controlling and directing an organization, 
such as accounting, energy and water supply, advertising, office resources expenses, etc.; ***The option for Shareholders Capital 
instead of Equity is justified by the existence of CCAM with lower equity resulting from previous years accumulated losses which 
can jeopardise the results of the study.  
The literature on corporate failure provides an extensive battery of ratios helpful to 
understand and predict this event. While taking these into consideration, the limitations 
imposed by the data available and CCAM particularities guided the selection in this 
study.  
CCAM are under a special regime, essentially because of their co-operative form and 
their priority goal to performing agricultural credit operations in favour of their 
members. They are specialized credit banks subjected to various restrictions imposed by 
law, namely, territorial area and authorized operations.  
Credit intermediation is the core business of banking activity, and for CCAM this is 
especially true. Despite CCAM efforts to diversify their net income portfolio, favouring 
a cross-selling strategy of insurance and investment products, financial margin is still 
CCAM main source of income.  A decade ago financial margin contribution to net 
income was around 90%, currently it is reduced to 75%, but is still 15 points above that 
of the overall banking system. This double specialization (in customers served and 
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products offered) is a serious constraint in modern Portugal, where rural exodus is on-
going, the population is concentrated in coastal urban areas and agriculture is in decline. 
In face of this, special care was given to the intermediation function and credit 
management activity. Intermediation function ratio measures the importance of financial 
margin to CCAM returns; a CCAM less dependent on this source of income lowers its 
risk by diversifying. Additionally, the decline of spreads is reducing CCAM earnings. 
Transformation and Credit overdue ratios aim to capture CCAM credit management 
risk. CCAM are saver, not borrower banks, with a prudential lending policy. This 
strategy, despite sacrificing short term revenues, has proved to be the correct one in the 
long term (Cabo and Rebelo, 2010b).  
A high transformation ratio maximizes CCAM revenues (and, thus, CCAM net returns) 
but can also put the CCAM in a vulnerable situation, facing credit overdue and liquidity 
distress, especially in times of economic recession, when borrowers have more 
difficulty in recovering their credit, and with interbank competition for funds remaining 
intense, as in the present economic and financial crisis. Thus, an aggressive lending 
policy is a high-return, high-risk strategy. A profound knowledge of market conditions 
and of their customers, based on the concept of proximity, as in the CCAM case, is 
essential for success when adopting this strategy.  Therefore, Transformation ratio 
influence on CCAM failure is unpredictable. Credit overdue is expected to have a 
positive influence on CCAM failure probability. Credit and customer resources growth 
ratios are measures of CCAM competitive strength and market share and should present 
a negative influence.  
Banking is a highly demanding activity, where cost efficiency is crucial for success. 
Thus, excessive expenditure will certainly result in financial problems. As a rule, the 
expenditure items must always be under CCAM management control. Expenses ratio, 
Labour costs and Structural costs ratios are measures of CCAM cost efficiency, 
expressing their ability to exploit scale economies and to rationalize expenses, 
particularly, of CCAM management and organizational structures. These ratios are 
expected to positively influence CCAM probability of failure.  
Indebtedness and Debt to Equity ratios are measures of CCAM level of capitalization 
and leverage. Equity is the cheaper financing source that CCAM disposal, given their 
118 
non-profit nature; although it is difficult to CCAM obtain equity since they cannot 
publicly do so.  
Liquidity reflects the means available to CCAM to answer short term debt. A lack of 
liquidity indicates that CCAM can experience problems in performing their daily 
operations. A credit institution with “no money” is on track to failure. On the other 
hand, the CCAM legal regime in practice limits CCAM financial applications to 
deposits in other banks. Thus, contrary to other entities operating in the Portuguese 
banking system, CCAM excess of liquidity can be a real problem, particularly at 
present, as the 2009 accounts show. Indeed, European Central Bank measures to 
respond to the liquidity shortfalls of a number of banks (starved of funds as the 
refinancing markets seized up in the crisis) severely affect CCAM operating conditions. 
“In fact, the impact of the policy was much more negative for us than the crisis itself.… 
With euribor rates hitting a very low point, the Group’s operating conditions bore the 
brunt, both in the local Caixas and at the Caixa Central, since a very large part of the 
credit portfolio is based on an interest rate structure linked to these market references. 
Moreover, the profitability of the Group’s liquidity reserves was also stunted by the 
unnecessarily low interest rate policy.” (Crédito Agrícola, 2010: 6). For this reason, a 
positive influence of Liquidity ratio on CCAM failure probability would not be a 
surprise.  
Finally, the ratios in the 4th Group, the profitability ratios, are expected to present a 
negative influence on CCAM failure probability. For CCAM, profit is not an end but a 
means for survival. Despite being non-profit banks, CCAM survival depends on their 
ability to generate net returns to support their capital needs. However, if the insolvent 
CCAM suffer from a deeper income specialization than the solvent ones (and the 
authors’ understanding of the CCAM reality suggests this), Financial margin ratio can 
present a positive influence on CCAM failure probability.  
Table 5.5 includes the expected signs of the coefficients of the variables that can 
influence the probability of CCAM failure.  
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Table 5.5 - Expects signs of variable coefficients 
Group 1 - Operational Efficiency and Growth Group 2 – Leverage and Liquidity 
1. Intermediation Function ratio 
2. Transformation ratio  
3. Credit Overdue 
4. Credit Growth 
5. Customer Resources Growth  
+ 
+/- 
+ 
- 
- 
1. Liquidity  
2. Cash Flow 
3. Indebtedness 
4. Debt to Equity ratio 
+/- 
- 
+ 
+ 
Group 3- Cost Efficiency Group 4 – Return ratios 
1. Expenses ratio 
2. Labour costs   
3. Structural costs  
+ 
+ 
+ 
1. ROA 
2. ROSC 
3. Financial Margin 
- 
- 
+/- 
 
5.6 - Results 
To determine which of the 15 explanatory variables is the best predictor of failures and 
following the same procedure as Janot (2001), a stepwise procedure combining forward 
and backward elimination is applied. The model starts as a baseline model without any 
variable on it. The 15 indicators are considered one at a time, and added to the model if 
succeeding in the selection criterion based on a p-value of 5%. When a new variable is 
added to the model, the variables previously included are evaluated for exclusion, at 
10% significance level. The ones which fail are excluded. When no more variables can 
be added or removed, the algorithm stops.   
The stepwise procedure within the logistic regression and MDA selects among the 
independent variables the ones that contributed more to the CCAM insolvency in the 
study periods, and calculates the insolvency probability of each CCAM. If that 
probability is greater than 0.5 the model classifies the CCAM as insolvent, otherwise, as 
solvent. When comparing this classification with the observed status of the CCAM two 
types of error can occur: Type I Error occurs when the model classifies as solvent a 
CCAM that became insolvent during the period analysed; Type II Error occurs when the 
model classifies as insolvent a solvent CCAM. The greater the model accuracy, the 
more efficiency it presents in predicting CCAM failure. 
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In order to better assess the model accuracy, the sample (1,827 cases) was divided and 
approximately 70% of the insolvent CCAM were randomly selected48
The variable Total Assets was added to both models to control for CCAM size. 
 and used to create 
the logistic regression model. The remaining insolvent CCAM were used to validate the 
model results.  
 
5.6.1 - Logit model 
The resultant model of the LRA, using the Forward Stepwise method 49
Table 5.6 - LRA coefficients and significance level 
 with the 
Likelihood ratio statistics, selected only 6 among the 15 variables used in the estimation 
as predictors of CCAM failure. Table 5.6 reports the results of the logit model. 
Variable Β Std. Dev. Significance 
Level 
Constant -33.408 2.459 0.000 
Customers Resources Growth -3.976 1.178 0.001 
Credit Overdue  4.228 1.471 0.004 
Expenses ratio 2.127 0.453 0.000 
Structural Costs 1.444 0.591 0.015 
Indebtedness  30.536 2.568 0.000 
Financial Margin 26.474 3.718 0.000 
Total Assets 0,000 0,000 0.020 
 
All coefficients present the expected signs, and the only surprise is the absence of a 
profitability variable (ROA and ROCS). The model Nagelkerke pseudo r-squared 
statistic50
                                                          
48 A variable validate was created with values of it set in order to be randomly generated Bernoulli variates with 
probability parameter 0.7. 
 is 0.626.  
49 The logit model was also estimated with all variables included and tested against the step wise model, using the chi 
square test [difference between log-likelihood (-2LL)] models. The results of this test show that the step wise model 
holds statistically at 0.1significance level. 
50 Pseudo r-squared statistic has similar properties to the true r-squared statistic and measures the variability in the 
dependent variable. The pseudo r-squared statistics are based on comparing the likelihood of the current model to the 
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The results show that CCAM failure is more likely when the CCAM presents an 
increase in Credit Overdue. Similarly, the positive sign on Expenses Ratio and 
Structural Costs ratio implies that an improvement in cost efficiency is correlated with a 
fall in the relative probability of failure.  
Another important determinant of CCAM failure is Indebtedness. Its positive coefficient 
confirms the importance of equity funds to CCAM in order to assure their financial 
autonomy.  Finance experts often suggest that a corporation may increase its leverage 
ratio by borrowing money. As more as it borrows less equity it needs, so any profits or 
losses are shared among a smaller base and are proportionately larger as a result. Co-
operative leaderships facing difficulties in increasing CCAM equity often prefer to deal 
with an outside creditor instead of implementing strategies to increase members’ 
shareholdings. This policy has higher financial costs, diminishing the co-operative net 
returns and, in the long run, jeopardizes survival.  
Finally, the positive sign of the Financial Margin coefficient confirms the hypothesis 
that higher concentration in income sources increases the probability of CCAM failure. 
The accuracy in classification indicates how well the model performs. A good model 
should correctly identify a higher percentage of cases. Classifications based upon the 
cases used to create the model tend to be too “optimistic”, in the sense that their 
classification rate is inflated. Subset validation is obtained by classifying insolvent 
CCAM that were not used to create the model.  
Table 5.7 show the result of applying the model for the prediction of CCAM failure to 
the sample of CCAM used in the model estimation, and to the unselected ones. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
restricted model (one without any predictors). Larger pseudo r-square statistics indicate that more of the variation is 
explained by the model, from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. 
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Table 5.7 – LRA classification* of CCAM 
 
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
Selected  
Cases 
 
Percentage 
Unselected 
Cases 
 
Percentage 
Failure Failure 
No Yes No Yes 
Failure No 912 32 96.6 357 14 96.2 
Yes 125 238 65.6 50 97 66.0 
Overall Percentage   88.0   87.6 
Notes: * Cut value is 0.5. Cells on the diagonal are correct predictions. Cells off the diagonal are incorrect predictions. 
From the cases used to create the model, 912 of the 944 solvent CCAM are classified 
correctly and 238 of the 363 insolvent CCAM are classified correctly. Overall, 88% of 
the cases are classified correctly. The results in the Unselected Cases show that 87.6 
percent of these cases were correctly classified by the model, which suggests that, 
overall, the model is correct about four out of five times. 
As mentioned earlier, Type I Error occurs when the model classifies as solvent a CCAM 
that became insolvent during the period analysed. The Logit model misclassifies 
approximately 1/3 of the insolvent CCAM:  34.4% of the selected cases and 34% of the 
unselected. This is a far worse result, especially because it is a more costly error. The 
failure to signal a potentially insolvent CCAM leaves it out of vigilance and no 
correction measures will be adopted to prevent the failure. This is an error that 
jeopardises the validity of the model as an early system warning.  
Type II Error occurs when the model classifies as insolvent a solvent CCAM. This error 
results in misdirecting resources to assist a CCAM which is not in need of them. The 
model incurs this fault less than 4%, overall. 
Having developed a logit model of failure, the analysis turns to consider the results from 
MDA, so as to evaluate whether there are gains in predictive accuracy from using logit 
rather than MDA.  
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5.6.2 - Discriminant Analysis model 
The MDA model presents quite different results from the Logit model. MDA selects 2 
additional variables as predictors of CCAM failure: Transformation ratio and Liquidity. 
Table 5.8 reports the results for the MDA model. 
 
Table 5.8 - MDA classification coefficients 
Variable 
Failure 
No Yes 
Constant -25.835 -31.421 
Customer Resources Growth 8.447 7.016 
Transformation Ratio  35.550 33.724 
Credit Overdue  -13.881 -2.789 
Expenses Ratio 5.787 6.915 
Structural Costs 1.120 1.307 
Liquidity 4.491 3.594 
Indebtedness 19.832 22.902 
Financial Margin 47.139 63.077 
Total Assets 2.93E-008 3.35E-008 
 
The results of the MDA are similar to the ones obtained by the Logit model for the 
variables selected by both methods. The coefficient for Customer Resources Growth is 
smaller for Yes classification function, which means that CCAM with more ability to 
attract customer resources are less likely to fail. Similarly, CCAM with greater Credit 
Overdue, Expenses and Structural Costs ratios and Indebtedness are more likely to fail. 
The new variables added by MDA, Transformation Ratio and Liquidity, present both a 
positive influence on the probability of failure. The coefficient for Transformation ratio 
is smaller for Yes function, which indicates that CCAM with a more aggressive lending 
policy are less likely to fail. As mentioned earlier this is a less risk-adverse strategy, not 
usual in co-operative banks and, thus, this result is somewhat surprising. Liquidity 
coefficient also indicates that CCAM with higher liquidity are less likely to fail. Despite 
the low return options available to CCAM to apply their liquidity surplus; MDA prove 
that more is still better in the case of liquidity. 
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To sum up, insolvent CCAM have high credit overdue scores, and low rates of 
customers’ resources growth and low ability to convert deposits on loans. They are cost 
inefficient, with a high relation between expenses and revenues generated, and heavy 
structural costs. Moreover, they experience liquidity pressure; a weighty dependence on 
outside capital to finance their operations and a low level of revenue diversification. 
Consulting the Logit model results, we expect that the new variables selected by MDA 
can contribute to a better understanding of CCAM failure and, so, the MDA model has 
better score in the validation phase. Table 5.9 shows the model performance in 
predicting CCAM failure. 
Table 5.9 - CCAM classification* by the MDA model 
 
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
Selected  
Cases 
 
Percentage 
Unselected 
Cases 
 
Percentage 
Failure Failure 
No Yes No Yes 
Failure No 842 102 89.2 330 41 89.9 
Yes 150 213 58.7 55 92 62.6 
Overall Percentage   80.7   81.5 
Notes: * Cut  value is 0.5. Cells on the diagonal are correct predictions. Cells off the diagonal are incorrect predictions. 
From the cases used to create the model, 842 of the 944 solvent CCAM are classified 
correctly and 213 of the 363 insolvent CCAM are classified correctly. Overall, 80.7% of 
the cases are classified correctly.  The results in the Unselected Cases show that 81.5 
percent of these cases were correctly classified by the model. This is a slightly worse 
result than the Logit model.  
The real problem, Type I Error, is somewhat inflated by this model. MDA model 
misclassifies almost 2/5 of the insolvent CCAM:  41.3% of the selected cases and 37.4% 
of the unselected.  
Overall Logit and MDA models excel at identifying solvent CCAM. However, it does a 
poor job in classifying insolvent CCAM. Further investigation is needed to find another 
predictor in order to better explain CCAM failure event. 
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Having developed two models of failure, the analysis turns to consider the results from 
both to evaluate whether there are gains in predictive accuracy from using logit rather 
than MDA. Despite the contribution of 2 additional variables the MDA model is 
rejected in favour of the higher accurate Logit model51
 
.  
5.7 - Conclusions 
The CCAM failure models presented identified: Customer Resources Growth, 
Transformation Ratio, Credit Overdue, Expenses Ratio, Structural Costs, Liquidity, 
Indebtedness and Financial Margin as determinants of CCAM failure. These results 
require that CCAM take measures geared to boosting business, to shoring up the 
financial margin and the deposit base, to bolstering the complementary margin and to 
improving the credit recovery processes. Additionally, it is necessary to increase cost 
efficiency, by rationalizing structures and procedures consistent with reducing operating 
costs, without detriment to the quality of service provided. 
The low performance of the models in the identification of insolvent CCAM, point out 
to the need for more research to identify other predictor variables that would better to 
classify these CCAM.  Additionally, the adoption of a blind rule in the CCAM 
classification can lead to potential misclassification and this is a question that deserves 
further attention. The specificity of SICAM governance and control mechanisms, and 
the change in CCAM operating conditions, in pursuit of better size and more solid and 
professional structures, can raise the question of the definition of insolvency used in this 
study for some specific situations, especially regarding Central CCAM interventions 
and the merger or incorporation indicators.  The sample used in this study contains 115 
merged/incorporated CCAM classified as insolvent. It is logical to assume that not all of 
them were near to a bankruptcy state when engaged in merger activity. A deeper 
understanding of each merger/incorporation circumstances could help to avoid the risk 
of misclassification.   
                                                          
51 The Logit model was re-estimate to include all of the selected DMA variables. Then, a chi square test (difference 
between -2LL models) was applied to test if the coefficients for the variables added are simultaneously 0. The results 
of the test show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, at 0.1 of significance level, thus, indicating that the model 
with less variables holds statistically. 
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Furthermore, the study and testing of another approaches and models to better 
understand the CCAM failure event is recommended, namely, as stated, recently neural 
networks have been employed to the construction of prediction models and their ability 
to learn and self-improve can be useful to the study of CCAM failure. This is a matter 
for near future research.  
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The 2008 global crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis that follow it, have left 
no doubt about the relationship between banks and state. If a bank gets into troubles, 
taxpayers end up bailing it out, showing that banks are global and private in life or 
profits, and are national and public in death or loss. 
With their origins in the 19th century, the co-operative banks have been considered 
central players in regional economic and social development. However, they have 
remained notably underexposed both in scientific publications and in the press and 
technical reports, despite the success of the co-operative business model in the present 
increasingly competitive environment. Indeed, a large number of co-operative banks 
remain successful and healthy, gaining market share over the investor owned banks. 
In the last two decades, especially following the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent 
economic recession, co-operative members, staff, regulators and others stakeholders 
involved in the co-operative banking business became aware of the need to strengthen 
co-operatives governance, since this is crucial to safeguarding sound management and, 
ultimately, to the survival and sustainability of these organizations.  
In Portugal, the co-operative banks (CCAM) with 9052
Taking as a reference the Portuguese agricultural credit co-operatives (CCAM) and their 
integrated system (SICAM), the main objective of this research was to analyse the 
governance structure and financial robustness of co-operative banks. Specifically, the 
thesis is structured in order to answer the following questions:  
 local banks and a network of 750 
branches, spread throughout the country, provide financial services to less privileged 
customers, mainly to small-and medium-scale savers, farmers, SMEs and traders, 
located in hinterland regions. Their historical background and importance in boosting 
local development gives them a key role in regional economic growth.  
- What are the economic bases of co-operative banks?  
                                                          
52 85 associated to SICAM + 5 operating outside SICAM 
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- How does a particular regulatory framework affect co-operative banking activity? 
- What is the impact of the different governance mechanisms of co-operative banks 
on control management? 
- What are the explanatory factors of Portuguese co-operative bank failures? 
The answer to these four questions is formulated through four essays, each one 
described in a separate chapter.  
Chapter 2 includes a survey of the literature on the economic nature of co-operatives. 
Traditional explanations for establishing co-operatives have focused on banking market 
failures, particularly on asymmetric information, an issue well addressed by the co-
operative banks governance model, mainly due to its membership concept. The new 
institutional economics theory, namely, agency, property rights and transaction costs 
economics theories, is reviewed as a tool to analyse issues related to the governance of 
co-operative banking. 
The agency theory suggests that a co-operative bank experiences lower agency costs 
mainly due to the “peer-monitoring” mechanism, which reduces asymmetric 
information and monitoring costs, and to the alignment of members and management 
risk behaviour, as a consequence of the co-operatives’ mutuality feature. Moreover, a 
co-operative bank may present lower agency costs consequence of its more efficient 
internal decision-making process, since the chain of decisions is usually shorter than in 
investor owned firms (IOFs), reducing the level of separation between ownership and 
management. 
The literature on property rights suggests that the separation between owners and 
managers in a co-operative may be reduced by appointing only members as managers 
and fostering members’ participation at the annual general assembly and other business 
meetings.  
Finally, transaction costs economics indicate that the proximity of the bank and the 
peculiar nature of the customer relationship give the co-operative bank some 
transaction-cost-specific advantages relative to IOFs. 
Like any other firm governance structure model, the co-operative model has advantages 
and disadvantages. What is specific to the typical co-operative governance model is the 
presence of informal governance mechanisms, based on peer-monitoring among 
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members and on the extra-economic sanctions imposed on debtors, which may be 
weakened by increasing the type of membership and the territorial area where the co-
operative bank operates. Indeed, in the last decades, throughout the world, the co-
operative banks have been engaged in a process of consolidation, through mergers, 
strategic alliances and networks with other co-operative banks. In essence, the 
integrated network, by supporting individual co-operative bank management, activities 
and organization, allows them to benefit from scale and scope economies. Regarding 
governance, the existence of a central organization may decrease possible conflicts 
between management and members but the integrated system also present some specific 
agency and coordination problems which need to be efficiently addressed in order to 
ensure the correct running of the integrated co-operative banking system.  
Chapter 3 includes the answer to the question: How does a particular regulatory 
framework affect co-operative banking activity? To achieve this aim, the chapter 
presents a literature review on the regulatory framework and some historic data on the 
Portuguese co-operative credit system.  
The Co-operative Credit System in Portugal comprises only agricultural credit co-
operatives. Its present corporate format was created in 1911, but the genesis of 
Portuguese agricultural credit co-operatives goes back to the XVI century and can be 
regarded as a typical example of how public policy can influence the development of 
co-operative credit institutions.  
Having been developed in a top-down process, the CCAM depended on public support 
to carry out their mission and were often used to accomplish political goals. Indeed, 
CCAM were used to provide a public benefit to the rural economy and rural population. 
Until the middle of 1970s CCAM played a minor role in the Portuguese banking 
system. With the democratization of the country and its entry into the European Union 
in 1986, the CCAM became self-governing and were placed in the framework of a 
financing strategy for the development of the agricultural sector. So, during the later 
part of the 1980s CCAM activity showed a spectacular, if uncontrolled growth in terms 
of loans and customer deposits. In the 1990s, the creation of an integrated system of 
agricultural co-operative credit (SICAM), coupled with a restructuring and an intense 
merger process, allowed CCAM to improve their performance, rationalizing costs and 
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achieving efficiency and return levels similar to and even higher than other domestic 
banking institutions.   
The SICAM is made up of an integrated system of two types of cooperatives: the central 
and the individual (associated). Central CCAM is the pivotal institution in the Crédito 
Agrícola Group, with a remit that is the mainstay of the Group strategic global 
coordination and supervision and guidance of the associated CCAM. 
In terms of governance, Central CCAM is responsible for the coordination and control 
of all the associates’ operational processes, i.e., it is the guardian of the system with 
powers to intervene in the management of the associates and even replace their boards. 
In cases of gross mismanagement or fraud, the directors can be formally discharged by 
the Central CCAM. 
CCAM are regulated by the Portuguese legislation on cooperatives, and follow the 
traditional cooperative structure, with open membership, democratic control and 
restricted residual claims; and in their banking activity they are subject to regulations 
similar to those applied to the banking system as a whole.  
The CCAM increasingly face survival challenges, partly as a consequence of their co-
operative nature and regionally defined member-customers and product range 
restrictions, aggravated by the economic and financial crisis that Portugal is undergoing.  
Recently some legislative changes have been made in order to overcome some of these 
restrictions, but still CCAM leaders require for a wider range of CCAM activities, 
allowing them to compete on equal terms with IOF banks. Despite not having relevant 
toxic assets in their portfolio, CCAM felt the effects of the crisis, with their returns 
being downsized mainly due the negative influence of the liquidity booster measures 
adopted by monetary authorities. CCAM strong customer deposits base and their 
prudential credit management policy proved to be crucial in confronting these hard 
times. The CCAM 2011 annual accounts report shows return levels similar to those 
previous to the crisis, while most of the remaining bigger Portuguese banks show 
negative net returns, proving that CCAM performed better in confronting the crisis.  
Chapter 4 answer the question: What is the impact of different governance mechanisms 
of co-operative banks on control management? Benefiting from concepts provided by 
the agency theory approach, the chapter includes an analysis of the governance 
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mechanisms operational in the Portuguese integrated system of agricultural credit co-
operatives. Covering the period between 1995 and 2009, the relation between CCAM 
performance and several control mechanisms operating within SICAM is analysed via 
two multinomial logit models.  
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first identifies and describes CCAM 
corporate governance mechanisms. The CCAM associated to SICAM present a two-tier 
system of corporate governance (the individual and the system mechanisms), among 
which six different control mechanisms have been identified: (a) regulatory framework; 
(b) ownership structure; (c) internal monitoring, by board of directors and internal 
control and audit; (d) external monitoring by central organizations, debt-holders, and 
regulators; (e) “market” for corporate control; and (f) executive compensation.  
In the second part of the chapter, two MNL model are used to assess the efficiency of 
different control mechanisms in disciplining CCAM management.  In the definition and 
variables to include in the models, different CCAM control mechanisms are settled as a 
function of CCAM performance. Thus, the dependent variable assumes several category 
values according to different control mechanisms (No intervention; BoD partial 
turnover; Chairman turnover; BoD total turnover; Central CCAM intervention by 
nomination of an agent; Central CCAM intervention by nomination of provisory 
(interim) Directors; Merger/incorporation) while the independent variables were a set of 
CCAM performance measures regarding operational efficiency and growth, cost 
efficiency and capitalization and profitability.  
The results show that overall internal governance mechanisms (BoD turnover) are not 
related to the CCAM performance, which indicates a potential weakness of the CCAM 
internal control mechanisms. In contrast, external governance mechanisms are related to 
CCAM operational and cost efficiency indicators, highlighting the importance of this 
mechanism in disciplining CCAM management. Moreover, the results emphasize the 
value of the supervision task of Central CCAM in the performance of its associates.  It 
is also possible to infer that the robustness of the results could be improved if the effects 
of CCAM management and governing bodies’ remuneration and of debt-holder 
FGCAM monitoring in CCAM performance were analysed, which is a topic for further 
research. 
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While Chapter 4 focuses on the selection of possible efficient governance mechanisms, 
Chapter 5 pays attention to CCAM survival, bearing in mind the answer to the 
question: What are the explanatory factors of Portuguese co-operative bank failures? 
To assess the potential failure of CCAM as a function of financial/economical 
indicators, CCAM data from 1995 to 2009, and a logistic regression analysis (LRA) and 
a multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), are used.  
In these models insolvency is interpreted as multidimensional, a CCAM being 
categorized as insolvent when it meets at least one of the following criteria in a given 
year: (a) presents negative equity; (b) is subjected to a Central CCAM intervention or 
FGCAM restructuring operation; (c) is incorporated into (or merged with) another 
CCAM; and (d) is bankrupt for any reason. The CCAM failure event was translated to 
the models through the binary nature of the dependent variable. As explanatory 
variables a set of financial ratios were used, representing measures of profitability, 
financial leverage, liquidity, operating efficiency and growth, all of them factors 
frequently included in models predicting either financial distress or bankruptcy. 
The statistical CCAM failure models (LRA and MDA) identified: Customer Resources 
Growth, Transformation Ratio, Credit Overdue, Expenses Ratio, Structural Costs, 
Liquidity, Indebtedness and Financial Margin as determinants of CCAM failure. These 
results suggest that CCAM should take decisions geared to boosting business, to shoring 
up the financial margin and the deposit base, to bolstering the complementary margin 
and to improving the credit recovery processes. Additionally, it is necessary to increase 
cost efficiency, by rationalizing structures and procedures consistent with reducing 
operating costs, without lowering the quality of the service provided. However, the low 
performance of the models to identify the insolvent CCAM indicates the need for 
further research to identify other predictor variables that would better classify these 
CCAM.   
To sum up, the CCAM system plays a crucial role in the Portuguese banking system. Its 
co-operative nature and unique business approach makes the CCAM a powerful force 
for Portuguese economic recovery, working as a stabilizing factor in the banking 
industry and a booster to the regional development. As recognized in the literature on 
the topic, the co-operative governance model presents deficiencies in controlling agency 
conflicts, mainly resulting from its co-operative nature, which can jeopardize its 
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survival. Operating in network, the CCAM are able to improve the effectiveness of 
CCAM governance mechanisms and, consequently, their performance. The results 
highlight the importance of the supervision role of Central CCAM in the performance of 
its associates. Moreover, the analysis of CCAM failure emphasizes the importance of 
the diversifying CCAM income sources and of improving cost efficiency. These results 
support CCAM lobbying for the removal of product restrictions, in order to achieve 
better conditions to compete with IOF banks, at a time when these banks are reorienting 
their activities towards traditional banking activity, i.e., domestic retail banking, the 
usual business core of CCAM. 
Finally, we hope that this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the co-operative 
structure, behaviour and performance of CCAM, mainly in terms of governance and 
financial survival. We are aware that, in spite of though with strong interconnections 
between them, each chapter (essay) includes a partial approach to the theme that can be 
improved in future research. Thus, in the first place, a deeper study of CCAM internal 
governance mechanisms is vital to identify the causes of their inefficiency and to take 
the appropriate business measures to improve it. In this sense, the effectiveness of the 
board of directors, as one of internal governance mechanisms intended to ensure that the 
interests of members and managers are closely aligned, and to discipline or to remove 
ineffective management teams, should be object of the research. Board socio-economic 
diversity, such as gender and age, educational and professional background, and 
independence of directors are among the most significant issues relating to future Board 
research. Moreover, given the role of members both as suppliers of inputs (depositors), 
credit customers (borrower) and owners (shareholders), it is important to have a 
profound knowledge of the CCAM membership base, in order to understand its 
objectives and behaviour. Secondly, it is important to study the impact on the CCAM 
governance resulting from the application of the new equity requirements imposed on 
banking by the Basel Accords.  Finally, the study and testing of another methodologies 
and models to better understand the CCAM failure event is recommended, namely, as 
stated, recently neural networks have been employed to the construction of prediction 
models, and their ability to learn and self-improve can be useful to the study of CCAM 
failure. 
